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ABSTRACT
ARABIC INFLUENCES IN AQUINAS’S DOCTRINE OF 
INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES 
Max Herrera
Marquette University, 2010
 In contemporary literature, one can find much information concerning Thomas 
Aquinas’s doctrine of intelligible species. However, none of the literature takes into 
account how and why Aquinas developed his doctrine of intelligible species.  Often, it is 
purported that Aquinas is just following Aristotle.  However, this is not the case.  There 
are aporiae in the Aristotelian corpus, and those who followed Aristotle tried to resolve 
the intellection and hylomorphism aporia, an aporia that arose as a result of denying 
Platonic forms and affirming hylomorphism.  Among those who attempted to resolve this 
aporia were Avicenna and Averroes from whom Aquinas drew and developed his 
doctrine of intelligible species. Avicenna’s and Averroes’ influence on Aquinas’s 
doctrine of intelligible species is the focus of this dissertation. In addition, Aquinas’s 
hylomorphic doctrines and  natural and supernatural psychologies are explicated, and the 
influence of Avicenna and Averroes on Aquinas’s psychologies is highlighted.  Finally,  
the arguments posed by contemporary scholars as to whether Aquinas is a direct realist or 
a representationalist are reviewed in light of the Arabic contributions and Aquinas’s 
synthesis.
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Glossary of Subscripts
Hylomorphism and abstraction take on different meanings throughout the context of this 
paper. So, in order to assist the reader, this glossary may be detached and referred to 
throughout the dissertation.
Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism1 refers to the kind of hylomorphism that both Averroes and Aristotle 
maintain. That is to say, the soul is the form of the body, and it is educed from the 
potency of matter. Therefore, at death, the soul does not continue to exist, for it is solely 
a material form, not a spiritual form. This type of hylomorphism precludes intelligibles 
from being received into the body because whatever is received into the soul is also 
received in matter and particularized. This kind of hylomorphism is that which was 
received by the Neoplatonic tradition.
Hylomorphism2 refers to the kind of hylomorphism that is held by Avicenna. That is to 
say, the soul is not the form of the body. Instead, the form of corporeity is the form of the 
body. The form of corporeity is a material form that is bestowed on matter by the Agent 
Intellect. The soul, on the other hand, is a spiritual substance that is related to the body (a 
form-matter composite) by means of an accidental unity. This kind of hylomorphic unity 
also precludes the reception of intelligibles because whatever is received into the form of 
corporeity is also received in matter and particularized.
Hylomorphism3 refers to the kind of hylomorphism that is held by Aquinas concerning 
non-rational animals. That is to say, the soul is the form of the body, and it is educed 
from the potency of matter. Therefore, at death, the soul does not continue to exist, for it 
is solely a material form, not a spiritual form. This type of hylomorphism precludes 
intelligibles from being received into the body because whatever is received into the soul 
is also received in matter and particularized. Aquinas’s version is different from 
hylomorphism1 inasmuch as there a two-fold composition. That is to say, form and matter 
give rise to an essence, and essence and existence gives rise to the hylomorphic entity. 
Because the composition of essence and existence is ontology subsequent to the 
composition of form and matter, the soul is not immortal in this scenario.
Hylomorphism4 refers to the kind of hylomorphism that is held by Aquinas concerning 
rational animals. That is to say, the soul is the form of the body, and it is created by God. 
Therefore, at death, the soul does continue to exist, for it is a spiritual form. This type of 
hylomorphism does not preclude intelligibles from being received into the individual 
because there is an aspect of the soul that transcends the body although it is not separate 
from the body. This version is different from hylomorphism3 in the order of composition . 
Whereas hylomorphism3 has form and matter composed ontologically prior to the 
composition with existence, hylomorphism4 has form and existence composed 
ontologically prior to the composition of form with matter. In this scenario, the soul is 
immortal.
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Glossary of Subscripts
Abstraction
Abstraction1 refers to the process that separates form from matter in sensation.
Abstraction2 refers to an intentional form that has been separated from matter in 
sensation
In Avicenna
Abstraction3 refers to the process of forms flowing from the Agent Intellect into the 
human soul. This kind of abstraction is found only in Avicenna.
Abstraction4 refers to the intentional form that flows from the Agent Intellect to the 
individual soul. This kind of form is multiplied and is a means of cognition, not an object 
of cognition. In other words, this kind of form is not that which is known, but that 
through which something else is known. This kind of form is found only in Avicenna.
Abstraction5 refers to an intelligible in act that resides in the Agent Intellect. This kind 
of form cannot be multiplied and is an object of cognition. This is found only in 
Avicenna.
In Averroes
Abstraction3 refers to the process of separating a form in the imagination from matter to 
produce an intelligible in act that resides in the Material Intellect. The process takes an 
imaginative form as input and produces an intelligible form. In other words, it transfers 
the ratio
from one mode of being to another.
Abstraction4 refers to the intentional form that was produced by Agent Intellect and 
resides in the Material Intellect.
In Aquinas
Abstraction3 refers to the process of separating a form in the imagination from matter to 
produce an intelligible in act that resides in the possible intellect. The process takes an 
imaginative form as input and produces an intelligible form. In other words, it transfers 
the ratio
from one mode of being to another.
Abstraction4 refers to the intentional species  that was produced by the agent intellect 
and resides in the possible intellect. This form is a means of cognition; it is not an object 
of cognition except reflexively.
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CHAPTER 1
INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES: OBSTACLES OR AIDS TO DIRECT COGNITION
Introduction
Questions concerning what is knowledge and how do we know can be seen as 
early as Plato’s Theaetetus. These questions still plague philosophers today. Regardless 
of whether one is dealing with issues in contemporary philosophy of mind (e.g., type-
type, token-token, etc.) issues, or the role of sensible species in medieval psychology,1 
inevitably obstacles arise when we try to given an account as to how we know. The role 
of intermediaries in the acquisition of knowledge is such an obstacle. Those who 
maintain that intermediaries are representations and are objects of cognition deny that 
things can be known as they are in themselves (i.e., only representations can be known).2 
Those who hold this view will be referred to as representationalists in this dissertation. 
Those who maintain that intermediaries do not preclude knowing things in themselves 
will be referred to as direct realists.3 Similarly, obstacles can be seen in the psychology of 
  
 1 
———————————
1. Robert Pasnau, “Id Quo Cognoscimus,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval 
and Early Modern Philosophy, Editted by Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Karkkainen 
(2008), pp. 131–50; Robert Pasnau, “What is Cognition?  A Reply to Some Critics,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 3 (Summer 2002): pp.483–90; John 
P. O’Callaghan, “Aquinas, Cognitive Theory, and Analogy: A Propos of Robert Pasnau’s 
Theory of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 76 (2002): pp. 451–82.
2. Gary Gutting, “Rorty,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd Edition, 
edited by Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 278.
3. John Heil, “Direct Realism,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd 
Edition, edited by  Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
237–38.
Thomas Aquinas, and one of the main obstacles is the intelligible species. The intelligible 
species seems to be an unnecessary intermediary that is affirmed by Aquinas. In addition, 
the concept, like the intelligible species also seems to be an unnecessary intermediary. As 
a result of affirming these “intermediaries,” some contemporary philosophers of medieval 
studies maintain that Aquinas is a representationalist. That is to say, these philosophers 
maintain that Aquinas held the position that we can only know our internal impressions 
or internal sensations so that we only know things as they appear to us; we cannot know 
things as they are in themselves. In contradistinction, other contemporary philosophers of 
medieval studies maintain that Aquinas is a direct realist. That is to say, these 
philosophers maintain that Aquinas held the position that we know things as they are in 
themselves.
The primary objective for this dissertation is to show how the doctrine of 
intelligible species arose and why intelligible species are necessary to Aquinas’s 
epistemology. My secondary objective is to show that Aquinas drew on Avicenna and 
Averroes to develop his natural epistemology and his super-natural epistemology.4 My 
last objective is to examine cursorily the modern debate as to whether Aquinas is a direct 
realist or a representationalist in light of my primary and secondary objectives.5 
In this chapter, I consider the positions taken on Aquinas by two schools of 
interpreters whom I call the representationalists versus the direct realists. After 
considering their assertions, I shall then look at how Aquinas may have contributed to the 
present misunderstanding. In light of Aquinas’s contribution to the current 
 2 
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4. Whereas Aquinas’s natural epistemology accounts for how we know things in 
the natural world, Aquinas’s supernatural epistemology accounts for how we know things 
beyond the natural world (e.g., prophesy and the beatific vision).   
5. In a non-pejorative manner,  I will label those who assert that Aquinas is a 
representationalist as the representationalists, and I will label those who assert that 
Aquinas is a direct realist as the direct realists.
misunderstanding, I consider Aquinas’s major sources (Averroes, Avicenna, and 
Augustine) to defend my conclusion that none of his major sources held an intelligible 
species doctrine. Although Aristotle is a major source who did not hold an intelligible 
species doctrine, I defer my discussion of Aristotle until chapter two because I examine 
Aristotle’s contribution in light of his response to Plato.
 In chapter two, I examine Plato and the “Aristotelian aporia,” a constructive 
dilemma that befuddled Aristotelians until Aquinas. In chapter three, I show that 
Avicenna and Averroes tried to resolve the Aristotelian aporia by grabbing different 
horns of the constructive dilemma. In chapter four, I argue that Aquinas resolves the 
Aristotelian aporia by grabbing both horns of the constructive dilemma, and by following 
Avicenna and Averroes, he develops his supernatural epistemology. Finally, in the fifth 
and final chapter, I summarize what has been accomplished, highlighting the important 
contributions of Avicenna and Averroes to the development of the new teachings of 
Aquinas and the reasoning that grounds those teachings. I then conclude by responding to 
the concerns of contemporary interpreters of Aquinas. With that said, let us examine how 
some representationalists understand Aquinas.
Aquinas According to the Representationalists
Among the representationalists are scholars such as Gyula Klima, Robert Pasnau, 
Houston Smit, Claude Pannacio, and Fernand Van Steenberghen. Although they agree 
that the direct objects of cognition are representations, there are nuances among their 
views.
Let us begin with Klima, whose account allows one to introduce some of the 
terminology of Aquinas. For Klima, “a representation is a form of a represented object or 
objects, existing in the thing representing the object or objects in question.”6 There is a 
 3 
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6. Gyula Klima, “Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of Mental 
Representation,” in Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, 
vol. 4 (New York, 2004), 4:4, 
formal identity between the thing existing in reality and that which exists in the mind 
asserts Klima since the intelligible species “is universal not in its being, for it is a 
singular act inherent in an individual mind, but in its mode of representation, insofar as it 
represents several individuals in respect of what is common to them all.”7 For Klima, a 
representation is not epistemologically problematic because the formal unity between the 
knower and the known is based on a relationship of formal causality. Moreover, the 
relationship of formal causality between the cause (i.e., in the prime case, the material 
thing existing in the world) and the effect (i.e., the intelligible species in the intellect) is 
grounded in some necessary relationship; namely, if there is a form in the knower, there 
must be some form in reality on which it depends. Klima writes:
 [I]n the earlier model (via antiqua), the formal unit of concept and object, that is, 
the sameness of information content, could secure a logically necessary 
connection between them, even if the entities carrying the same information 
content are themselves contingent and contingently related. . . . But on the newer 
model (via moderna) concept and objects cannot be characterized as formally 
identical, whence they become merely contingently related entities without some 
logically necessarily identical information content.8
In other words, Klima seems to imply that in the earlier model, the information content 
(i.e., the form) existed under various modalities of being. The idea of a form existing 
under various modes of being is a bit recondite, but it should not be to strange to us. 
Consider that a score of music, a DVD, and a hard disk all have the same song, yet how 
the song exists is different. In the score, only notes exist. On the hard disk, the song is 
stored as binary read-writable bits, and on the DVD, the song is stored as binary read-
only bits. Furthermore, when the song is actually played, it exists ephemerally in the air.9 
That is why Klima can assert that representation is not epistemologically problematic 
 4 
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[Continued from previous page]
HTTP://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM4/PSMLM4.pdf.
7. Klima, “Medieval Mental Representation,” p. 5.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
unless one denies the Thomistic notion of analogy of being; those who deny the analogy 
of being have
no way to talk about the formal sameness of these acts and their objects, for there 
is no way to talk about the common information content of each as the direct 
object of some intellectual act of cognition. The intentionality of mental 
representation in their case therefore cannot be analyzed in terms of similarity or 
causality, whence it is reduced at best to some simple, unanalyzed feature of a 
mental concept, sometimes described as ‘indifferent representation.’ But this 
‘indifferent representation’ cannot specify any formal aspect of the objects it is 
supposed to represent that would secure the logically necessary formal unity 
between concept and object.10
The notion of “analogy of being” is also foreign to those who do not study Aquinas, so 
let us briefly examine what is meant by “analogy of being.” In Thomistic metaphysics, all 
being is analogical. That is to say, were being equivocal or univocal, one would be lead 
back to Parmenidian monism.11 The only other choice is that being is analogical. By 
maintaining that being is analogical, one may have a multiplicity of beings as well as a 
formality existing under various modes of being. However, if one denies analogy of 
being, then the same formality cannot be spoken of as existing under different modalities. 
Thus, there could be no formal sameness between the knower and the known in one’s 
account. Thus, a denial of the analogy of being entails the dismissal of a formal identity 
between the knower and the known. According to Klima, this opens the door for 
skepticism: “ ‘demonic’ deception becomes a logical possibility, opening up the way to 
all the epistemological troubles of modern philosophy.”12 For Klima, the intelligible 
 5 
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10. Klima, “Medieval Mental Representation,” p. 7.
11. Parmenides argued that two things can either differ by being or non-being.  
They cannot differ by non-being, for there would be no difference between them.  
Furthermore, they could not differ by being because being was common to both.  
Consequently, it follows that there can only be one being.  Parmenides presupposed that 
all being was univocal.   In contradistinction to Parmenides, one could assert that being is 
equivocal, but the outcome would be the same, monism.  This is the case because if there 
were one being, and all other beings were totally other than this being, they would not be.
12. Klima, “Medieval Mental Representation,” p. 7.
species serves as a causal explanation for the formal likeness between the knower and the 
known. However, for Klima, what is present in the intellect is the intelligible species. The 
intellect does not have direct access to the material world; the only material thing to 
which the intellect has access is the phantasm. Thus, Aquinas, according to Klima, is a 
representationalist.13
Robert Pasnau agrees that Aquinas must be understood as a representationalist. 
Pasnau states, “Aquinas shares the presupposition . . . that the immediate and direct 
objects of cognitive apprehension are our internal impressions. His position on this 
question is subtle and interesting. But it is not radically distinct from modern theories.”14 
Yet, Pasnau disagrees with Klima when it comes to formal identity. He asserts:
So formal identity seems relevant to direct realism only if species are somehow 
themselves apprehended. I don’t think that saying this is enough to end discussion 
of the identity doctrine, because there is a sense in which Aquinas does treat 
species as the objects of cognition . . .But we should notice that, even if the 
identity doctrine gives us a way to reject representationalism, this still isn’t going 
to help us refute the associated skeptical difficulties . . .Because the species is 
identical with the object, apprehending the species is apprehending the object. 
This line of argument, however, rests on an invalid move. The argument assumes 
that we can substitute identical objects into claims about perceiving and 
apprehending while preserving the truth of those claims. . . the identity of knower 
and known is an embarrassment for Aquinas when he takes up the problem of 
whether sensible and intelligible species are the objects of cognition. . . . Formal 
identity does not help Aquinas with the epistemological problem of getting from 
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13. Gyula Klima, “Intentional Transfer in Averroes, Indifference of Nature in 
Avicenna, and the Issue of Representationalism of Aquinas,” Ancient and Medieval 
Conference (Fordham University, 2005), p. 3: “In this [pre-Ockhamist] framework, there 
are intermediary objects between cognitive acts and their ultimate objects. Indeed, there 
can be multiple intermediary objects between a cognitive act and its ultimate objects, as 
Aquinas certainly takes it to be the case in intellectual cognition, where an act of thought 
uses an intelligible species to form a concept to represent a common nature that in turn 
exists individualized in the ultimate objects of this act of thought, namely, in the 
members of the species, some of which provided the sensory information, the phantasms, 
from which their intelligible species was abstracted. So, if what makes someone a 
representationalist is the mere positing of intermediary objects, then Aquinas is certainly 
“guilty” on several counts.”  [emphasis added]   For Klima, representationalism is benign 
because he affirms analogy of being.
14. Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas On Human Nature (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 308.
our ideas and impressions to the external world.15
Formal identity, according to Pasnau, may be able to support direct realism only if the 
intelligible species are objects that are cognized. However, contrary to Klima’s assertion, 
formal identity does not safeguard against skepticism because one has no way of 
comparing the intelligible species with the thing existing in extra-mental reality. In other 
words, “Formal identity does not help Aquinas with the epistemological problem of 
getting from our ideas and impressions to the external world.”16
Now, of course, one may think that Pasnau has confused second intentions, the 
intellect reflecting on its act of understanding, with first intentions, the intellect’s 
grasping of the sensible thing by means of abstractions.17 For Aquinas’s epistemology 
seems to be aimed at giving an empiricist account of how the world is known. Yet, if one 
looks at Pasnau’s understanding of Aquinas, it becomes evident why Pasnau is concerned 
with trying to get from our ideas to the external world. Pasnau writes: 
I now want to show Aquinas intends nothing less than to affirm Augustine’s 
theory and place it at the very heart of his own account of intellective cognition. 
Aquinas’s commitment to divine illumination is a consequence of the way he 
understands the opening words of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. . . For, as is 
said in Posterior Analytics I, “all intellectual teaching and learning is brought 
about through pre-existing cognition.” (InDA III.10.185.-192) Aquinas takes this 
to entail that knowledge cannot start up ex nihilo, and that the human intellect, if 
left unaided, would be incapable of having any knowledge” . . . Aquinas can still 
deny that we have innate knowledge. But on his view, we must possess the innate 
capacity to see the truth of certain principles. If our mind were entirely blank, our 
education could never begin. . . . In this sense, Aquinas is even willing to speak of 
the soul’s having a prior knowledge of everything that it knows. . . . In a way, 
Plato was right: we do have what amounts to innate knowledge. . . . So much for 
empiricism.18
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15. Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 300–03 [emphasis added]
16. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, p. 303.
17. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston: Center for 
Thomistic Studies, 1985 reprint), pp. 237–39.
18. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas On Human Nature, pp. 307–09.
According to Pasnau’s reading of Aquinas, Aquinas is following Augustine, and in doing 
so, Aquinas is maintaining some form of divine illumination. Consequently, if ideas are 
in some fashion innate, albeit in an inchoate fashion, then the project does become 
understanding how these ideas correspond to extra-mental reality. One would have to 
rely on some other principle such as divine beneficence to safeguard that one’s concept is 
indeed veridical. The demonic deception that Descartes and Klima speak about becomes 
logically possible given Pasnau’s reading of Aquinas.
The notion that our ideas are provided by God and exist in some inchoate fashion 
is not something held only by Pasnau. Houston Smit’s writes:
the intelligible forms that come to inform our intellects are not propagated to our 
souls through our senses. Indeed, they are not present in any sensible cognition. 
They are, rather, forms produced through our share in the divine spiritual light. 
This connatural light of our souls produces these forms . . . . Moreover, it is 
capable of doing so [producing the forms] only because all scientia pre-exists in it 
[the soul] virtually and universally, in partial active potency.19
For Smit, intelligible species and forms are not things that are derived from sensation 
because intelligible forms are not present in sensation at all. Thus, the connatural light by 
which humans participate in the divine produces these forms in our intellect. Moreover, it 
is not the case that these forms are produced ex nihilo; instead, these forms already exist 
in our soul (i.e., in the agent intellect) in “partial active potency.” In other words, our 
concepts are innate, and they exist in an inchoate fashion in the agent intellect. The role 
of the agent intellect is to illumine our intellect so that we can see what is already present 
in it. Thus, the content of intellection and the light by which one sees these intelligible 
forms are both given to us by God. Similar to Pasnau’s account, our intellect would only 
be aware of intelligible forms, and the veridical nature of concepts to reality would 
depend again on a principle such as divine beneficence in order to avoid demonic 
skepticism.
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Claude Pannacio makes it clear that neither the intelligible species nor the concept 
is the nature of the thing existing in reality, even though Aquinas says that the natures of 
things are known in the intellect. As a result, Pannacio concludes that the intelligible 
species and the concept have a relationship of similitude with the nature in a material 
thing; it is via knowing similitudes (i.e., representations) that the nature is known. 
Consequently, according to Pannacio, “Aquinas’s representationalism thus turns out to be 
incompatible with direct realism after all.”20 
 Last, but certainly not least, Fernand van Steenberghen says:
It is again the natural orientation of the intellect toward the real which makes 
possible a certain knowledge of the singular [thing]. Not a direct knowledge 
because the material individual (l’ individu materiel), which owes its 
individuation to the material . . . is not intelligible to us. But we are able to attain 
it indirectly by a return to cerebral images which represent the singular [thing] . . . 
As an immaterial and immanent, the act of the intellect is completely conscious: 
the first object of thought is the real [thing] delivered by the senses.21 
 For Van Steenberghen, the only cognitive object that is ontologically present to the 
intellect is the phantasm, and by means of the phantasm, which represents the singular, 
one has access to the real. Therefore, the intellect does not know things existing outside 
the mind directly because the matter in a hylomorphic composite precludes the intellect’s 
ability to grasp the intelligibility of material objects. In other words, by means of the 
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20. Claude Pannacio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation,” in Ancient and 
Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 
2001), p. 200.
21. Fernand Van Steenberghen, Le Thomisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1992), p. 84: C'est encore l'orientation naturelle de l'intelligence vers le reel qui 
rend possible une certaine connaissance intellectuelle du singulier. Non pas une 
connaissance directe, car 1'individu materiel, qui doit son individuation à la materiel... 
n'est pas intelligible pour nous. Mais nous pouvons l'atteindre indirectement par un 
retour aux images cerebrales (phantasmata), qui represent le singulier....Acte immateriel 
et immanent, l'acte d'intelligence est pleinement conscient : le premier objet de la pensee 
est le reel livré par les sens. [emphasis added]
phantasm (a representation), the intellect knows singular, material objects, which are 
otherwise unavailable to the intellect.
One can clearly see that the representationalists agree that the human intellect 
cannot grasp extra-mental reality directly (i.e., only representations are present to the 
human intellect, and by means of these representation, one is made aware of the external 
world). For Klima and van Steenberghen, this is not problematic because they maintain 
that formal causality provides the ontological grounds that safeguard the veridical nature 
of knowing. For Pasnau and Smit, formal causality does not safeguard anything because, 
albeit in an inchoate fashion, concepts are innate to the human intellect by virtue of 
divine illumination. For them, Divine illumination, however, opens the door to demonic 
skepticism, and Aquinas has failed adequately to give an account explaining how our 
concepts or internal impressions correspond to reality. Pannacio make the ontological 
distinction between the nature of a thing that is intrinsic to a hylomorphic entity, and the 
concept of intelligible species, which is intrinsic to the intellect. Whereas the former 
exists as a substantial form in the extra-mental material entity, the latter exists as an 
accidental form in an immaterial intellect. Consequently, they cannot be the same thing. 
Thus, what is presented to the intellect is something other than, though similar to, the 
nature of the thing, a representation.
 Although the representationalists agree that only representations are directly 
present to the intellect, they disagree as to the source of knowledge. Those who maintain 
some kind of formal causality will affirm that knowledge about the world comes from the 
world, whereas the group that denies formal causality will affirm that knowledge about 
the world comes from God by means of Divine illumination. Regardless of their 
difference, they would all affirm that Aquinas is not a direct realist.
Aquinas According to the Direct Realists
In contradistinction to the representationalists, the direct realists affirm that 
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Aquinas’s epistemology is such that we know things outside of the mind. That is to say, 
humans are not limited to knowing only internal representations and images. Among the 
direct-realists, one can find scholars such as Joseph Owens, Eleanore Stump, Etienne 
Gilson, Anthony Kenny, Norman Kretzmann, John O’Callaghan, and Lawrence Dewan. 
Joseph Owens maintains that Aquinas is a direct realist. He affirms:
By its very nature it has to call upon much knowledge that has been attained in 
the sciences and in other philosophical disciplines. And by its nature as human 
cognition it shows why the myth of an obligatory direct bearing upon ideas, 
sensations, or sense data different from real existents, may today be exorcized 
from an acceptable philosophic procedure.22
For Owens, human cognition does not immediately pertain to ideas, sensations, or sense 
data (i.e., representations); rather, human cognition is directed towards real existents. 
Yet, Owens affirms:
The concept . . . is something that is produced by the activity of intellection, while 
the thing known in it is not so produced but is presupposed. The concept is 
produced as a similitude of the thing in order that the thing itself may be known in 
and through it. Its whole purpose . . . is to enable you to know something else. Its 
knowable content is the same as the thing itself.23
Owens’ statements appear contradictory. On one hand, he is affirming that one knows 
real existents, and on the other hand, he is affirming that the concept (i.e., a 
representation) is produced by the intellect. The purpose of the concept to allow one to 
know the real existent. The representationalist camp would say that if the concept is a 
similitude (i.e., a representation), then it is the concept that is known, not the thing 
existing in reality. Moreover, the representationalist would affirm that the concept stands 
in the way between the thing in reality and the knower. That is to say, the concept is an 
intermediary that precludes knowing reality. Nevertheless, for Owens, the concept 
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22. Joseph Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston: Center for 
Thomistic Studies, 1992), p. 53.
23. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 243.
enables one to know reality.24
For Owens, the concept is necessary for three reasons. First, the concept serves as 
the ontological basis for intellectual memory for things that have no real existence. The 
human imagination, a power residing in the brain, is able to construct images that it has 
never seen. For example, one may imagine a golden mountain although one has never 
seen one. Further, the intellect has to have the ability to produce a similitude that 
corresponds to what one has imagined.25 Second, the concepts are the ontological basis in 
which the intelligible content is stored in intellectual memory.26 According to Owens, 
“when intellection ceases, the concept in which it [intellection] took place remains stored 
in the intellectual memory.”27 Third, concepts are necessary because the intellect knows 
things as abstractions (i.e., without matter or the concrete conditions of matter). “Human 
intellect is of such a nature that it has to produce an intelligible similitude in which it may 
know its object.”28 For example, whereas Socrates is a person who is sitting, the intellect 
is able to form an abstraction regarding the one person who is sitting under various 
concepts. For example, one may consider “person”, “sitting”, “Socrates”, “man”, and 
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24. Owens seems to focus primarily on the concept and not on the intelligible 
species.  This may be the case because the intelligible species is not knowable directly 
but only reflexively.  Owen states:
Species intelligibilis is also used by St. Thomas for the form that actuates the 
intellect in first actuality and is not immediately known except by reflection: 
“Therefore the intelligible species that is the principle of the intellectual operation 
necessarily differs from the word of the heart that is formed through the 
operations of the intellect although the word itself can be called an intelligible 
species or form, as constituted by the intellect...” Joseph Owens, An Elementary 
Christian Metaphysics, pp. 242–43.
25. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 243.
26. Ibid., p. 244.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
“animal”. In other words, what is united in reality can be considered under multiple 
distinct abstractions in the intellect. Thus, each abstraction would require a concept 
which can be inspected by the intellect. Although Owens denies that one primarily knows 
internal objects inasmuch as he affirms that one knows real existents, how does he avoid 
the charge that the intellect is knowing the concept, an internal object with the 
aforementioned three roles?29
Owens asserts that “cognitional similitude or image” (i.e., the concept) should not 
be conceived in the manner of a material picture or a mirror.30 Yet, he gives an example 
of one looking at a guard through a mirror, and then later realizing that one was not 
looking at the guard but at a reflection of a guard in a mirror. In other words, Owens’ 
analogy is intended to imply that by looking at the concept, one is oblivious of the 
concept and only cognizant of the content that the concept makes present to the intellect. 
Unfortunately, this analogy, which is intended to support direct realism, can be used to 
demonstrated that the basis for direct realism is an illusion in which one confuses the 
representation (i.e., the concept), for the real thing. Moreover, in the example that is 
given, particulars are the basis for the example, but the intellect supposedly only has 
universals present to it. As Owens acknowledges, the very reason for abstraction was to 
remove the particularity to get at the intelligible content that is supposed to be universal 
and necessary.31 Owens admits that the example is imperfect.32 However, it is difficult to 
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29. The notion of how one knows one self and what constitutes  “self” are beyond 
the scope of the dissertation.  In this context,  “the denial of internal objects” means that 
real existents are the object of intellection as opposed to perception, sense data,  or 
concepts.
30. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 244.
31. Ibid., p. 235.
32. Ibid., p. 244.
see how he can maintain a direct realist position when the concept is interposed between 
the thing in reality and the knower.
Concerning Owens’ position, Eleanore Stump writes:
In many passages, Aquinas is concerned to rule out the possibility that the
intelligible form is itself the object of cognition in ordinary cases of cognition,
in which people cognize external particulars. In his recent book Cognition : An 
Epistemological Inquiry (Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992), 
Joseph Owens is similarly concerned to show that the direct object of the intellect 
is not an intelligible form but some extramental object. He is so concerned to rule 
out the possibility of skepticism, however, that he goes to the other extreme and 
maintains that for Aquinas there is unmediated awareness of things in the world. 
Aquinas 's position seems to stand somewhere between the position Owens 
ascribes to him and the position Aquinas himself is ruling out. Owens is right to 
hold that the object of ordinary intellective cognition is part of extramental reality 
and not some internal state of the intellect. But, on the other hand, it takes a 
process on the part of the intellect to reach the state in which it has cognition of 
some extramental object, and that process is mediated by intelligible forms. Pace 
Owens, then, an intelligible form is, therefore, the medium between the cognizer 
and the thing cognized . The nature of Aquinas's position can be seen clearly, e .g 
., in QQ 7 .1 .133
In the aforementioned text, Stump points out that Aquinas is a direct realist. However, 
the process by which one comes to direct knowledge of real existents requires some type 
of intermediaries, intelligible forms, and Owens seems to be denying that intermediaries 
are necessary. However, Owens is not denying that there are intermediaries; rather, he 
seems to be denying that we only know intermediaries; he may also deny that we must 
know the intermediary prior to knowing real existents. The second denial seems a little 
more difficult to maintain based on his discussion of concepts and their roles in human 
intellection because the concept must be first known before one knows what exists in 
extramental reality. Stump then quotes a text from QQ . 7. 1.1 to support the statement 
that Aquinas’s epistemology does use intermediaries and she translates the text as 
follows:34
One should know that in intellective vision there can be three sorts of 
intermediary . . . [The second sort of] intermediary is that by which it sees, and 
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33. Eleanore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 509.
34. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales (2003), 7.1.1.
this is the intelligible species, which determines the possible intellect and is 
related to the possible intellect as the species of a rock is related to the eye [which 
sees the rock] . . . Consequently, the first and the second [sort of] intermediary do 
not produce mediated vision, for a person is said
to see a rock immediately, although he sees it by means of a species of the
rock received in the eye and by means of light.35
Stump has translated the Latin word “medium” as intermediary. However, the same word 
may be translated “means” or “instrument.”36 In this context,  “means” seems more 
appropriate, for Aquinas says:
I respond that it ought to be said that undoubtingly that the divine essence in 
heaven [in patria] may be seen immediately by the glorified intellect . . . In proof 
of this, it ought to be known that there are threefold means in intellectual vision. 
One under which the intellect is, and sees what disposes it for seeing, and this is 
the light of the agent intellect in us that is related to our possible intellect just as 
the light of the sun to the eye. Another means is that by which one sees, and this 
is the intelligible species which determines the possible intellect; it is related to 
the possible intellect just as the species of the stone to the eye. The third means is 
that in which something is seen; this is something though which we come to 
cognition of another just as we see the cause in the effect or [when] something 
else in one of similar things or contrary things, we see the other; this means is 
related to the intellect just as the mirror is to corporeal vision in which the eye 
sees something else. The first and second means do not cause a mediated vision: 
for someone is said to see the stone immediately although he sees through the 
species received in the eye. [This is] because by means of the light vision is not 
carried into these means just as into visible things, but rather though these media, 
one is taken into a visible thing, which is outside the eye. But in the third [mean] 
brings about mediated vision. For vision is drawn to the mirror as the visible 
thing, by which means it receives a species of the thing seen in the species or in 
the mirror; similarly the intellect knows the cause in the effect, it is drawn to the 
effect as an intelligible from which it moves into cognition of the cause.37
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35. Stump, Aquinas, pp. 509–10.
36. Roy. J. Deferrari, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas (Baltimore: The John D. 
Lucas Printing Co., 1949), p. 677.
37. Aquinas, QQ, 7.1.1: Respondeo. Dicendum, quod absque dubio tenendum est, 
quod divina essentia in patria immediate ab intellectu glorificato videatur. Ad cuius 
evidentiam sciendum est, quod in visione intellectiva triplex medium contingit esse. 
Unum, sub quo intellectus videt, quod disponit eum ad videndum; et hoc est in nobis 
lumen intellectus agentis, quod se habet ad intellectum possibilem nostrum, sicut lumen 
solis ad oculum. Aliud medium est quo videt; et hoc est species intelligibilis, quae 
intellectum possibilem determinat, et habet se ad intellectum possibilem, sicut species 
lapidis ad oculum. Tertium medium est in quo aliquid videtur; et hoc est res aliqua per 
quam in cognitionem alterius devenimus, sicut in effectu videmus causam, et in uno 
If “intermediary” implies that something must be known before knowing something else, 
then neither the agent intellect nor the intelligible species are intermediaries because 
according to Aquinas, there are no forms in the agent intellect that can be cognized, and 
an intelligible species is not cognized immediately.38 Moreover, although the intelligible 
species is cognizable, it is cognized only by means of reflection. That is to say, it does 
not have to be known before one knows the nature of some thing although it must be 
received into the intellect before knowing the nature of some thing. Hence, neither the 
agent intellect nor the intelligible species is an intermediary. On the other hand, if 
“intermediary” implies “media or means that are necessary conditions for cognition,” 
then the agent intellect and the intelligible species are “intermediaries.” The point is that 
without defining what constitutes an intermediary, one should avoid translating 
“medium” as “intermediary” because the latter term has a connotation that may imply 
some form of representationalism. However, it seems that the point of this text is not to 
establish what constitutes an intermediary, or whether intermediaries are being used; 
rather, Aquinas is contrasting knowing things immediately or knowing things mediately. 
His point is that in heaven, God will be known immediately by the intellect (i.e., without 
any other intermediaries like intelligible species) though he does not elaborate here how 
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similium vel contrariorum videtur aliud; et hoc medium se habet ad intellectum, sicut 
speculum ad visum corporalem, in quo oculus aliquam rem videt. Primum ergo medium 
et secundum non faciunt mediatam visionem: immediate enim dicitur aliquis videre 
lapidem, quamvis eum per speciem eius in oculo receptam et per lumen videat: quia visus 
non fertur in haec media tamquam in visibilia, sed per haec media fertur in unum visibile, 
quod est extra oculum. Sed tertium medium facit visionem mediatam. Visus enim prius 
fertur in speculum sicut in visibile, quo mediante accipit speciem rei visae in specie vel 
speculo; similiter intellectus cognoscens causam in causato, fertur in ipsum causatum 
sicut in quoddam intelligibile, ex quo transit in cognitionem causae.
38. Thomas Aquinas, Qvestiones dispvtate de anima (Rome: Leonine 
Commission, 1996), q.5, a. 9: intellectus agens non sufficit per se ad reducendum 
intellectum possibilem perfecte in actum, cum non sint in eo determinate rationes 
omnium rerum, ut dictum est.
this will be the case. Furthermore, the example that Aquinas gives for knowing things 
immediately is that of natural knowing. Thus, Aquinas is asserting that our knowledge of 
the natural world is immediate albeit by use of certain media, means or tools.
As does Stump, Gilson asserts that our knowledge of the world is immediate, and 
he also asserts that there must be intermediaries. He writes:
In every order of knowledge there exists a subject, an object, and an intermediary 
between the subject and the object. This holds for the most immediate types of 
sensation . . . and it is more and more manifest as we go up the ladder of 
knowledge. . . .The species has to play this role . . . . But it is important to 
understand that the species of an object is not one being and the object another. It 
is the very object under the mode of species.39 
Gilson affirms that we have direct awareness of those things before us, but the species 
serve as intermediaries between the knower (the subject) and the known (the object). 
Having admitted that there are intermediaries, Gilson still wants to avoid 
representationalism, and so he says that the species is the very same object under the 
mode of species. Although the phrase “mode of speciei” is used by Aquinas, nevertheless 
it is not used in the sense that Gilson affirms.
Aquinas writes: “For just as every action is according to the mode of a form by 
which an agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of heat, so too cognition is 
according to the mode of a species by which the knower knows.”40 Following Aristotle, 
Aquinas accounts for the imparting of physical qualities (e.g., heat) by appealing to 
forms. For example, the form of heat would convey heat to its subject. In other words, by 
way of form (secundum modum formae), quality is conveyed to its subject. Similarly, by 
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39. Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), p. 227 [emphasis added]
40. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (Ottawa, Canada: Studii Generalis O. 
PR, 1941), Ia  Q. 76, A. 2, ad 3: Sicut enim omnis actio est secundum modum formae qua 
agens agit, ut calefactio secundum modum caloris; ita cognitio est secundum modum 
speciei qua cognoscens cognoscit. 
way of species (modum speciei) ,what is known is conveyed to the knower. The phrase 
“modum speciei” connotes the manner of conveyance of species, not its mode of being.
One way of avoiding representationalism is to avoid intermediaries as Anthony 
Kenny does.
Kenny agrees that our knowledge of the natural world is immediate and direct. He 
writes:
In Aquinas’s theory there are no intermediaries like sense-data which come 
between perceiver and the perceived. In sensation the sense-faculty does not come 
into contact with a likeness of the sense-object. Instead, it becomes itself like the 
sense-object, by
taking on the sense-object's form; but it takes on the form not physically, but 
intentionally. This is summed up by Aquinas in a slogan which he takes over from 
Aristotle: the sense-faculty in operation is identical with the sense-object in action 
(Sensus in actu est sensible in actu)41
Aquinas is indeed right that we ‘perceive’, that is to say, know without any 
intermediary, what we are thinking.42
Kenny, in contradistinction to Stump, is asserting that there are no intermediaries that 
stand between the extra-mental object that is being known and the knower. Yet, how is 
this possible when he asserts that the sense-faculty does not come in contact with a 
likeness of the sense-object but becomes like the sense-object by taking on its form? 
Given that the sense-object’s form is ontologically distinct from the sense object, is it not 
the case that the sense-object’s form is an intermediary? And if it is an intermediary, how 
can Kenny maintain that we have direct and immediate knowledge of the world around 
us?
Norman Kretzman would agree that we have direct and guaranteed access to 
extra-mental reality. He writes:
The guaranteed access is utterly direct, to the point of formal identity between the 
extra-mental object and the actually cognizing faculty in its cognizing of that 
object (although Aquinas's terminology can be initially misleading on this 
score).... strong claims of formal identity are expressed in terms of "likeness" 
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41. Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 35.
42. Ibid., p. 125.
might suggest that the foundations of Aquinas's theory of intellection contain a 
dubious mixture of direct realism and representationalism. Dispelling that 
impression depends on getting a clearer view of Aquinas's account of the data of 
cognition, their transmission, and their transformation.43
Kretzman affirms that Aquinas is a direct realist and that the ontological basis for the 
direct realism is a formal identity between the knower and the known. He admits that 
Aquinas’s terminology can lead one to believe that Aquinas holds some form of 
representationalism, yet one can dispel such notions by getting a clearer view of 
Aquinas’s account of cognition. It is “important to see that these intelligible species 
themselves are not proper objects of intellective cognitions any more than phantasms are; 
direct realism could hardly be sustained if either of those entities internal to the human 
being were identified as a proper object of ordinary, nonreflexive cognition.”44 For 
Kretzman, the key to understanding Aquinas’s direct realism is found in the proper 
understanding of the role of the phantasm and the intelligible species. Failure to 
understand either or both of these would lead one to assert that Aquinas is a 
representationalist. 
Kretzman is correct that improper understanding of the intelligible species or the 
phantasm would lead one to some form of representationalism. Yet, improper 
understanding of the concept or concept formation can lead one astray. According to 
Kretzman, the intellect’s “first operation” consists in the formation of concepts of 
external objects.45 If the first operation is concept formation, is this concept an internal 
object that must be cognized? Owens affirmed that the concept is cognizable. How can 
one maintain a direct realist epistemology and simultaneously assert the concept is a 
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43. Norman Kretzman, “Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophical Topics 2, 
no. 2 (Fall 1992): pp. 85–86 (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas, 1992).
44. Kretzman, “Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind,” p. 88.
45. Ibid., p. 89.
proper object46 of the intellect?47
John O’Callaghan is well aware that based on textual grounds, one can maintain 
that the intelligible species is not a cognitive object except reflexively. Rather, the 
intelligible species is a formal principle of intellectual operations.48 He is also aware, 
however, that the concept can be understood as an intermediary (i.e., a third thing) 
between the knower and the known.49 In order to show that a concept is not a thing, 
O’Callaghan shows that the prepositions “in” and “outside” do not necessarily connote 
some spatial referent; instead, depending on the content, they may connote a mode of 
existence.50 Thus, when one is saying that a nature exists in singular things or a nature 
exists in the intellect, one is not referring to its spatial location, but its mode of being.51 
Failure to make the distinction between spatial location and modes of existence opens the 
door to “classical representationalism.”52 Armed with the aforementioned distinction, O’ 
Callaghan cites Aquinas:
For in the first place the passivity of the possible intellect may be considered 
inasmuch as
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46. In this interrogative statement,  “proper object” is not being used in an 
Aristotelian/Scholastic sense.  That is to say,  “proper objects” in an 
Aristotelian/Scholastic sense connote that which is proportioned to some power.   For 
example,  the proper object of vision is color, and the proper object of hearing is sound.  
Instead,  “proper object” is being used to denote that the concept is an object of thought.  
In Scholatics terms,  the concept is an object of thought (i.e., a second intention).
47. Kretzman, “Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind,” p. 89.
48. John P. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a 
More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, Press, 
2003), p. 165.
49. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, pp. 165–98.
50. Ibid., p. 165.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
it is informed by the intelligible species. So informed, it forms in the second place 
either a definition or a division or a composition, which is signified through an 
articulated sound. Hence, the ratio which the name signifies is a definition, and 
the enunciation signifies a composition or division of the intellect. Therefore, 
articulated sounds do not
signify the intelligible species, but rather that which the intellect forms for itself 
to judge of exterior things.53  
The text itself states that articulated sounds refer to those [things]  that the intellect forms 
for itself [intellectus sibi format]. That is, the text clearly implies that the intellect forms 
concepts that are the ontological grounds for speech. O’Callaghan states:
What is interesting here is the last line. The passage seems to suggest that the 
possible intellect forms some being, some thing when it forms definitions, 
combinations, and divisions. Thus the first and second acts of the [possible] 
intellect do not bear upon res extra animam, but rather are productive acts that 
produce entities in anima; they produce concepts that are entities distinct from the 
productive acts, entities produced in order to
judge external things.54
However, such a reading according to O’Callaghan is actually a misreading of the text. 
According to O’Callaghan, such a reading is committing the error of the Platonist that 
Aquinas had warned us about. That is to say, the Platonist mistook the mode of knowing 
for mode of the thing known.55 According to Aquinas, Plato deviated from the truth 
because Plato asserted that all cognition happens by means of a similitude of being; thus, 
he believed that the understood intelligible form necessarily is in the knower in the same 
manner in which it is in the known.56 According to O’Callaghan, Aquinas is considering 
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53. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 166; Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 85, a. 2, 
ad. 3: Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod 
informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel 
divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat 
nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. 
Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format 
ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus. 
54. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 167.
55. Ibid.
56. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 84, A. 1, Response: Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviasse a 
the features of human cognition separately, but it does not follow that these features are 
actually separate in reality. Failure to make these distinctions leads one to “the error of 
the Platonists.”57
How should one then interpret this text? According to O’Callaghan, linguistically, 
one can nominalize that which is actually an action. For example, were one to say, “I am 
grasping the pen, and I have the pen in my grasp,” both clauses mean the same thing. 
However, in reality, the activity of grasping the pen is what is occurring though I can 
express the same activity as the object of a preposition. That is to say, I can express the 
action as a substantive. It is not the case that there exists a third thing called a “grasp.” 
Instead, there is only the hand and its activity. Similarly, O’Callaghan is asserting that 
there is no third thing called a “concept” that is interposed between the knower and the 
known. Instead, there is only the intellect and its activity, conceptualizing.58 But how 
does one deal with the assertion that there is a formal identity between the res extra 
anima and res in anima?
When Aquinas asserts that the intelligible in act is the intellect in act, “it appears 
that the res extra animam is actually understood when it is converted into a res in anima 
that is directly related to the act of understanding.”59 In other words, there is a third thing 
interposed between the intellect and the thing outside of the intellect and this third thing 
has a formal identity with the thing existing outside the intellect. According to 
O’Callaghan, this is a misreading of Aquinas because the things outside the intellect are 
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veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, 
credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito.
57. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 167.
58. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 169: Similarly, there is no third 
thing other than conceiving intellect and the res extra animam.
59. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 170.
only potentially intelligible. To become actually intelligible, it must be rendered actually 
intelligible. He asserts, “The intelligible in act is not a mental entity distinct from the act 
of intellect, but it is rather the act of intellect itself informed by the intelligible species.”60 
Once again, the emphasis is on the activity of the intellect, not some third thing that is 
constructed. By interpreting Aquinas in this fashion, O’Callaghan is ensuring that what is 
conceived as an internal state or impression is actually a cognitive activity that gives one 
direct access to things without having to interpose any intermediaries.
O’Callaghan’s reading of Aquinas allows one to make sense as to how Aquinas 
can be understood as a direct-realist. However, texts like the following, may cause 
problems for O’Callaghan’s interpretation. Aquinas writes:
I respond that it ought to be said that our intellect is not able to directly and 
primarily know the singular in material things. The reason for this is that the 
principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our 
intellect, just as was said above, understands by abstracting intelligible species 
from this kind of matter. But what is abstracted from individual matter is 
universal. Hence, our intellect is directly cognizant only of universals. However, 
indirectly, as through some kind of reflection, it is able to know the singular 
because, just as was stated above, after it has abstracted intelligible species, it is 
not able to understand according to these [species] except by turning itself toward 
phantasms, in which it understands the intelligible species, as is said in book 3 of 
the De Anima.... In this way, therefore, it understands the universal itself directly 
through the intelligible species. However, [it understands] indirectly the singulars 
of which there are phantasms. And in this manner, it forms this proposition, 
Socrates is a man.61
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60. Ibid.
61. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 86, A. 1, Response:  Respondeo dicendum quod singulare 
in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius 
ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis, 
intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem 
intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est 
universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. 
Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, 
sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest 
secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species 
intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem 
intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et 
hoc modo format hanc propositionem, socrates est homo. 
Aquinas is asserting that the intellect does not have direct access to singular material 
entities existing outside of the intellect. Even if outside means a different mode of 
existence, the intellect still does not have access to them directly. It only has direct access 
to universals, which could be interpreted as some kind of third object between the 
intellect and the material singulars existing outside the mind.
Furthermore, O’Callaghan’s strategy for making Aquinas a direct realist shifts the 
debate from the text of Aquinas to the hermeneutical method that should be used to 
interpret Aquinas. Thus, if representationalists are going to argue against O’Callaghan 
position, they must show why their hermeneutical method should be preferred over 
O’Callaghan’s hermeneutical method. Notwithstanding, a representationalist may argue 
that O’Callaghan is begging the question. For it seems that O’Callaghan employs a plain 
reading of Aquinas’s text in order to obtain his hermeneutical principle (e.g., Aquinas’s 
warning to avoid the error of the Platonist). Then he uses this hermeneutical principle to 
say that a plain reading of the texts that deal with concepts is incorrect. When to use a 
plain reading of the text and when not to use a plain reading of the text seems capricious.
 Interpreting Aquinas in a fashion such that intermediaries are interpreted as acts 
of the intellect is not the only fashion of maintaining that Aquinas is a direct realist. In an 
article entitled “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Knowledge,” Lawrence Dewan explains 
how Aquinas is in part to blame, for the current misunderstandings of Aquinas’s 
epistemology, and he offers a means for understanding Aquinas such that the concept and 
direct-realism are preserved.62 According to Dewan, early in Aquinas’s career, Aquinas 
apparently characterized intelligible species as what is primarily understood. On this 
account, extramental things are only understood secondarily. This is evident when, while 
addressing the question whether God knows something other than Himself, Aquinas says:
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62. Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Knowledge,” Maritain 
Studies 11 (1995): p. 220–33.
What is first seen is the species of a visible thing existing in the pupil, which is 
also the perfection of the one seeing, and it is the principle of vision... what is 
seen second is the thing itself outside the soul. Similarly, the first thing 
understood is the thing's similitude, which is in the intellect, and the second thing 
understood is the thing itself [outside the intellect], which is understood through 
that similitude.63
 Interestingly, in this text, Aquinas says that in the same manner that the sensible species 
is perceived prior to the perception of the extramental object, the intelligible species is 
understood prior to the understanding of the extramental object. In addition, Aquinas 
states that the extramental object is understood through the similitude, which had 
previously been understood. That is to say, by first cognizing the intelligible species, a 
similitude or mental object, one is said only then to cognize that which exist outside the 
intellect. Yet, how does cognizing a similitude of something give knowledge of 
something other than the similitude? According to Dewan, Aquinas tries to resolve this 
by changing his position on intelligible species.
On Dewan’s reading, then, in the middle period, it is not surprising that Aquinas 
deals with the problem by asserting that the concept (i.e. the interior word) is that which 
is per se known or cognized, and the intelligible species is the principle for 
understanding. Aquinas says:
That which is understood per se is not that thing through the intellect, since that 
[thing] sometimes is understood only in potency, and it is outside the one 
understanding, just as when man understands material things such as a stone or an 
animal or something else of this kind; since nevertheless it is necessary that the 
understood is in the one understanding and is one with him. Nor again is that 
which is understood per se the similitude of the understood thing, through which 
the intellect is informed for understanding. For the intellect is not able to 
understand except inasmuch as it comes to be in act through this similitude [i.e., 
the intelligible species], just as nothing is able to act upon another inasmuch as it 
is in potency, but [only] inasmuch as it comes to be in act through some form. 
Therefore, this similitude [i.e., the intelligible species] is related to understanding 
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63. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis magistri petri lombardi, edited by 
Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), Bk. I, d. 35, q. 1, a.2: Est enim primum visum 
quod est ipsa species rei visibilis in pupilla existens, quae est etiam perfectio videntis, et, 
principium visionis... et est visum secundum, quod est ipsa res extra animam. Similiter 
intellectum primum est ipsa rei similitudo, quae est in intellectu; et est intellectum 
secundum ipsa res, quae per similitudinem illam intelligitur.
as the principle of understanding... not as the end of the understanding. Therefore, 
that is primarily and per se understood which the intellect conceives in itself 
concerning the understood thing.... What is conceived by the intellect in this way 
is called the interior word.64 
 As I understand Dewan, Aquinas affirms that the intellect does not have per se 
knowledge of material things, for material things are only potentially intelligible 
(intellecta in potentia tantum). In addition, he says that in order for the intellect to know 
two criteria must be satisfied: (1) what is known must be in the knower (in intelligente) 
and (2) what is known must have some type of identity with the knower (unum cum ipso). 
Thus, Aquinas's criteria preclude per se knowledge of material things, for material things 
are outside the knower (extra intelligentem) and what is per se and primarily known is in 
the knower (in intelligente). Hence, since material things are not what is per se and 
primarily known, one may be tempted to think that the intelligible species is per se 
known, for it meets the aforementioned two criteria. Yet, Aquinas denies that the 
intelligible species is per se known, for the intelligible species is that through which the 
intellect is informed for understanding. He writes, “Nor what is understood per se a 
similitude of the understood thing through which the intellect is informed for 
understanding.”65 In other words, the intelligible species is not what is understood per se, 
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64. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, 8th ed., edited by 
Marietti (Taurini-Rome, 1953), q. 9, a. 5, response: Id autem quod est per se intellectum 
non est res illa cuius notitia per intellectum habetur, cum illa quandoque sit intellecta in 
potentia tantum, et sit extra intelligentem, sicut cum homo intelligit res materiales, ut 
lapidem vel animal aut aliud huiusmodi: cum tamen oporteat quod intellectum sit in 
intelligente, et unum cum ipso. Neque etiam intellectum per se est similitudo rei 
intellectae, per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum: intellectus enim non potest 
intelligere nisi secundum quod fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest 
operari secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam. 
Haec ergo similitudo se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium... non sicut 
intelligendi terminus. Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in seipso 
concipit de re intellecta... Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur verbum 
interius.[emphasis added]
65. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 9, A. 5, Response: Neque etiam intellectum per se est 
similitudo rei intellectae, per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum.
but it gives rise to understanding. Thus, Aquinas's two criteria are necessary conditions 
for per se knowing, but not sufficient conditions for per se knowing. It seems that 
because the intelligible species is a principle for knowing, it cannot be per se known. In 
order for something to be known per se, it must meet the two criteria; it must also be the 
term of the act of knowing.66 The concept, which the intellect forms in itself, is that term 
of understanding. Thus, the concept is what is per se known. 
On the basis of Aquinas's affirming in the middle period that the concept is per se 
known, one can infer that Aquinas may be unwittingly espousing some form of idealism 
such that what are known are concepts or ideas as opposed to material things in the 
world. Yet, as we will see in his mature writings, Aquinas affirms that we know material 
things in the world albeit not per se. Thus, whatever is meant by "per se known" does 
not, for Aquinas, preclude knowing that thing in some other way. For example, although 
Aquinas denies that species are per se known, he does not deny that they are known in 
some other way, which is not per se.
According to Dewan, in Aquinas’s late and mature period, in the Summa 
Theologiae, Aquinas argues that intelligible species are not known primarily (i.e., per se), 
but they are known only reflexively. He says:
If those things which we understand were only the species that are in the soul, it 
would follow that all knowledge would not be concerning things outside the soul, 
but only concerning intelligible species, which are in the soul.... But because the 
intellect reflects upon itself, according to that very same reflexive [act] it 
understands both its understanding and the species by which it understands. In 
this way, the understood species is that which is understood secondarily, but that 
which is understood primarily is the thing; the intelligible species of which is a 
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66. Although Aquinas does not tell us why a principle of knowing cannot be per 
se known, Aquinas seems to be implying the following: Causes or principles are 
ontologically prior to their effects. An intelligible species is a formal cause or principle of 
knowing. Knowing is the effect.  Therefore, knowing, the effect, must be ontologically 
consequent to the intellect's being informed by the intelligible species. If the intelligible 
species were known per se, then the intelligible species would be both the cause of 
knowing and the effect, that which is known. 
similitude [of the thing].67
Unlike the senses, which cannot sense themselves sensing, the intellect can understand 
that it understands; thus, this intellectual act is called a reflexive act and is secondary. It 
is through a reflexive act that the intellect understands the intelligible species. In other 
words, intelligible species are understood only insofar as the intellectual act is itself 
considered as an object of the intellect. However, normally, the intelligible species is not 
an object of understanding any more than the act of understanding is an object of 
understanding. On this view, the object of understanding is the thing existing outside the 
intellect. 
By parity of reason, if the intelligible species is not known primarily because it 
would entail that knowledge concerns only forms in the soul, it would seem that the 
concept cannot be known primarily because one would only know a form in the soul; in 
that case, knowledge would not be concerning things outside the soul, but would be about 
concepts existing in the mind. Though Aquinas does not explicitly argue this point in 
Summa Theologiae question 85, nevertheless, the same reasoning that applies to species 
can be applied to concepts. As a matter of fact, Lawrence Dewan makes this point citing 
texts from Thomas's De Unitate Intellectus to demonstrate that concepts are not primarily 
known.68 According to Dewan:
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67. Aquinas, S.T., Ia q. 85, a. 2, Response: Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent 
solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus 
quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima... Sed 
quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et 
suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod 
intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est 
similitudo. 
68. Dewan, “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Knowledge,” p.230–31: “But it is 
true that the nature of the stone, as it is in singulars, is the ‘understood in potency’ 
[intellecta in potentia]; but it is rendered ‘understood in act’ through this, that the species 
come from sensible things, by the mediation of the senses, right to the imagination, and 
through the power of the agent intellect are abstracted the species intelligibles, which are 
the important thing for Thomas is to change the idea of understanding, so that it 
does not have as its target some pure intelligible existing within the intellect. 
Certainly, the mental word would only cause confusion in the presentation, since 
it can easily be taken for just such an inner object.69
In other words, according to Dewan, Thomas's reluctance to speak concerning the mental 
word (i.e., the concept) is evidence that for Thomas, the concept is not the understood 
thing; rather, extra-mental reality is that which is understood.
In addition to the aforementioned confusion, there is also confusion as to what the 
intelligible species makes present to the intellect. At times, Aquinas says that through the 
intelligible species the soul knows things existing outside the soul.
If we therefore understand the species of earth in the place of earth, according to 
the teaching of Aristotle, who said that "the stone is not in the soul, but the 
species of the stone," it follows that the soul through intelligible species knows 
things that are outside the soul.70
That is to say, things [i.e., the nature] is known through the intelligible species. Yet, 
Aquinas also says that the natures of things without their individuating concomitants are 
known by the intellect. He says:
Regarding the fifth [objection], it ought to be said that our intellect abstracts 
intelligible species from phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things 
universally, and nevertheless, it understands them in the phantasms because it is 
not able to understand those things whose species it abstracts [i.e., material 
things], except by reverting to phantasms as said above.71
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in the possible intellect. But these species do not stand related to the possible intellect as 
‘the understood’ [intellecta], but as the species by which the intellect understands, just as 
also the species which are in [the sense of] sight are not the very [items] seen [ipsa visa], 
but those [factors] by which the sight sees [ea quibus visus videt]: save inasmuch as the 
intellect reflects upon itself, which cannot happen in the sense.” Dewans' translation.   
Thomas Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus 5 (Leonine line 164-185). 
69. Dewan, “St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Knowledge,” p. 231.
70. Aquinas, S.T., Ia, q. 85, a. 2,  Response: Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae 
loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod "lapis non est in anima, sed 
species lapidis"; sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt 
extra animam. 
71. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  q. 85, a. 1, r.5: Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus 
So not only is there confusion as to how one knows, but there is also confusion as to what 
one knows. As a result of these conflicting views found in Aquinas, it is not surprising 
that there are various conflicting positions in contemporary Thomistic scholarship.
The Novelty of Intelligible Species
Although Aquinas is to blame for some of the confusion concerning his doctrine 
of intelligible species, not all the blame rests with Aquinas. Some of the mentioned 
interpreters of Aquinas are confused because they have failed to take into account the 
philosophical presuppositions that necessitated the doctrine of intelligible species. If one 
is to understand Aquinas, one needs to consider Aquinas's philosophical and historical 
context. Aquinas developed his psychology by considering the philosophical ideas and 
issues in his times and by accepting certain presuppositions and methods, methods and 
presuppositions that would determine his novel doctrine of intelligible species. I argue 
that his doctrine of intelligible species is novel because Aquinas's teaching on intelligible 
species is not found in any of his predecessors, as confirmed by Leen Spruit.72 (e.g., 
Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna, Averroes, who were major influences in the development 
of Aquinas's thought), yet neither is his doctrine of intelligible species developed apart 
from certain key predecessors: Avicenna, Averroes, Augustine, and Aristotle. I examine 
these sources in this order because I end with Aristotle who is the focus of our next 
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noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas 
rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere 
etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum 
est. 
72. Leen Spruit, Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, in Species 
Intelligibilis from Perception to Knowledge (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), pp. 156–57. 
“Thomas puts forward, for the first time in the Middle Ages, a theory of mental 
representation which is sufficiently complex and complete to bear scrutiny of its own. In 
this respect, Thomas' theory eclipses all its (possible) sources. No longer assimilating 
intelligible species to the intelligible form or to the object of intellectual cognition, 
Thomas offers a fundamentally new interpretation of this notion.”
chapter. Moreover, the focus of the dissertation is not on the intelligible species per se, 
but on the influences that Avicenna and Averroes have on Aquinas, influences which will 
necessitate and aid Aquinas in the development of his novel doctrine.
Avicenna has no Intelligible Species Doctrine
When one examines Avicenna's Philosophia Prima and De Anima, one does not 
find the phrase species intelligibiles used at all. Nonetheless, Aquinas commenting on 
Avicenna and Plato says:
and thus in this, Avicenna agrees with Plato that the intelligible species of our 
intellect
flow from some separated forms.73
 Both Plato and Avicenna agree that the forms that Aquinas calls intelligible species are 
known by the human intellect, but they disagree as to the ontological status of these 
forms. For Plato, the intelligible forms are subsistent, simple, immutable, and in act. 
Thus, for Plato, the form of Good subsists immaterially, immutably and distinctly; it is 
separate from the form of the Beautiful and from all the other forms.74 For Avicenna, 
intelligible forms are simple, immutable, in act, but they exist in the agent intellect, an 
immaterial separate subsistent substance. In the agent intellect, each intelligible form is 
its own species,75 and it exists per se. Avicenna says:
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73. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  q. 84, a. 4, Response: “Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum Platone 
concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus effluunt a quibusdam formis 
separatis”: quas tamen Plato dicit per se subsistere, Avicenna vero ponit eas in 
intelligentia agente. Differunt etiam quantum ad hoc, quod Avicenna ponit species 
intelligibiles non remanere in intellectu nostro postquam desinit actu intelligere, sed 
indiget ut iterato se convertat ad recipiendum de novo. Unde non ponit scientiam animae 
naturaliter inditam, sicut Plato, qui poinit participationes idearum immobiliter in anima 
permanere.
74. Plato, “Republic,” in Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), 475e-476a.
75. Here, the term “species” is being used in a logical sense as a predicable.  It is 
not being used in an epistemological sense.
We shall say that these forms are things existing per se, each of which is a species 
and a thing existing per se, but the [human] intellect at times regards them and at 
times is turned away from them, and afterwards turns toward them [again], and 
the soul is as a mirror, whereas these [intelligible forms], are, as it were, things 
extrinsic [to the soul] which sometimes appear in it and other times do not appear. 
This occurs according to the relationships which exist between them and the soul; 
or from the agent principle one form after another emanates into the soul 
according to the request of the soul, from which principle when later on [the soul] 
has turned away, the emanation ceases.76
For both Plato and Avicenna, in order to attain knowledge, the human knower must come 
in contact with these intelligible forms, which do not come to be, but are. That is to say, 
intelligible forms do not belong to the realm of becoming but to the realm of being. 
Given the immutability and the actuality of intelligible forms, Plato and Avicenna 
understand intelligible forms to be objects of cognition. That is to say, intelligible forms 
are that which is known. In contradistinction, for the mature Aquinas, intelligible species 
are that by which something is known, but they are not that which is known. Thus, it is 
clear that Aquinas's doctrine of intelligible species is not found in Avicenna.
Averroes has no Intelligible Species Doctrine
In Averroes's magisterial work, his Long Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, 
one does not find the phrase "species intelligibiles" anywhere. Nonetheless, Aquinas 
says:
 In Book III of De Anima, the Commentator claims this union to be through an 
intelligible species, which indeed has twofold subject: the possible intellect, and 
the other one is phantasms, which are in corporeal organs. And thus through an 
intelligible species, the possible intellect is continuous with  the body of this or 
that man. But, this continuity or union does not suffice in order that the action of 
the intellect be the action of Socrates. And this is made manifest through a 
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76. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, edited by  Simone van 
Riet (Louvain: Editions orientalistes Brill, 1968), Bk. 5, Ch. 5, p. 146–47: Aut dicemus 
quod ipsae formae intelligibles sunt res per se existentes, quarum unaquaeque est species 
et res per se existens, sed intellectus aliquando aspicit illas et aliquando avertitur ab illis, 
et postea convertitur ad illas, et est anima quasi speculum ipsae vero quasi res extrinsecae 
quae aliquando apparent in ea et aliquando non apparent.  Et hoc fiat secundum 
comparationes quae sunt inter eas et animam; aut ex principo agente emanet in animam 
forma post formam secundum petitionem animae, a quo principio postea cum avertitur, 
cesset emanatio.
similitude in the sense power, from which Aristotle proceeds in order to consider 
those thing which belong to intellect. Therefore, just as species of colors are in 
sight, so species of phantasms are in the possible intellect. However, it is evident 
that from the fact that colors are in the wall, the similitudes of which are in vision, 
the action of vision is not attributed to the wall, for we do not say that the wall 
sees but rather that it is seen. From the fact that species of phantasms are in the 
possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates in whom are the phantasms, 
understands, but that he himself or his phantasms are understood.77
Here, Aquinas argues that Averroes's notion of two-subjects cannot account for why one 
attributes an intellectual cognitive act to the human being who supplies the image for 
abstraction. By taking a closer look at what Aquinas is doing in this text, we will see that 
the doctrine of intelligible species is not found in Averroes, so let us consider what 
Aquinas is doing and contrast him with Averroes. With his remark, about the sensible 
species and the color of the wall, Aquinas addresses two issues: the role of the species 
and the numerical distinctness of the species. Let us first consider the role of the species 
before considering the numerical distinctness of the species.
Aquinas is explicit concerning the first issue, the role of the species. For Aquinas, 
seeing is the reception of a species into the sense organ. On the reception of a sensible 
species, the organ senses the colored thing that caused the species. In other words, a 
cognitive state is attributed to the subject that receives the species, not to the object that 
produces the species. The relation of the colored wall to the sense organ is a relation of 
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77. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  q. 76, a. 1: Hanc autem unionem commentator, in III de 
Anima, dicit, esse per speciem intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex subiectum: 
unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud ipsa phantasmata quae sunt in organis 
corporeis.  Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possiblis corpori huius 
vel illius hominis - Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc quod actio intellectus 
sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad 
considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent phantasmata ad intellectum ut 
dicitur in III de anima, sicut colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita 
species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc quod colores 
sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti: non 
enim dicimus quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur.  Ex hoc ergo quod species 
phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibli, non sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt 
phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel eius phantasmata intelligantur.
that which is sensed to that which is sensing. It would be inane to attribute sensing to the 
wall. Analogously, the relation of the intelligible species in the phantasm to the possible 
intellect is a relation of that which is understood to that which understands. It would be 
inane to attribute understanding to the phantasm, or to the subject who possesses the 
phantasm in virtue of possessing the phantasm alone. On Averroes’ account, as analyzed 
by Aquinas, then, understanding belongs to the possible intellect, but it does not belong 
to any particular human.
 Let us now consider the problem of numerical distinctness. Although in the 
quoted passage Aquinas is not explicit concerning the numerical distinctness of 
intelligible species, nevertheless, throughout his career, he maintains that numerically 
distinct intelligible species, one in the phantasm and one in the possible intellect, cannot 
constitute an individual act of understanding.78 Before proceeding, I need to distinguish 
between two senses of form and formal unity. I shall use formal1 or formal unity1 to 
denote a likeness or unity of ratio between two numerically distinct things. I shall use 
formal2 or formal unity2 to denote a numerically individual form or unity, such as one 
that results from the reception of form into matter. For Aquinas, a species in the wall and 
a species in the sense organ are numerically distinct. That is to say, although the species 
in the wall and the species in the eye are formally1 the same, the species vary in terms of 
their mode of existence. In modern terms, the species in the wall and the species in the 
eye are two distinct and separate objects with similar properties.79 Consequently, to say 
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78. Edward P. Mahoney, “Aquinas’s Critique of Averroes Doctrine of the Unity 
of the Intellect,” in Aquinas and His Legacy, edited by David M. Gallagher (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1994), pp. 83–106: “Although it is said that 
the intelligible species is in the phantasm, the intelligible species is not actually in the 
phantasm; rather, the intelligible species is in the phantasm only in potency. That is to 
say, the ratio contained in the phantasm has the potential to be made intelligible by the 
agent intellect.” 
79.  It is extremely difficult to talk about species in modern terms because modern 
philosophy denies the notion of formal causality. Species are actually formal causes. John 
that the cognitive species are formally1 the same as the objects that gave rise to the 
cognitive species is to say that they do not differ formally1. Whatever does not differ 
formally1 is formally1 one, and whatever is one is some kind of unity.80 However, the 
formal unity1 provided by the species is not an ontological unity (i.e., formal unity2). 
Aquinas is tacitly asserting that even if one grants that there is some formal1 likeness 
between the intelligible species in the phantasm and the intelligible species in the 
possible intellect, the formal1 likeness between intelligible species and the phantasm is 
not an ontological unity (i.e., formal unity2). Thus, the intelligible species in the 
phantasm cannot be that which unites an individual to the possible intellect that is 
separate from us and numerically one for all humans. Therefore, Averroes's account 
cannot warrant an individual act of understanding to an individual human intellect. For 
Aquinas, what is required to constitute such an act is a formal unity2 that is an ontological 
unity. That is to say, the formal unity2 that is required to constitute an individual act of 
understanding is the unity that is found between the  soul, the form of the body, and the 
body, for anything that acts, acts through its form2. In other words, it is only the 
individuation of each human intellect that can account for individual acts of 
understanding.81 Thus, if there is going to be understanding, it will happen by means of 
each person's individual intellect in his or her individual soul. 
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Haldane concludes that in order to resolve some of the conundrums in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, one must "reintroduce a notion of formal causation that does not 
reduce to efficient causation;” John Haldane, “The Breakdown of Contemporary 
Philosophy of Mind,” in Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytic 
Traditions (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), p. 68.
80. I am not asserting that all species are formally the same as each other.  That is 
to say, the species of a dog is not formally the same as the species of a tree. However, the 
species of a tree is formally the same as the form in the tree, and the species of a dog is  
formally the same as the form in the dog that gave rise to the species.
81.  The individuation of the human intellect will be examined in Chapter 4.
One can see that there are substantial differences between Aquinas and Averroes. 
First and foremost, Averroes does not have a intelligible species doctrine like Aquinas 
because for Aquinas intelligibles species are principles for intellection, whereas for 
Averroes, intelligibles in act, which Aquinas will refer to as intelligible species, are 
objects of intellection; Second, for Averroes, intelligibles in act must be unique and 
cannot be multiplied, whereas for Aquinas intelligible species are multiplied and exist in 
a plurality of individual human intellects. For Averroes, the intelligible in act is that 
which is understood, yet for Aquinas, the intelligible species is that by which one 
understands. For Averroes the formal unity1 between the phantasm and the intelligible in 
act is sufficient to permit acts of cognition in multiple subjects, whereas for Aquinas only 
a formal unity2 would suffice so that so that the cognitive power that is intrinsic to each 
particular human knower in an ontological way, not separated from human nature. Thus, 
it is highly unlikely that Aquinas received his mature notion of intelligible species from 
Averroes. Still, it will be made clear in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 that Avicenna and 
Averroes played an important role in the formation of the teaching of Aquinas on this 
issue.
In addition to the aforementioned reason why it is unlikely that Aquinas received 
his doctrine of intelligible species from Averroes, Leen Spruit states that it is incorrect to 
presume “that Thomas identifies the Averroistic notion of ‘intellectum speculativum’ 
with his ‘intelligible species.’”82 According to Spruit, Carlos Bazán erroneously 
presumes this in his article entitled “Intellectum Speculativum: Averroes, Thomas 
Aquinas and Siger of Brabant on the intelligible object.”83 Spruit is not alone, for Edward 
Mahoney says, “According to his [Aquinas's] reading of Averroes -- and his claim that 
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82. Spruit, Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, p. 161.
83. Bernardo Carlos Bazán, “Intellectum Speculativum: Averroes, Thomas 
Aquinas and Siger of Brabant on the Intelligible Object,” Journal of the History of 
Philosopy 19 (1981): p. 432.
Averroes maintained ‘intelligible species’ is surely doubtful -the latter holds that 
intelligible species have a twofold subject (duplex subiectum).”84 
Augustine has no Doctrine of Intelligible Species
One finds that the phrase intelligible species has various connotations in the 
works of Augustine. For example, in De Diversis Questionibus Octoginta Tribus, 
Augustine argues against the existence of a highest (i.e., infinite) evil. He says:
Each thing that exists is either corporeal or incorporeal. The corporeal is limited 
to the sensible [form, and] the incorporeal is limited to the intelligible form 
(intelligibili specie) nothing exists without some form. Where there is some form, 
necessarily there is some measure and measure is some kind of good. Therefore, 
the highest evil has no measure; it lacks every good. Therefore, it does not exist 
because it is limited by no form.85
In this text an intelligible species (i.e., form) is a metaphysical principle that limits 
incorporeal entities, but it is not a principle of intellection.
In De Civitate Dei, Augustine mentions that certain philosophers transcended all 
material things in search of God. On account of God's incommunicability and simplicity, 
these philosophers understood that all things were created by Him and that He had not 
been made by any. Concerning these philosophers, Augustine says:
For they thought that whatever is, is either a body or life, and it is better to be life 
than to be a body; and the form of the body better is sensible, [whereas] life is 
intelligible. Hence, they preferred the intelligible form (intellegibilem speciem) to 
the sensible. We call sensibles those things which are perceived by vision or by 
touch of the body. We call intelligible [those things] which are to be understood 
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84. Mahoney, “Aquinas’s Critique of Averroes Doctrine of the Unity of the 
Intellect,” p. 85.
85. Augustine, “De Diversis Questionibus Octoginta Tribus,” in Oeuvres de Saint 
Augustin, Bibliotheque Augustinienne, Edited and Translated by J.A. Beckaert (Paris: 
Desclee de Brouwer, 1952), q. 6, p. 56: Omne quod est, aut est corporeum, aut 
incorporeum. Corporeum sensibili, incorporeum autem intelligibili specie continetur. 
Omne igitur quod est sine aliqua specie non est. Ubi autem aliqua species, necessario est 
aliquis modus, et modus aliquid boni est. Summum ergo malum nullum modum habet; 
caret enim omni bono. Non est igitur; quia nulla specie continetur.
by the perception of the mind.86
In this text, one sees that intelligibles are those things that are grasped by the mind and 
the intelligible was preferred to sensible form. Yet, the text does not affirm intelligible 
forms as principles in the mind ontologically other than principles in reality. Intelligible 
forms apparently connote metaphysical principles that constitute incorporeal entities 
separate from the mind.
Later in the same work, Augustine says that we judge by means of intelligibles 
forms. He says:
So concerning these [things] we do not judge with the sense of the body. For we 
have another sense belonging to the interior man, far more present than [a bodily 
sense], by which we perceive just and unjust things, just things through an 
intelligible form and unjust things through its privation.87
In this text, Augustine maintains that acts of justice and injustice are perceived not by any 
sense of the body, but by the “inner man,” which in scripture is a metaphor for the soul. 
That is to say, there is some power, which Augustine calls an interior sense, in the soul 
by which one can perceive justice. In addition, in order to judge whether an action is just 
one must cognize it through the intelligible form (intellegibilem speciem) of justice, and 
one judges injustices through the privation of the intelligible form. What Augustine 
means by privation of an intelligible form is not clear. What is clear is that an intelligible 
form is something that is knowable and serves as a standard by which one judges moral 
actions. In other words, for Augustine an intelligible form is that by which one judges 
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86. Augustine, “La Cité De Dieu,” in Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, Bibliotheque 
Augustinienne, Edited and Translated by  G. Combes (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 
1959), p. 254: Consideraverunt enim, quidquid est, vel corpus esse vel vitam, meliusque 
aliquid vitam esse quam corpus, speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intellegibilem 
vitam. Proinde intellegibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae 
visu tactuque corporis sentire querunt; intellegibilia, quae conspectu mentis intellegi. 
87. Augustine, “La Cité De Dieu,” p. 119–20: De his non sensu corporis 
iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, 
quo iusta et iniusta sentimus, iusta per intellegibilem speciem, iniusta per eius 
privationem.
what something ought to be, whereas for Aquinas an intelligible species is that through 
which one comes to know what is.
Chapter Summary
The question “how do you know” has been a question that human beings have 
tried to answer for time immemorial. Whether the theory is contemporary, medieval, or 
ancient, each theory is fraught with problems that prevent it from comprehensively 
explaining how one knows. Among those who attempted to explain human cognition is 
Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s teaching on human cognition is vast, and it extends over a 
protracted period of time. Changes in Aquinas’s view on intelligible species may have 
contributed to wealth of diversity among his interpreters.
Contemporary philosophers of medieval are debating whether or not Aquinas is a 
direct realist or a representationalist. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to settle 
the debate. My contribution towards the debate is much more modest. I intend to show 
that the doctrine of intelligible species is necessary for Aquinas because of his 
reformulation of hylomorphism. Furthermore, I intend to show that Avicenna and 
Averroes contributed to Aquinas’s intelligible species doctrine as well as to Aquinas’s 
related explanation of prophecy and the beatific vision. By examining Aquinas in his 
historical context and by examining the Arab influence on Aquinas, I hope to resolve 
some of the confusion that surrounds contemporary misunderstanding of Aquinas.
In this chapter, I have cursorily shown that the doctrine of intelligible species is 
not found in Averroes, Avicenna, or Augustine. The next chapter raises the question as to 
whether Aristotle has a doctrine of intelligible species. There I discuss how Plato has 
framed knowing and knower in immaterial terms. That is to say, the subject of 
knowledge and the object of knowledge must be immaterial. Consequently, for Plato, if 
knowledge is to be acquired, it cannot be derived from the natural world. In response to 
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Plato, Aristotle takes the immutable and unique forms found in Plato, and he ascribes 
them to individual humans. Thus, the substantial form (i.e., the immutable nature) is 
found in each particular. By grounding knowledge in particulars, Aristotle must come up 
with a way to account for universals, which does not appeal to separated substance and 
must appeal to the particulars. As will be shown, by accepting Plato’s premises that 
intellect must be immaterial in order to receive intelligible forms, Aristotle agrees with 
Plato that the knower and the known must be immaterial. However, the immateriality of 
the knower and the known could not be reconciled with Aristotle’s doctrine of 
hylomorphism. The irreconcilability of hylomorphism with intellection is the Aristotelian 
aporia, which I shall delineate in more detail in the next chapter. In order to try to resolve 
the Aristotelian aporia, the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic tradition affirm immaterial 
substances that were ontologically separate from the body; these immaterial substances 
were capable of receiving forms.
Among those who affirm immaterial substance were Avicenna and Averroes, 
which I examine in chapter three. Both philosophers agreed that hylomorphism as 
understood with the tradition was incompatible with intellection. Avicenna reformulated 
hylomorphism in a manner that denied that the soul is the form of the body, and by 
separating the soul from the body, he hoped to make the human soul (a spiritual 
substance) the subject of intelligibles. Although he is Aristotelian when it comes to 
sensation, as we will see, nevertheless, he is unable to bridge the gap between the 
material body and the immaterial intellect, so he needs to have intellection come from an 
immaterial source, the Agent Intellect. In contradistinction to Avicenna, Averroes holds 
fast to hylomorphism inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body. Consequently, it is 
not possible for intellectual powers (whether active or receptive) to inhere in an 
individuals’ substantial form, for the reception of an intelligible in the soul would entail a 
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reception into matter; moreover, any form received into matter is no longer intelligible.88 
As a result of this view of hylomorphism, Averroes must affirm two separate immaterial 
entities, the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect. By conjoining with these entities, 
humans can be denominated as rational per accidens. After examining Avicenna and 
Averroes on sensation, abstraction, and the subject of intelligibles, I shall offer a critique 
of both of their positions.
In chapter four I show how Aquinas agrees with Avicenna and Averroes. The 
subject of intellection must be a spiritual substance (i.e., an immaterial substance). 
However, Aquinas will do the unthinkable. He will assert that the soul is a spiritual 
substance and that the soul is the form of the body. Whereas Avicenna grabs one horn of 
the dilemma (the soul is a spiritual substance), and Averroes grabs the other horn of the 
dilemma (the soul is the form of the body), Aquinas grabs both horns. In doing so, he will 
need to reformulate hylomorphism in such a manner that allows both the active and 
passive powers to be inherent in the human soul, while simultaneously preventing these 
powers from being immersed in matter. His reformulation of hylomorphism necessitates 
that Aquinas affirm intelligible species so that he can bridge the gap between a material 
body and an immaterial aspect of the soul. After examining Aquinas on sensation, 
abstraction, and the subject of intelligibles, I also examine Aquinas’s supernatural 
epistemology, which relies on Avicenna to account for prophecy and relies on Averroes 
to account for the beatific vision.
In chapter five, I summarize the contributions made by Avicenna and Averroes to 
Aquinas’s epistemology, and I examine the positions in chapter one in light of what was 
observed in chapters 2, 3, and 4. I end the dissertation with a return to the question of 
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88. In this dissertation,  I will only consider Averroes’ Long Commentary of 
Aristotle’s DeAnima, which was available to Aquinas.
direct realism and whether Aquinas is or is not a direct realist, and I look at some 
unexplained areas in Aquinas’s epistemology.
 42 
  
CHAPTER 2
PLATO AND THE ARISTOTELIAN APORIA
Introduction
Thomas Aquinas asserted that in order to know the world, sensible and 
intelligible species are necessary.1 According to Spruit, prior to Aquinas, it appears that 
no Aristotelian had affirmed such a doctrine.2 Although Aristotelians like Averroes and 
Avicenna disagreed in their interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology, neither philosopher 
affirmed the need for intelligible species.3 When one looks at the aforementioned 
psychologies, Avicenna’s psychology and Averroes’ psychology are more similar to each 
other than they are different from each other, whereas Aquinas’s psychology is radically 
different from theirs. According to Aquinas, he himself interpreted Aristotle correctly 
and Averroes and Avicenna had erred in their understanding of “the Philosopher.”4  
Moreover, according to Aquinas, if anyone had perverted Aristotle’s psychology, it was 
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1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, edited by Caramello (Marietti: 
Taurini-Romae, 1961), Bk. 2, Ch. 30, 1076d.
2. Spruit, Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, vol 1. p.156–57.
3. Richard C. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” in Averroes et Les 
Averroïsmes Juif et Latin, edited by J.-B  Brenet (Paris: Brepols, 2007), p. 120–23: 
Although Averroes held to a similar view in his Middle Commentary,  he did not hold to 
a species doctrine in the sense that it is the principle of knowledge.   Instead, for 
Averroes, the intelligible forms would have been objects of knowledge.  Furthermore, 
this dissertation focuses on the text that would have been available to Aquinas (i.e., 
Averroes’ Long Commentary  in Latin).
4. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 61–70.
Averroes.5 However, as Alain de Libera has demonstrated, internal aporiae existing in the 
Aristotelian corpus sometimes make it difficult to adjudicate Aristotle’s intended 
meaning.6 
Nevertheless, although Avicenna, Aquinas and Averroes disagree as to the correct 
interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology, they were in agreement inasmuch as they saw 
the Aristotelian aporia that would preclude a human being from being denominated as 
rational. In response, Avicenna, Averroes and Aquinas each came up with his own 
unique solution. But what is this Aristotelian aporia, and how did it come to be? 
In order to answer these questions, one must go back in the history of philosophy 
and examine Plato, for it is he who frames the epistemic issues; furthermore, it is he who 
sets the stage and the conditions that will constrain his successors. After examining Plato, 
I consider Aristotle’s response, for his response sets up one of the horns of the 
constructive dilemma that I call the Aristotelian aporia. I then examine the various senses 
in which hylomorphism may be understood, for if understood in the sense that most of 
Aristotle’s successors had understood it, hylomorphism sets up the other horn of the 
constructive dilemma (i.e., sets up the Aristotelian aporia). 
Plato and the Ontological Basis for Knowledge
 For the purpose of this dissertation, I shall draw upon some representative and 
relevant texts from The Phaedo, and The Republic. These two works are sufficient to 
provide the background necessary to understand Aristotle’s reaction to Plato’s doctrine of 
forms. It is Aristotle’s reaction to Plato that will give rise to the aporia.
In the Phaedo, one finds that Socrates has been condemned to death, and given 
his imminent demise, Socrates and his colleagues ponder whether or not the soul is 
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5. Thomas Aquinas, Tractus de unitate contra averroistas (Rome: Leonine 
Commission, 1976), Cap. 5.
6. Alain de Libera, La Querelle Des Universaux: De Platon à la Fin Du Moyen 
Age (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996), pp. 29–31.
immortal. During their discussions, several key concepts arise, such as the difference 
between the mutable world and the immutable forms, the nature of the soul, and the 
nature of knowledge. These concepts will have an indelible impact on everyone who 
follows Plato.
Concerning the source of knowledge, Plato makes a distinction between material 
objects and those that are not material. When inquiring into the source of knowledge, 
Socrates asks whether or not our knowledge was derived from perceivable objects, and 
he concludes that our knowledge of things such as equality and inequality could not have 
come from material objects. He reasons that without undergoing any change, material 
objects can simultaneously appear to be equal and unequal to different people. 
Nevertheless, one never confuses the concept of equality with the concept of inequality. 
He concludes that those things that can be confused to be equal and unequal 
simultaneously must be different from those things that cannot be confused.7After 
establishing that there is a difference between material things that can simultaneously 
appear to be equal and unequal to different observers and between those things that 
cannot appear equal and unequal to different people, Plato establishes that equal sticks 
are really not equal at all, but they fall short of being absolutely equal. In other words, the 
equal sticks are poor imitations of that which is absolutely equal.8 Given that no two 
material entities are absolutely equal, material entities cannot be the ontological grounds 
from which we derive our concept of equality. Furthermore, in order to judge that the 
“equal sticks” were in fact not equal, one must have had prior knowledge as to what 
equality is. For example, one cannot affirm that a cat is not a dog unless one already 
knows what a dog is. Similarly, one cannot argue that two things are unequal unless one 
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7. Plato, “Phaedo,” in Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), 74b-74c.
8. Ibid., 74d-74e.
already knows what equality is.9 Plato infers that our concept of equality could not have 
come from perception.10 Furthermore, he infers that perception could not have give risen 
to the concepts of beauty, goodness, uprightness.11 As a result of this reasoning, Plato 
concludes that prior to our birth, we may have acquired knowledge of beauty, goodness, 
et alia. In other words, we acquired our knowledge of what he names the forms while we 
were in a disembodied stated prior to birth.12 However, in order to confirm that one does 
acquire knowledge prior birth, it is necessary to prove the separate existence of those 
forms. It is stated that if it could be proven that the forms exist, then it would logically 
entail that the soul exists prior to its being interred in the body.13
Although he does not directly give an argument for the existence of the forms, 
Plato argues indirectly for the immutability of the forms. He states that what is constant 
and invariable is incomposite (i.e., it is simple), and what is mutable is composite.14 
Given that these things (e.g., equality itself, beauty itself, righteousness itself) are 
unchanging, it follows that they too must be incomposite (i.e., simple). Note that Plato’s 
argument has not established the existence of the form. Instead, it has established that if 
such forms were to exist, then they would necessarily have the following characteristics, 
simplicity, necessity, and immutability.
 I do not think it is the case that Plato is committing a hypothetical counter-factual 
fallacy. That is to say, he is not arguing from a possible state of affairs to an actual state 
 46 
  
———————————
9. Ibid., 74d-74e.
10. Ibid., 75a.
11. Ibid., 75c-75d.
12. Ibid., 76e-77a.
13. Ibid., 76e-77a.
14. Ibid., 78c.
of affairs. Instead, I think Plato is asserting that, given our human experience of forming 
unchanging concepts (e.g., beauty, equality, etc.), there must be an unchanging 
ontological basis, the forms, that is the ontological grounds for these unchanging 
concepts.
If one holds to some form of univocal predication, one can understand how Plato 
can maintain his position. In other words, if one assumes that for any given term there 
must be one kind of thing that is existentially denoted, Plato’s account is coherent and 
consistent. For example, when using the term bird, one can see that the term applies to at 
least one bird, and it does not apply to anything that is not a bird. Similarly, when one 
uses the term beauty, it would seem that there must be at least one entity that serves as its 
referent. Otherwise, terms like “beauty, “justice”, and “good” would be vacuous terms 
that have no ontological referent. Moreover, without an ontological referent, the 
connotation of these terms would be subject to the mutability of human convention. Yet, 
it appears to be the case that beauty is always understood as beauty, and it is not 
misunderstood to mean ugly. There must be some reason for the consistency in our 
concepts. What could it be? Plato’s answer is the forms are the unchanging ontological 
ground for our unchanging concepts.
The distinction between simple, immaterial forms and complex, material, 
concrete entities is important. Whereas the former are apprehended only by thought, the 
latter are apprehended only by sensation.15 By bifurcating the immutable forms and the 
mutable concrete entities of perception, Plato intentionally creates an epistemological rift 
between sensation and intellection. Plato’s rift, however, is not only epistemological. It is 
also ontological, for the material world cannot causally act on the soul to produce 
knowledge in the soul. At best one can only sense the material world and by virtue of 
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sensation, form opinions concerning the material world;16 but, one cannot acquire 
intellectual knowledge from the material world. Knowledge can only be attained from the 
immutable, eternal forms.
 Further along in the Phaedo, Plato gets to his original purpose, proving the 
immortality of the soul. Having shown that concepts are immutable and assuming that 
concepts have an ontological referent, Plato uses the forms, the ontological referent for 
thought, as the basis for proving that the human soul is immortal. He argues that there are 
two classes of things, the visible and the invisible. Whereas the visible are mutable, the 
invisible are immutable. He then asserts that humans are part body and part soul. He 
likens the body to the visible and the soul to the invisible. The soul uses the 
instrumentality of the body for inquiry by means of sensation, and when the soul is drawn 
away by the body into the realm of mutable, the soul loses its way and becomes confused 
and dizzy. However, when the soul investigates itself, it passes into the realm of the pure, 
everlasting, immortal, immutable, and it is free from interference from the body. In this 
state, the soul does not stray, but remains in the realm of the absolute, constant, 
invariable through contact with beings of a similar nature. This condition of the soul is 
called wisdom.17 
Although Plato’s affinity argument is fallacious because one cannot conclude just 
because two things have some properties in common that they have all properties in 
common, nevertheless, this passage tells us some things about Plato’s conception of the 
soul. Inasmuch as the soul is like the forms, the soul is simple, immaterial, intelligible, 
and accidentally related to the body. It is evident that the soul is intelligible, for it is able 
to reflect upon itself, and it is able to understand that which is intelligible. One sees 
 48 
  
———————————
16. Nicholas P. White, “Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology,” in Cambridge 
Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 284.
17. Plato, “Phaedo,” 79a-79d.
already that knowing has been framed in such a manner that spiritual substances must be 
both the object and the subject of knowledge. For example, when the soul reflects upon 
itself, it is capable of understanding because it is an immaterial substance; it is also 
capable of being understood because it is an immaterial substance. As a matter of fact, all 
objects of knowledge (e.g. the forms) must be immaterial, for matter precludes 
knowledge.
In addition to being immaterial, the object and subject of knowledge must be 
simple. The metaphysical simplicity of the forms is necessary to safeguard their 
immutability. During the sort of non-essential change that Aristotle will later call an 
accidental change, there must be one part that remains constant throughout the change, 
and another that is changing; otherwise, one would have annihilation and creation. By 
having no parts, the forms are indivisible, so they cannot be destroyed, and they cannot 
undergo change. Also, the immutability of the forms entails that they are ontologically 
necessary, for necessity means that a thing cannot be other than it is. Thus, if a form is an 
object of knowledge, it will never present itself to be other than it is. In other words, the 
necessity of the form entails the necessity of knowledge. 
In this account by Plato, knowing has been framed in such a way that both the 
objects and subjects of knowledge must be simple. The object and subject of knowledge 
must be immaterial. The object and the subject of knowledge must be necessary in terms 
of their being. Implicit is that knowing is veridical because of the immateriality of the 
object and subject of knowledge. As a matter of fact, all of these conditions are 
conditions that will be accepted by many philosophers following the Greek tradition. 
What remains to be seen is why the material world cannot be an object of knowledge.
In The Republic, Plato argues that everything that is perceptible appears 
simultaneously beautiful and also ugly. He then infers that perceptible things no more 
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“are than they are not,” in the sense that they are between being and non-being.18 Plato is 
alluding to their mutability, for everything that changes ceases to be what it is in one 
sense, and it comes to be what it is not in another sense. Given that only that which is is 
knowable (for that which is not cannot be an object of knowledge), it follows that 
material entities are not knowable, for although they exist, they are constantly ceasing to 
be what they are (i.e., they are always changing).19
In brief, Plato has framed knowing in such a way that only immaterial entities are 
knowable, and only immaterial entities can be knowers. Furthermore, both knower and 
known must be simple entities, and the mutability of material objects prevents them from 
being objects of knowledge. Also, Plato has bifurcated sensation and intellection, and he 
has created an ontological rift such that sensation cannot causally give rise to knowledge. 
This is simply because only the immaterial and transcendent forms can be the ontological 
basis for knowing.
The Aristotelian Aporia
 For an empiricist like Aristotle, who was given to classification of animals and 
study of nature, knowledge, if it is going to be obtained, must come from the natural 
world. There should be no need to affirm immaterial entities as the ontological grounds 
for knowledge. Thus, in order to deny that first principles (i.e., Platonic forms) are 
primary substances, Aristotle appeals to language and to the nature of knowledge. For 
Aristotle, a primary substance is a concrete entity (in Greek a tode ti). That is to say, a 
primary substance is a particular (i.e., “a this”).20 Universals, on the other hand, are not 
 50 
  
———————————
18. White, “Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology,” p. 284.
19. Plato, “Republic,” 479b9–10.
20. Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. 2 of The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by 
Johnathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Bk. 7, Ch. 15, 
1039b20.
particulars, for they do not denote a concrete entity; rather, they denote a kind (i.e., “a 
such”).21 Linguistically, universals are expressed as common predicates, whereas 
particulars are identified inasmuch as they cannot be predicated of another particular 
(e.g., “Plato is Socrates.”).22 Were particulars predicable of other particulars, then the  
subject of predication would be multiple things (i.e., the one subject would be many).23 
For example, “Socrates will be several things: himself, and man, and animal.”24 
However, a subject cannot simultaneously be one and many in the same sense. Thus, 
Aristotle concludes, “It is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain 
also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a ‘this’ , but rather a ‘such’. If not, 
many difficulties follow and especially the ‘third man.’”25 
In order to deny that Platonic forms are first principles of knowing, Aristotle also 
appeals to the nature of knowledge. For Aristotle, “the knowledge of anything is 
universal.”26 For example, if what one knew about the human heart only applied to a 
particular heart, Aristotle would deny that one has knowledge of human hearts. For 
Aristotle, in order to have knowledge of human hearts, that knowledge must have an 
extension that includes other human hearts. For example, knowing that a human heart has 
two ventricles and two atriums would count as knowledge inasmuch as it extends to other 
hearts. By reason of analogy, Aristotle argues that if first principles (i.e., Platonic forms) 
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were substances, they would be particulars. Moreover, if a thing is a particular, it is not 
knowable, for the knowledge of anything is universal. Consequently, if first principles 
were substances, then they would not be knowable. It is not the case that first principles 
are not knowable, therefore, first principles cannot be substances.
It is important to note that Aristotle is arguing that if Platonic forms were to exist, 
they would actually be particulars, and that which is actually a particular cannot be 
actually a universal. Given that particulars and universals are mutually exclusive in terms 
of their mode of being, it does not follow that a particular cannot be the basis for 
universals even if it cannot be the basis qua particular. As a matter of fact, later we will 
see that Aristotle will argue that particulars are the basis for universals. Furthermore, 
there seems to be some ambiguity as to whether universality is referring to the mode of 
being of a thing or to the extension of that thing. For example, if a universal is to exist in 
a human mind, it would be particular in terms of its mode of being, yet it would be a 
universal in terms of its extension because it would existentially denote all the particulars 
of which the universal may be predicated. For example, assume that the universal ‘dog’ 
existed in some intellect. In Aristotle’s ontology, it could exist as a particular accident in 
that intellect, yet it could be predicated of all dogs; thus, it would be universal in terms of 
its extension. However, Aristotle’s argument proves too much. If the particularity of 
anything excludes it from being knowable, it would follow that neither the sensibles of 
the world nor Platonic forms are knowable, for according to Aristotle, both the sensible 
world and the Platonic forms (were they to exist) are particulars. In addition, were an 
intelligible form to exist in the intellect, it too would be a particular, and by virtue of its 
particularity, it would not be knowable. On the other hand, if the particularity of sensible 
things does not preclude one from acquiring knowledge, neither should the particularity 
of a Platonic form.
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Notwithstanding, having denied that first principles are substances, Aristotle 
seems to have backed himself into a corner because knowledge concerns universals, but 
only particular (i.e., non-universals) subsist. How can one have knowledge of universals, 
when universals are not objects of sense experience? Is it not the case that all knowledge 
starts with the senses? Aristotle realizes that “true universal knowledge should entail 
corresponding universal principles of beings; he knew that by making universal 
knowledge a creation of the mind he still needed to find an explanation of the 
universality in things.”27 Thus, if there is going to be an ontological basis for universals, 
it is to be found in the particular.
Aristotle proposes that principles of existing things must be universal, and not 
separated substances, yet he affirms:
The statement that all knowledge is universal, so that the principles of things must 
also be universal and not separate substances, presents indeed, of all points we 
have mentioned the greatest difficulty, but yet the statement is in a sense true, 
although in a sense it is not. For knowledge, like knowing, is spoken in two ways 
- as potential and as actual. The potentiality, being, as matter, universal and 
indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality being definite, 
deals with a definite object - being a ‘this.’ But per accidens sight sees universal 
coulour, because this individual colour which it sees is colour, and this individual 
a which he grammarian investigates is an a. For if the principles must be 
universal, what is derived from them must also be universal, as in demonstrations; 
and if this is so, there will be nothing capable of separate existence - i.e., no 
substance. But evidently in a sense knowledge is universal, and in a sense it is 
not.28
Realizing that universals need some ontological grounding (other than Platonic forms), 
Aristotle in the aforementioned text suggests that the universals are ontologically 
grounded in the particular. Aristotle mentions that knowledge can be considered either as 
actual or potential. In actuality that which exists are particulars; however, when one 
examines the particular, one becomes cognizant of the universal. Therefore, in some 
manner, the universals exist potentially in the particular.
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The notion that universals are derived from the particular is an affront to the 
Platonic separated substance, and it will require a new metaphysical framework.29 
Realizing that particulars are mutable and contingent, Aristotle must somehow give an 
account explaining how immutable, necessary and universal knowledge is derived from 
the particulars. Aristotle seems to have accepted from Plato that form is the principle of 
intelligibility.30 Whereas Plato had one form per species existing separated from matter, 
Aristotle revamps the concept of form and embeds the form into each particular, whereby 
the form is multiplied.31 By virtue of an intrinsic form, each hylomorphic entity is 
determined and specified, and although each hylomorphic entity in a species is 
numerically different, nevertheless they are specifically one.32 The fact that the members 
in a species are specifically one will allow Aristotle to assert that the universal is formed 
from the particular. Moreover, by virtue of an educed form, a substance arises that only 
undergoes accidental change until it undergoes corruption. Therefore, although 
hylomorphic beings are mutable, they are only mutable in terms of their accidents. In 
terms of their substance, they remain the same. In other words, Aristotle’s metaphysical 
framework has an unchanging basis that can serve as the basis for unchanging, necessary, 
and universal knowledge.33 The problem, however, becomes how does one get to the 
intelligible portion (i.e., the form) when that form is intrinsic to the hylomorphic being?
According to Aristotle, experience allows one to do so. Memory is consequent 
upon perception, and by encountering the same thing multiple times, one derives 
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experience, and from experience, “the whole universal has come to rest in the soul (the 
one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things).”34 In other 
words, by repeated exposures to particulars in the same species, one comes to know the 
universal, which comes to rest in the soul. Aristotle uses the analogy of a rout during a 
battle. He says, “if one man makes a stand another does and then another, until a position 
of strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.”35 
Aristotle tells us that universals comes to rest in the soul, but the analogy does not tell us 
how. For a more detailed account of how perception gives rise to the universal, let us 
examine Aristotle’s De Anima.
For Aristotle, all knowledge begins with the senses, so let us examine Aristotle’s 
account of sensation, imagination, and intellect. According to Aristotle, two conditions 
must obtain for sensation to occur. First, the sense organ must receive a form without 
matter so that the sense organ is specified and determined in an intentional manner. 
Aristotle gives the analogy of a signet ring being impressed on wax, and his emphasis is 
not on the material aspect of the ring (i.e., its gold); rather, it is the shape of the ring that 
is impressed into the wax. The shape of the ring is supposed to be analogous to the 
formula (i.e., the ratio) that specifies and determines the sense. The second condition that 
must obtain is that the sense organ in the primary sense of the term must be able to 
receive the form. I say “in a primary sense” because the sense organ and its receptivity 
are not necessarily co-extensive. For corpses have organs, but the organs are only called 
so in a secondary sense because they no longer are receptive to these sensible forms.36 
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Aristotle determines that there must be a sense that adjudicates among the various 
senses, for we compare the various sensations to each other. For example, when we 
perceive a cube of sugar, we can taste that it is sweet and simultaneously know that it is 
white. Yet, each sense only knows about its proper object (i.e., vision is informed with 
color, hearing with sound, etc.). Thus, there must be a sense to which all sensations are 
present, and this sense which asserts the difference must be one sense. Furthermore, the 
sense that adjudicates among the various sensations accounts for the co-temporal nature 
of sensation. In other words, the sense is presently coordinating the sensation from the 
five senses so that one is aware that the sweetness that is being tasted and the white of the 
sugar are both occurring simultaneously and belong to the same object, the sugar cube.37
Having given an account of how sensation occurs, Aristotle distinguishes between 
sensation, imagination and thought. He asserts that imagination is distinct from sensation, 
for one does not say that one has imagined a person that one is sensing; rather, one says 
that one senses a person.38 Furthermore, the fact that one can see images when the eyes 
are shut (e.g., when one dreams) is evidence that imagination is distinct from sensation.39 
Primarily, imagination is a movement that is caused by sensation. Without sensation, 
there would be nothing stored in imagination. Yet, the imagination is receptive inasmuch 
as it is able to store representations that resemble sensation.40 Imagination is also distinct 
from thought because non-rational animals have imagination, but they do not have 
reason.41 After discussing imagination, Aristotle proceeds to “thought” and how it comes 
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about.
Analogous to sensation, two conditions are necessary for thinking to occur. First, 
there must be an object of thought. Aristotle tells us that the part of the soul that thinks is 
analogous to perceiving, and that it is acted upon by that which is thinkable.42 He tells us 
that the thinkable is the form of an object, but at this point, he does not mention what that 
object might be.43 Later in the De Anima, he tells us that it is not the stone that comes to 
reside in the soul; rather, it is the form of the stone.44 Further still in the text, Aristotle 
asserts that nothing has separate existence (i.e., this is a denial of Platonic forms), and the 
objects of thought (i.e., the thinkable) reside in sensible forms.45 Because the objects of 
thought reside in sensible forms, Aristotle asserts that understanding would not be 
possible without the images in the imagination which serve an analogous role to the 
objects of perception.46 In other words, the objects of thought are found in the sensible 
forms that have been propagated to the senses and to the imagination. The second 
condition that must be satisfied is that soul (or the part of the soul, which is called 
intellect and is responsible for intellection) must be receptive of all intelligible forms. In 
order to be receptive of all intelligible forms, intellect must have no actual existence until 
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it thinks.47 It must be like a tablet in which nothing has been written.48 That it is to say, it 
must be devoid of any innate forms. Aristotle agrees that the soul is the place of forms 
not as a whole, but only the part that thinks.49 However, Aristotle proceeds to tell us that 
in order for the second condition to be met, the soul (at least the part of the soul, mind, 
that is receptive of intelligible forms) must be unmixed with the body. If the mind were 
mixed with a body, then the reception of any intelligible form would be received as a 
quality or a quantity inhering in a body.50 
Unlike sensation, the aforementioned two conditions are not sufficient to bring 
about thought. In addition to the aforementioned two conditions, Aristotle asserts that 
mind also has an active component that functions like a light. This active component of 
mind is separable, unmixed, and is essentially an activity, and it alone is immortal and 
everlasting, and without this active component nothing thinks.51 By asserting that the 
receptive and active components of the mind are not mixed with the body, Aristotle 
opens Pandora’s box as it relates to the nature of knowledge, the nature of the soul, and 
the nature of knowing.
But what is meant by asserting that the active and passive components are 
unmixed with the body? Are they ontologically separate from the body? Given that 
Aristotle denies the immortality of the soul,52 and given that the active component alone 
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52. For Aristotle form-matter composites are generable and corruptible.  
Inasmuch as form is educed from matter, a new form-matter composite is generated, and 
as soon as the form-matter union is dissolved, the entity ceases to exist.
is immortal and everlasting, the active component would seem to have to be ontologically 
separate from the human being. Moreover, if these powers are ontologically separate 
from the body, it seems to suggest that the subjects of intelligible forms are immaterial 
substances. According to Aristotle, the active component is able to think itself; thus, the 
active component would need to be intelligizing and intelligible, which is not possible if 
the active component were mixed with a body. Yet, this position is similar to Plato’s 
position, for Plato asserted that the subject of knowledge and object of knowledge are 
immaterial, and that the soul is able to investigate itself. It seems that Aristotle is in 
agreement that the object and subject of intellection must be immaterial. 
 In addition to the ontological status of the receptive and active component of the 
intellect, has not Aristotle bifurcated sensation and intellection like Plato? If the active 
and passive components of the intellect are in fact separate and unmixed from the body, 
and sensation occurs in the body, how do the objects of thought found in the imagination 
come to exist in the receptive portion of the intellect? Also, given that the objects of 
thought are only potentially in the imagination (i.e., the objects of thought are not 
actually in the imagination), how can Aristotle affirm that the objects of thoughts are 
“found in sensible forms,” when he simultaneously affirms: “In things which have 
matter, each of the objects of thought are only potentially present”?53  This affirmation 
implies that there is no place in the body where the objects of thought can be located. 
Furthermore, Aristotle uses light as an analogy, which suggests that the intelligible forms 
are potentially “visible” to the receptive part of the intellect, and they become actually 
“visible” to the receptive part of the intellect.54 Yet, there is no account as to how they are 
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made visible. Does the active component provide the intelligible forms to the receptive 
component? If so, does it provide the intelligible content from itself or does it provide the 
intelligible content from another (e.g., the forms of the imagination)? Does the 
intelligible content already exist potentially in the receptive part of the intellect, and does 
the Agent Intellect merely educe intelligible forms from the potency found in the 
receptive component of the intellect? How far should the analogy between receptive 
intellect and prime matter be taken? Moreover, has not this intelligible form taken “on 
the detached character of the rejected separate forms of Plato”?55
Given the insurmountable gap between the body and a separate intellect, 
Aristotle’s account seems deficient and reminds us of Plato’s epistemology, which also 
bifurcated the material and unintelligible world from the immaterial and intelligible 
world. It is not any wonder that some have understood Aristotle to be a dualist.56 But 
perhaps, I have pushed Aristotle beyond his intended meaning. Perhaps, separate and 
unmixed does not mean ontologically separated from the body. Yet, historically most of 
Aristotle’s successors understood “separate” to mean ontologically separate.57 Prominent 
among them is Aquinas who will unequivocally assert that “separation” means able to 
operate without the use of a bodily organ.58 In order to understand why most of 
Aristotle’s successors understood intellect as ontologically separate, let us examine the 
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various ways that hylomorphism may be understood. Historically, hylomorphism and 
intellection were seen as incompatible.59 
Hylomorphism1 
For Aristotle, all natural substances are composed of two entitative principles: 
form and matter; these natural substances arise as a result of natural causes. Aristotle 
understood prime matter to be infinite, inchoate, and receptive of form.60 On the other 
hand, he understood form to be that which specifies and determines matter such that the 
form determines the species of what comes to be, and the matter individuates the form 
such that a this arises. Furthermore, because the notion of creation does not exist in 
Aristotle, generation is the result of an efficient cause educing form from matter. In an 
Aristotelian framework, it is unintelligible to affirm that something should arise from 
nothing simpliciter. Instead, if something comes to be, it must exist in potency before it 
exists in actuality. For example, for Aristotle, a human being comes to be as a result of 
matter, the female secretion and the male semen, the formal principle, and the efficient 
cause, the motion of the semen.61
Like any other natural substances, Aristotle understood human beings to be 
composed of form and matter. For Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body, and the 
body is the matter.62 When addressing whether “the soul and the body are one,” Aristotle 
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(1974): 53: “Why Aristotelians would use the terms ‘matter’ and ‘body’ interchangeably 
is rooted in Aristotle’s problematic definition of the soul  In De Anima Book 2, the soul is 
defined as the first actuality of a physical organic body.  However, the term ‘body’ 
already includes the notion of soul because according to Aristotle, the term “body” is 
responded, “we must describe it [the soul] as an actuality of the first kind of a natural 
organized body. That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul 
and body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are 
one.”63 Aristotle seems to imply that if one understood the relationship between the shape 
and the wax, one would understand the relationship between the soul and the body. So, 
let us analyze said relationship.
There is a sense in which the wax and the shape are one, and there is another 
sense in which they are not one. Inasmuch as the wax and the shape are not two 
ontologically separate existents, the wax and shape are one, for there is only one thing 
existing, the wax with the impressed shape. On the other hand, the wax and the shape are 
not one inasmuch as the shape is distinct from the wax, such as provided by a given seal. 
That is to say, it is not metaphysically necessary for the wax to have a particular shape 
since it may take on any shape; also, it is not metaphysically necessary for the particular 
shape to be impressed in wax, since the same shape may be impressed in anything 
capable of receiving its impression.64 Hence, if it is not metaphysically necessary that the 
wax have a particular shape, nor is it metaphysically necessary that a particular shape be 
received into wax, the wax and the shape are not one, for the shape is capable of 
specifying and determining the wax, whereas the wax is capable of being specified and 
determined. That is to say, they are related as action is to passion.
Similarly, Aristotle is intimating that form and matter are in fact one in one sense; 
yet there is another sense in which they are not one; consequently, some have understood 
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Aristotle to be espousing some form of substance dualism.65 However, matter qua matter 
is actually nothing although it is potentially anything after it has been specified and 
determined by form, whereas form qua form is nothing unless it is specifying and 
determining matter. That is to say, form and matter are not two separate existents; 
inasmuch as they are not two separate existents, they are one. Yet, in another sense, it 
seems that Aristotle is intimating that form and matter are not one; for although they are 
not separate, they are distinct inasmuch as they have different metaphysical roles (i.e., 
they are distinct because form specifies matter, whereas matter is specified by form.).
The notion that form and matter are distinct though not separate gives rise to the 
question of precisely how form and matter are related. Logically there are eight possible 
relationships between form and matter:
1: All of the form actualizes matter.
2: None of the form actualizes the matter.
3: Some of the form actualizes the matter.
4: Some of the form does not actualize matter.
5: All of the matter is actualized by the form.
6: None of the matter is actualized by the form
7: Some of the matter is actualized by the form.
8: Some of the matter is not actualized by the form.
Yet, although there are eight logical possibilities, there are several possibilities that can 
be excluded based on Aristotelian principles. Proposition two and six can be excluded 
based on the Aristotelian principle that form actualizes matter, and matter is that which is 
actualized by form. Proposition eight can be excluded based on the Aristotelian principle 
that non-actualized matter does not exist. Proposition four can be excluded because for 
Aristotle, nature never does anything superfluously.66 
1: All of the form actualizes matter.
3: Some of the form actualizes the matter.
5: All of the matter is actualized by the form.
 63 
  
———————————
65. Shields, “Soul and Body in Aristotle,” p. 106.
66. Aristotle, Parts of Animal, vol. 1 of The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited 
by Johnathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Bk. 3.61b17–
1b26.
7: Some of the matter is actualized by the form.
 By parity of reason, because nature does not do anything superfluously, then it follows 
that all of the form actualizes all of the matter, and all of the matter is actualized by all of 
the form. Were this not the case, some of the form would not be actualizing the matter. 
Consequently, propositions one and five must be true based on Aristotelian principles, 
and by sub-alternation,  proposition three and seven must also be true. Thus, by process 
of elimination, hylomorphism is the conjunction of propositions one and five: all of the 
matter is actualized by all of the form, and all of the form actualizes all of the matter. 
 Hylomorphism conceived in this manner seems to precludes knowledge. Why is 
this the case? Considering that form does not exist  per se, form cannot perform any 
operation per se. Similarly, considering that matter does not exist per se, matter cannot 
perform any operations  per se. If neither form nor matter can perform operations per se, 
and natural substances perform operations, neither form nor matter can be the per se 
cause of any operations each taken alone. In other words, form and matter may be 
necessary conditions for an operation by a form-matter composite, but neither is a 
sufficient condition. Consequently, it appears that every operation performed by a natural 
substance arises because of the form and the matter, not because of the form or  the 
matter alone. However, if every operation arises because of the form and the matter, the 
human soul, the form of the body, cannot receive intelligibles without receiving said 
forms into matter (i.e., the body) because if reception were an operation, it would depend 
on matter, and if reception were not an operation, the receiving subject would be 
material. Moreover, any form received into matter is not intelligible.67 
If hylomorphism is understood as stated above, then there are only two ways of 
asserting that humans are rational. First, one can deny that an individual is a hylomorphic 
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67. Aristotle, On the Soul, 429a25–30.
composite. That is to say, one can assert that an individual is an immaterial soul that is 
related accidentally to a body. Consequently, the individual is able to receive intelligible 
forms into an immaterial soul which would be the subject of intelligible forms. Second, 
one can affirm that a man is a hylomorphic composite who is unable to receive 
intelligible forms; consequently, one needs to look for an immaterial subject capable of 
receiving intelligible forms. As will be made clear in subsequent chapters, Avicenna will 
opt for the first, whereas Averroes will opt for the second. Aquinas, in contradistinction, 
will deny that the aforementioned conception of hylomorphism applies to rational 
composite substances although he will affirm that the aforementioned conception of 
hylomorphism applies to non-rational composite substances.68
Four Distinct Conceptions of Hylomorphism 
Thus, hylomorphism will take on four distinct meanings in the analyses in this 
dissertation. I shall denote the different types of hylomorphism by using subscripts (e.g., 
hylomorphism1). In the first sense of hylomorphism1, the soul and the body are united in 
such manner that the soul is the form of the body. Hylomorphism1 in this sense entails 
that the separation of form (i.e., the soul) and matter result in the destruction of the 
substantial form (i.e., the soul). In addition, this sense of hylomorphism precludes the 
reception of intelligible forms, for the reception of any intelligible form would involve 
reception into matter, which is the subject of the substantial form. Instead, if intelligible 
forms are to be received, the subject of those intelligible forms will have to be a 
substance separate from matter which, in the case of Averroes, is the separated material 
intellect. Furthermore, the substantial form must be educed from the potency of matter. 
Consequently, the composite is generable and corruptible; therefore, at the dissolution of 
the composite, the substantial form is destroyed and matter takes on a different 
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68. The positions maintained by Avicenna and Averroes are examined in detail in 
chapter three.  Aquinas’s position is examined in chapter four.
substantial form. Last, but not least, given that a substantial form is a necessary condition 
for performing operations but not a sufficient condition for performing operations, all 
operations performed by this form-matter composite are performed via a physical organ. 
Thus, if intellection is to happen, it must happen outside the form-matter composite. In 
other words, hylomorphism1 precludes the reception of intelligibles, it denies the 
immortality of the soul, and every operation performed by a hylomorphic1 being must be 
performed by a bodily organ. This sense of hylomorphism1 apparently applies to both 
Aristotle and Averroes.
 The second sense of hylomorphism, hylomorphism2, shares all of the 
characteristics of hylomorphism1 except two. Hylomorphism2 differs in that the 
substantial form is not educed from matter; instead, the substantial form arises from a 
separated immaterial substance, the agent intellect.69 Hylomorphism2 also differs in that 
the substantial, corporeal form is not the soul. Rather, the substantial form is the form of 
corporeity, which actualizes the matter. Given that the form of corporeity communicates 
actuality to matter, the role of the soul, a separated substance70, is to communicate life to 
the body. However, given that the body is a substantial form, and the soul is a substantial 
form, these two substantial forms are related in a non-essential sense that we can 
characterize as accidental to each other. Moreover, as in hylomorphism1, the form-matter 
composite is unable to receive intelligible forms. Instead, the soul is the subject of 
intelligible forms. Any operations performed by form-matter composites require a 
physical organ; hence intellection must happen outside the form-matter composite. This 
sense of hylomorphism2 applies to Avicenna.
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69. This separated substance, the Agent Intellect,  is an immaterial substance that 
necessarily emanates substantial forms to the form-matter composites.  The Agent 
Intellect will be treated in more detail in Chapter 3.
70. This notion of separated substance will be discussed in chapter 3 when I 
examine the various notions of substance in Avicenna.
The third sense of hylomorphism, hylomorphism3 is like hylomorphism1. The 
only difference is that there is a composition of form and matter that gives rise to essence, 
and this essence in turn is in potency to an act of existence.71 Apart from that distinction, 
all the characteristics of hylomorphism1 pertain to hylomorphism3. Hylomorphism3 is the 
type of hylomorphism that Aquinas will attribute to all non-rational entities.
The fourth sense of hylomorphism, hylomorphism4 shares characteristics common 
to hylomorphism1 and hylomorphism2. Like hylomorphism1, the soul is the substantial 
form of the body. However, unlike in hylomorphism1 and hylomorphism2, in 
hylomorphism4, when the substantial form (i.e., the soul) is separated from matter (i.e., 
the body), the substantial form of the body, the soul, is not destroyed.72 Hylomorphism4 
does not preclude the reception of intelligible forms73 into the form-matter composite, yet 
the subject of intelligible forms is immaterial and distinct from matter although not 
ontologically separated from matter, as I show in Chapter 4.74 That is to say, there are 
operations that can be performed by the soul independent of the body. Unlike 
hylomorphism1 and hylomorphism2, the substantial form for hylomorphism4 is not 
educed from matter, but rather it is created by God. Consequently, the form-matter 
composite does not have a material existence (i.e., an existence that can only be realized 
 67 
  
———————————
71. The composition for hylmorphism3 will be addressed in chapter 4.
72. Although hylomorphism2 does not have the soul as the substantial form of the 
body, nevertheless the separation of the substantial form, the form of corporeity, from 
matter does result in the ceasing to be of that substantial form, but it does not entail the 
destruction of the soul, whose existence is not dependent on matter.
73. Intelligible forms in this sense are not intelligibles in act existing in separated 
substances.  Instead, intelligible forms connote intelligibles which are mechanisms that 
communicate a ratio from a material subject to an immaterial subject.  These intelligibles 
are called intelligible species.
74. The term “subject” will be used analogically in this dissertation, and it should 
be understood as “that which is capable of receiving a form.”  For example, matter is said 
to be the subject of form.  The form-matter composite is said to be the subject of 
accidents.  The eye is said to be the subject of sensible forms.  The intellect is said to be 
the subject of intelligible forms. A person is said to be the subject of knowing.
when it is existing materially); instead, it is a spiritual existence. This sense of 
hylomorphism4 is the kind of hylomorphism that Aquinas attributes to humans.
Chapter Summary
In the Phaedo and in The Republic, we ascertain that Plato maintains that forms, 
immaterial separated substances,  are the objects of cognition. The immutability, 
simplicity, and necessity of the forms safeguard the immutability, simplicity, and 
necessity of human thought. The material world cannot be an object of knowledge; at 
best, it can be an object of opinion. This is the case because material entities are 
constantly ceasing to be what they are, and they are coming to be what they are not; 
given that only that which is is knowable, the material world is unknowable. Further, one 
finds that for Plato both the object and subject of knowledge must be immaterial. In 
addition, the soul is an immaterial substance that is intelligible and intelligizing. By 
holding the aforementioned view, Plato has framed what it means to know, what is the 
subject of knowledge, and what is the object of knowledge. In response to Plato, Aristotle 
denies that the forms of corporeal things exist as substances. Thus, Platonic forms are not 
the ontological ground for thought, and, given that knowledge concerns universals, 
Platonic forms are not the ontological grounds for universals. Having denied that 
universals exist, Aristotle needs to give an account as to how particular existents can 
serve as the ground for thought and knowledge, which is universal. In the De Anima, 
Aristotle works his way through various epistemic issues. Yet, when Aristotle must 
account for how thought takes place, he uses analogies to explain how intellection 
occurs. However, the analogies are broad enough to allow multiple interpretations. 
Moreover, by affirming that active and passive components of the intellect must be 
separate and unmixed from the body, Aristotle opens up an epistemological and a 
metaphysical gap that seems to bifurcate sensation and intellection. Given that 
subsequently hylomorphism and intellection are held to be incompatible, his successors 
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are led, as we shall see, into affirming that either the active intellectual component or the 
passive intellectual component (or both) are ontologically separate substances. On the 
other hand, contemporary philosophers deem Aristotle’s position so tenuous that some 
have charged Aristotle with being a substance dualist in order to reconcile the tension 
between hylomorphism and intellection.
Although based on Aristotelian principles, there are eight logically possible 
interpretations of hylomorphism, one can conclude that hylomorphism as understood by 
Aristotle’s successors means that form and matter are co-extensive in such a manner that 
it precluded the reception of intelligible forms, for on the reception of an intelligible 
form, said form would be received into matter, rendering it unintelligible. The 
Aristotelian aporia, then, can be summarized as follows: 
P1: If the human soul is the form of the body, it is unable to receive intelligible 
forms.
P2: If the human soul is not the form of the body (i.e., it is a separated substance), 
it is able to receive intelligibles.
P3: Either the human soul is the form of the body, or it is not the form of the body 
(i.e., it is a separated substance).
C: Therefore, either the human is unable to receive intelligibles, or the human 
soul is able to receive intelligibles.
In other words, hylomorphism as understood by Aristotle’s successors precludes 
reception of intelligibles into a hylomorphic entity.
 In order to resolve the aporia, one can hold to hylomorphism1 as understood by 
the tradition. Averroes will opt for this solution. Hylomorphism1 requires that the subject 
of intelligibles is ontologically distinct from the hylomorphic entity. One can also try to 
resolve the aporia by reformulating hylomorphism. Both Avicenna and Aquinas will take 
this approach. Avicenna will espouse a new form of hylomorphism: hylomorphism2. In 
the same manner that hylomorphism1 precludes the reception of intelligibles into the 
hylomorphic entity so does hylomorphism2. However, hylomorphism2 differs in that the 
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soul is not the form of the body; instead, the form of corporeity functions as the 
substantial form in hylomorphism2. Thus, hylomorphism2 allows for the human soul to be 
the subject of intelligibles. Aquinas, as we shall see, will espouse a new form of 
hylomorphism, hylomorphism4 that will allow him to maintain that the soul is the form of 
the body (like hylomorphism1), and that the soul is the subject of intelligibles. However, 
in this case, Aquinas’s reformulation of hylomorphism4 will necessitate intelligible 
species because hylomorphism4 is a two-edged sword that brings with it the strengths and 
weaknesses found in hylomorphism1 and hylomorphism2. Having looked at the historical 
background, let us turn to Avicenna and Averroes to see how they uniquely try to resolve 
the Aristotelian aporia. 
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CHAPTER 3
THE ARABIC TRADITION’S SOLUTIONS
Introduction
Although Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Theophrastus had tried to 
resolve the aporia, much of their work was directly unknown to Aquinas, and it is by 
means of the philosophers of the Arabic tradition, particularly Averroes’ Long 
Commentary on the De Anima, that Aquinas became familiar with the historical attempts 
to resolve the Aristotelian aporia.1 In this chapter, for Avicenna and Averroes, I shall 
proceed in the following order: the solution to the aporia, hylomorphism, sensation, 
abstraction, subject of intelligibles, and a summary and critique of the position of each.
Avicenna’s Solution to the Aristotelian Aporia
Avicenna tries to reconcile the Aristotelian Aporia with a solution requiring that 
he affirm several aspects of hylomorphism, while at the same time rejecting one crucial 
Aristotelian aspect of hylomorphism. Affirming that hylomorphism gives rise to a 
singular subject, the form-matter composite, Avicenna also asserts that matter cannot 
exist unless it is informed by a substantial form. In addition, he holds that the form of the 
body pervades matter in such a fashion that the form of the body is impressed into matter. 
Yet insofar as the form of the body is impressed into matter, it is rendered a material 
form; consequently, it is unable to receive intelligible forms. In other words, a properly 
hylomorphic entity is a single subject that is unable to receive intelligible forms. On this 
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1. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1: [H]orum autem qui ponunt unum 
intellectum possibilem in omnibus, duplex est opinio. Una est themistii et theophrasti, ut 
Commentator eis imponit in 3 de anima.
response to the strong hylomorphism account that was outlined in the previous chapter, 
Avicenna resolves one side of the aporia, but his approach gives rise to other aporiae.2
 For Avicenna the rational soul is not the form of the body, but a separated, 
immaterial, and simple substance. Given that intelligible forms can only be received into 
immaterial, separated, simple substances, Avicenna crafts a conception of the human soul 
as a suitable subject for the reception of intelligible forms. As we shall see, while for 
Avicenna the human soul is not properly speaking the form of the body in the full 
Aristotelian sense, it is nevertheless importantly connected with the body while at the 
same time being a separate, immaterial and simple substance. As a consequence of this 
doctrine, Avicenna fails to solve the aporia, for he has failed to make a hylomorphic 
entity the subject of intelligibles. The Agent Intellect is the only suitable subject for 
intelligible forms because intelligible forms cannot be multiplied. In this section, I show 
(1) that Avicenna has crafted a new kind of hylomorphism; (2) that his psychology 
remains Aristotelian inasmuch as sensation is a necessary condition for intellection; (3) 
that abstraction has many meanings in Avicenna, but excludes the extraction of 
intelligible forms from sensible forms; and (4) that although he attempted to make each 
person a suitable subject for the reception of intelligibles, he fails to do so; instead, he 
introduces the notion of representation, and (5) I shall critique Avicenna’s psychology. 
Avicenna’s Hylomorphism2
In his Liber de Philosophia Prima Sive Scientia Divina, Avicenna denies that the 
soul is the form of the body.3 While discussing the many ways that the term “substance” 
can be predicated, Avicenna writes:
First, therefore, we say that each substance is either a body, or it is not a body. If, 
however, it were not a body, either it will be part of a body, or it will not be part 
of a body, but completely separated from the body. If, however, it were part of the 
 72 
  
———————————
2. See page 66.
3. I will be using the Latin works of Avicenna.
body, then it will be formal or material. If, however, it were something separate, 
which is not part of the body, it will have a link in some way with bodies on 
account of the motion by which it moves them, and it is called “soul,” or it will be 
in every way separated from matter, and it is called “intelligence.”4 
 According to Avicenna, the term “substance” may be predicated of a body, or of intrinsic 
parts of the body, or of entities that are completely separated from bodies. The parts that 
are intrinsic to the body are formal and material, whereas those entities that are separate 
from the body are the rational soul and the intellect.5 Although rational soul and intellect 
are separate from the body, they differ from one another in that the soul is related to a 
body inasmuch as it moves the body, whereas intellect is not related to the body in any 
way. That the form of the body is intrinsic to the body, while the soul is extrinsic, 
indicates that the soul itself cannot be the form of the body.
 Avicenna often remarks that the soul is not the form of the body. First, he writes, 
“If you will remember that which we said concerning the soul, it will be shown to you to 
be a separated substance, not a body.”6 Second, he affirms that the soul is a substance 
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4. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, edited and 
translated  by  Simone Van Riet (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1980), Bk. II, Ch. 2, p.68–69: 
Primum, igitur dicimus quod omnis substantia vel est corpus vel non corpus. Si autem 
fuerit non corpus vel erit pars corporis vel non erit pars corporis, sed est separatum 
omnino a corpore. Si autem fuerit pars corporis, tunc vel erit formalis vel materialis. Si 
autem fuerit separatum quod non sit pars corporis, vel habebit ligationem aliquo modo 
cum corporibus propter motum quo movet illa et vocatur anima, vel erit separatum a 
materiis omnimodo et vocatur intelligentia. [emphasis added]
5. Given that this dissertation focuses on intellection and how Avicenna and 
Averroes influence Aquinas’s doctrine of intelligible species, unless otherwise stated,  
when I use the term “soul” in Avicenna,  it means the rational soul. Discussion 
concerning the vegetative and sensitive soul are outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Notwithstanding, following Aristotle,  Avicenna does make the distinctions between 
vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul. For more information on the vegetative and 
sensitive soul in Avicenna see Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 
1, Ch. 4, pp. 76–79.
6. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Bk. 3 Ch. 1, p.104: 
Si autem memineris id quod diximus de anima, certificabitur tibi esse substantiam 
separatam, non corpus.
that stands alone.7  Third, he argues that the substance that is the subject of intelligible 
forms (that is to say, the rational soul) is not a body, neither does it have being on 
account of the body in any way, nor does it have being on account of a power in the 
body, nor does it have being in any way by being a power in [the body] or its form.8 In 
other words, the soul’s existence is not dependent on the body in any way. Lastly, he 
writes:
When there is a thing which is existing per se but is just as is from something or 
with the being of something other than itself -- but the first is just as is the body 
which is of matter and form, the second is just as are rational souls with the 
generation of bodies -- then the possibility of that thing’s own being will depend 
on that: not because that thing is in potency to be a white body through a potency, 
nor because in that there is impressed the potency of being the possibility of 
whiteness in a subject in which white is impressed, but rather in such a way that 
either it has being with it or when a certain disposition accrues to it.9 
 In other words, Avicenna is contrasting two ways in which a subsisting entity may come 
to be. That is to say, a subsisting entity may come to be from another or with another. An 
entity that comes to be as a result of entitative principles (e.g., form and matter) is said to 
come from  another.  For example, bodies, hylomorphic2 entities, come to be from 
another, for they arise as a result of form’s being received into matter. In 
contradistinction, there are entities that do not come to be from  another; instead, they 
come to be  on the occasion that other entities come to be, and they are said to come to be 
with another. For example, the rational soul does not pre-exist the body, but it comes to 
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7. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 1, p.80 anima 
est quod habet has virtutes et est, sicut postea declarabimus, substantia solitaria.
8. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 2, p. 82: 
substantia quae est subiectum intelligibilium non est corpus, nec habens esse propter 
corpus ullo modo eo quod est virtus in eo aut forma eius.
9. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Bk. 4, Ch. 2,  p. 
204: Cum autem fuerit res quae est existens per se, sed est ex aliquo vel cum esse alterius 
a se --primum vero est sicut corpus quod est ex hyle et forma, secundum est sicut animae 
rationales cum generatione corporum, --tunc possibilitas sui esse pendebit ab illo, non 
quod illa res in potentia sit esse corpus album per potentiam, nec quod in illa sit impressa 
potentia essendi possibilitatem albedinis in subiecto in quo imprimitur albedo, sed sic ut 
vel habeat esse cum eo vel cum advenerit ei aliqua dispositio.
be only when a body comes to be.10 This example of the way a subsisting entity comes to 
be shows that the body and the soul come to be separately from each other, and entities 
that come to be and continue to exist separately cannot be hylomorphically united. In his 
own words, “The human soul, however, is not related to the body as form, as we will 
demonstrate afterwards.”11 Yet, Avicenna does not completely reject hylomorphism, 
even in the case of humans.
Avicenna maintains that the body is a hylomorphic2 entity, and as such it is 
generable and corruptible. According to his view, the body is a substance composed from 
something that has potency, and from something through which it has actuality. That 
which has actuality is its form, but that which has potency is its matter.12 However, for 
Avicenna, the first form of the body is the form of corporeity. Without the form of 
corporeity, the body could not exist, nor could the form of corporeity exist devoid of 
matter.13 It is by virtue of the form of corporeity that a body has three dimensions.14 
 75 
  
———————————
10. Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 140.
11. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 1, p. 113: 
Anima autem humana non habet se ad corpus ut forma, sicut postea ostendemus; 
Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 2, p. 111: Ergo anima 
non est una, sed est multae numero... illud autem non est impression animae in materia.
12. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Bk. 2, Ch. 2,  p.77: 
Corpus igitur est substantia composita ex quodam per quod habet potentiam, et ex 
quodam per quod habet effectum.  Id autem per quod habet effectum est forma eius, vero 
habet potentiam est materia eius, et hoc est hyle.
13. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p.82: 
Forma vero corporeitatis, inquantum est corporeitas, est un natura simplex acquisita non 
habens in se diversitatem, et ideo forma corporeitatis simpliciter non differt a forma 
corporeitatis simpliciter per differentiam intrantem in corporeitatem... Impossibile est ut 
sit corporeitas egens materia... Manifestum est quod corpora composita sunt ex materia et 
forma.... Dicemus nunc quod haec materia corporalis non potest esse in effectu spoliata a 
forma.
14. John McGinnis, “A Penetrating Question in the History of Ideas: Space, 
Dimensionality and Interpenetration in the Thought of Avicenna,” Arabic Sciences and 
Philosophy 16 (2006): p. 61; Arthur Hyman, Averroes’ De Substantia Orbis (Israel: 
Moreover, having acquired the form of corporeity, a body may acquire several higher 
forms (e.g., the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul).15 The form of corporeity acts as a 
substratum that allows the immaterial rational soul to act on the material body; via this 
substratum the soul may act upon the principle organ, the heart, by virtue of which 
powers emanate to all the other organs.16  What remains to be seen is whether a 
hylomorphically2 composed body can unite with the soul, a spiritual substance, to give 
rise to a hylomorphic entity.
According to Avicenna, two substances cannot unite. He argues that if two 
substances were to unite, each of the substances still existing, then there would be two 
substances, not one. And if they were to unite such that one of these would cease to exist 
and the other would continue to exist, then it would be impossible to unite an existing 
substance with nothing. Lastly, if the two substances cease to be and a tertium quid arose 
from these two, then the two substances have not united, but they have been annihilated. 
Hence, Avicenna declares that the notion of uniting two substances is an absurdity.17 
In sum, Avicenna has denied that the soul is the form of the body, and in doing so 
he has given a decidedly new twist to what we find in Aristotle’s account of 
hylomorphism. Yet, he still maintains that the body is a hylomorphic2 entity that arises 
from the composition of the form of corporeity and matter in relation to the rational soul. 
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[Continued from previous page]
Medieval Academy of America, 1986), p. 41.
15. Michael Marmura, “Some Questions Regarding Avicenna’s Theory of the 
Temporal Origination of the Human Rational Soul,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18 
(2008): p. 135.
16. Ibid., p. 129.
17. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Bk. 2, Ch. 3, p. 
88–89: Si autem dixerint quod prima duo, quamvis duo sint, uniuntur tamen et fiunt 
unum, dicemus absurdum esse duas substantias uniri. Si enim uniuntur et unaquaeque 
earum habet esse, tunc sunt duo, non unum.  Si autem uniuntur ita ut unum eorum desinat 
esse et alterum habeat esse, tunc quomodo potest esse ut id quod non est uniatur cum eo 
quod est? Si vero utrumque desinit esse in unione et provenit aliquid tertium ex eis, tunc 
sunt non unita, sed annihilata.
Moreover, given that the body is a substance and the soul is a substance, it is impossible 
for two substances to undergo composition. Hence, the body and the soul will remain 
ontologically separate from each other. But the separation of the soul and the body is a 
two-edged sword. On one hand, Avicenna has made the human soul an adequate subject 
for the reception of intelligible forms, as will demonstrated in the section that addresses 
the subject of intelligibles. Yet, for Avicenna, the acquisition of knowledge begins with 
the external world via the external and  internal senses; the separation of body and soul, 
however, create an ontological chasm that Avicenna’s psychology cannot bridge. Having 
examined Avicenna’s hylmorphism2 and his substance dualism, let us turn to his account 
of sensation.
Avicenna and Sensation
Apart from first principles, the acquisition of knowledge begins with the external 
world via both the external and internal senses. In this section, I explicate Avicenna’s 
account of sensation starting with (a) what is meant by sensation; (b) what are the various 
ways that abstraction is used in Avicenna; and (c) what are internal senses and their roles. 
Precisely what is meant by sensation by Avicenna? Further, what are the various ways 
that abstraction is used by Avicenna? To answer these questions, we must examine his 
teachings on internal and external senses.
Before delving into the topic of sensation, it is important to recall two things:  
Avicenna is working in an Aristotelian framework in which (i) form accounts for both 
immanent and transient operations, and (ii) intentions are a kind of form. For Aristotle 
and Avicenna, the form of a non-rational animal accounts for its formal, final, and 
efficient cause. That is to say, it is by virtue of its intrinsic form that a thing is what it is, 
is able to act, and acts in a certain manner. For example, a salmon is a salmon by virtue 
of the form that was received into matter. Moreover, each salmon acts like a salmon (e.g., 
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returning to the river where it hatched, it swims) because of its form. Lastly, without its 
form, a non-rational animal is dead, unable to act. Not only does form serve as principle 
of immanent operations in non-rational animals, but form also accounts for transient 
motion. Following Aristotle, all transient motion requires two things: (a) contact between 
the mover and the movable and (b) the transmission of a form from the mover to the 
movable.18 For example, when a ball is thrown, the hand communicates motion to the 
ball, and the ball communicates motion to the air, and via the transmission of form and 
contact with the air, the ball is kept aloft.19 However, the communication of form may be 
sufficient to account for transient motion, but it is insufficient to account for sensation.
Aristotle and Avicenna can account for the transfer of motion and certain qualities 
(e.g., heat) by means of forms. However, when it comes to sensation, these forms are 
insufficient because they only transfer a quantity or quality. For example, were one to get 
struck in the eye with a torch, the form of heat  would be conveyed to the eye, and the 
qualities that are conveyed (i.e., heat and motion) are apt to destroy the sense organ 
instead of informing the sense organ. So, if the sense organ is to be informed for the sake 
of sensation, it must be by virtue of some other mechanism. An intentional form is a kind 
of form that conveys the intention of a physical thing such that it can move a sense from 
potentially sensing to actually sensing. Yet, it does so in a manner that informs the sense 
organ without damaging the sense organ or without actualizing the sense organ with the 
same material form in the same way that is found in the physical world.
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18. Aristotle, Physics, vol. 1 of The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by 
Johnathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Bk. 3, Ch. 2, 
p.344.
19. I am aware that there are problems with having forms account for motion, 
especially in light of inertia.  However,  it is important to note that formal causality was 
used not only to account for motion but for perception and intellection.  Averroes and 
Aquinas will work in a similar framework, and I will need to  refer to the formal causality 
to point out the problems with Pasnau and Smit’s understanding of Aquinas.
In his Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus, Avicenna dedicates several 
chapters to discuss each of the five senses; however, before beginning his exhaustive 
treatment of each sense, he discusses what is common to all sensation. He writes:
Let us now speak concerning the sensible and apprehending powers, but let us 
speak of them in  general words, saying that it seems that to apprehend is nothing 
but to apprehend the form of the apprehended [thing] in some of these ways; but 
if apprehending means to apprehend a material thing, then apprehending is to 
apprehend the form of something abstracted from matter by some [kind of] 
abstraction. The kinds of abstraction are diverse, and the degrees of these 
[abstractions] are quite distinct from each other.20
Note that the three characteristics that underpin sensation are: (a) apprehending is 
nothing more than the reception of some form; (b) if the apprehension pertains to a 
material object, then the form is received as an intentional form devoid of matter; (c) 
there are various degrees of abstraction. With these three characteristics in mind, we 
come to the first question. What is sensation?
Sensation is the reception of a form into the sense organ of a sentient being.21 The 
intentional form is received into the sense organ denuded of matter; by virtue of the 
intentional form the sentient entity is informed.22 In the case of sensation, these 
intentional forms are necessary for sensation. Following Aristotle, sense organs are 
passive powers; as such in themselves, they have sensation only in potency. A medium is 
required between the sensible object and the sense organ; moreover, that which is in 
potency can only be rendered actual by means of something that is already in act. By 
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20. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 114:  
Loquamur nunc de virtutibus sensibilibus et apprehendentibus, sed loquamur de eis verba 
generalia, dicentes quia videtur quod apprehendere non sit nisi apprehendere formam 
apprehensi aliquo modorum; sed si apprehendere est apprehendere rem materialem, tunc 
apprehendere est apprehendere formam alicuius abstractam a materia aliqua abstractione. 
Species autem abstractionis diversae sunt et gradus earum multum distantes.
21. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 121: 
sentiri extrinsecus est quod eius forma assimilata est in meo sensu.
22. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 120: 
sentire etenim est recipere formam rei nudam sua materia, ita ut informetur per eam 
sentiens.
means of the medium, the intentional form conveys actuality to the sense organ and 
specifies and determines the sense organ, so that not only does sensation arise, but it is 
the sensation of a particular thing (e.g., brown, sweet, hot, etc.).23 Given that the 
intentional form determines the sense organ, one can say that the sense organ has the 
ability to become formally what the sensible thing is in actuality.24  This formal identity 
is important because it ensures that sensing is veridical. Having defined sensation, one 
can see that the apprehending of a form without matter is essential to sensation. Yet, the 
various ways that intentional forms are abstracted remain to be seen.
For Avicenna, the term “abstraction” is predicated analogically based on the type 
of sensation that is occurring; for example, he writes:
Vision needs these accidents when it apprehends a form inasmuch as it does not 
abstract form from matter by a true abstraction. Rather it is necessary that matter 
be present so that this form may be apprehended in that [organ].25 
The term “abstraction” may refer to either (1) the process or activity by which a form is 
separated from matter, or it may refer to (2) the intentional form that has been denuded 
from its matter in some sense. To avoid equivocation, I shall be using “abstraction2” to 
denote the intentional form that has been denuded from matter in some sense, and I shall 
be using “abstraction1” to denote the process or activity by which a form is denuded from 
matter. For example, in the sentence “An abstraction2 results when abstraction1 occurs,” 
the word “abstraction” has both connotations. As we proceed from the external world 
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23. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 128: 
Ergo verum est quod sensibus necessaria sunt instrumenta corporalia, et aliquibus eorum 
media, quia sentire est passio aliqua, quae est receptio formae sensati et permutatio in 
similitudinem sensati in effectu. Et sentiens in effectu est sicut sensatum in effectu.  
24. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 120: 
Dicemus autem quod sentiens habet in sua potentia fieri sicut sensatum in effectu.
25. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 116: 
Visus autem indiget his accidentibus cum apprehendit formam, eo quod non abstrahit 
formam a materia abstractione vera, sed est necessarium materiam adesse ad hoc ut haec 
forma apprehendatur in illa.
through the external senses and the internal senses, one need to be mindful of 
abstractions2 (i.e., intentional forms) and abstractions1 (i.e., process) performed by the 
sense organs.
 In the text above, Avicenna is affirming that the process of abstraction is not 
performed by the eye, consonant with the notion that the senses are passive.26 Given that 
prior to the sense organ there is no active power that is able to separate form from matter, 
one must conclude that sensible objects emit sensible, intentional forms to their 
environment, and the environment transfers the sensible species to the sense organ. This 
is most obvious in the case of vision which occurs in the presence of light.
These sensible, intentional forms are the lowest grade of abstraction2 because they 
are dependent on matter in two says. First, the sensible object must be material in order 
for sensible, intentional forms to be transmitted to the sense organ. For example, an 
immaterial angel could be present before a sense organ, and because of its immateriality, 
no sensible species would inform the sense organ; consequently, one would be oblivious 
to the angel’s presence. Second, sensible, intentional forms are dependent on matter 
inasmuch as the presence of the material object to the sense organ is necessary for 
sensation. For example, when the ice cream is removed from the presence of one’s eyes, 
one can no longer sense the ice cream. Try as one may, one cannot force oneself to see 
the ice cream when it is not present to the eyes. Similarly, each sense only receives 
intentional forms appropriate to it, and each of these intentional forms is dependent on 
matter. For this reason, vision sees, but it cannot hear, taste, touch or smell. The same 
applies to all other senses, which have their own proper object.27 Yet, the reception of the 
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26. In addition to the formal identity mentioned above, the passivity of the sense 
organ contributes to the veridical nature of sensation because it is not the case that the 
sense organ is able to specify or determine itself without the reception of some species.
27. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, p. 269: 
volo autem dicere quod virtus visibilis videt et non audit nec olfacit nec tangit nec gustat.
intentional, sensible form is not sufficient to account for the unity of the perceived object. 
For example, when one lights a match, one hears the crackle, smells the sulfur, sees the 
flame, and feels the heat. Nevertheless, one does not attribute the four distinct sensations 
to four distinct objects; rather, one attributes all of these sensations to the match. 
Something must account for the unified perception.
The common sense is an internal sense organ that coordinates and unifies the 
various sensations, which consist of the reception of sensible forms into the sense organs. 
The common sense is able to do so because the sense organs are extensions of it. 
Avicenna tells us that vision is outside of the common sense, and vision is a power 
emanates from the common sense.28 Similarly, it would seem that all the other senses are 
outside the common sense, but they emanate from it. Being grounded in the common 
sense, the sense organs are able to transfer  to the common sense sensible, intentional 
forms that they have received. For this reason, the common sense is said to see, hear, 
touch, taste, and smell.29 Like the sense organs, the common sense can only perform its 
role when the sense organs are sensing, for it receives intentional forms from the sense 
organs. However, it does not retain the intentional forms.30  It seems to be the case that 
the common sense is also dependent on matter just like the external senses, for when a 
material entity is not present to the senses, the senses do not sense, nor does the common 
sense retain forms. It cannot be the case that all of our senses are dependent on matter 
because when one dreams, one can see images that are not being sensed. Moreover, one 
can imagine where the refrigerator is even when the refrigerator is not being sensed. 
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28. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, p. 269: 
Virtus autem visibilis est extra sensum communem, quamvis emanet ab eo.
29. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, p. 269 
virtus vero sensus communis videt et audit, et cetera.
30. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, p.270:  
Sensus etenim communis est recipens formam, sed non retinens.
Therefore, there must be a power in the body that retains the sensible images that were 
constructed by the common sense; otherwise animals would not be able to locate the 
resources necessary for their survival.
The imagination allows an animal to retain images when the object of sensation is 
no longer present. That is to say, the imagination has a better abstraction2 because it is 
less dependent on matter than the common sense and the external senses. For example, 
even when the ice cream is not present before me, I can imagine that it is in the 
refrigerator. Yet, I am unable to sense that the ice cream is in the refrigerator, for I am in 
another room. These images that are retained in the imagination are called imaginable 
forms because they have been impressed in the imagination by the common sense.31 
Although the imaginable forms are a better abstraction2, nevertheless, they are not 
denuded from the vestige of matter, for they still have time, location, quality and quantity 
adjoined to them.32 The imagination not only has the role of retaining imaginable, 
intentional forms, but it transmits these forms to the estimative power, a power located in 
the back part of the brain.33 
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31. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch.8, p. 269: 
[S]ensus communis. . . reponit eam ibi apud virtutem formalem, quae est imaginativa, 
sicut postea scies, quae recipit formam et conservat eam.
32. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 117: Sed 
imaginatio non denudat eam ab accidentibus materialibus... formae etenim quae sunt in 
imaginatione, sunt sensibiles et secundum quantitatem et qualitatem aliquam et situm.
33. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, p. 270–71: 
Deinde forma quae est in imaginatione penetrate posteriorem ventriculum, cum voluerit 
virtus aestimativa et elevaverit vermem... forma quae erat in imaginativa imprimetur in 
spiritu virtutis aestimationis, et virtus imaginationis servit virtuti aestimationis, reddens ei 
quod est in imaginativa. Avicenna will maintain that the imaginative power is not only 
passive inasmuch as it receives intentional forms, but it is also active inasmuch as it has 
the power of composing intentions.  For example, one has seen a horse, and one has seen 
a man, and consequently, the imagination is able to compose these two images to create a 
centaur.  However,  an adequate treatment of the active power of the imagination is 
beyond the scope of this paper; See Deborah Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic 
Paradigms and Western Transformations,” Topoi 19, no. 1 (2000): pp. 59–75;  Deborah 
Black, “Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,” 
Dialogue 32 (1993): pp. 219–58; Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes 
For Avicenna, the estimative power has the highest level of abstraction2 among 
the internal and external sense organs because it is able to apprehend non-sensible 
intentions (e.g., danger or goodness) that are not in matter although they are concomitant 
with matter.34 Whereas shape, color and location are only found in material things, non-
sensible intentions such as danger and goodness can belong to material and immaterial 
things, and they can be understood without a reference to a body. Therefore, they must be 
non-sensible intentions that are concomitant with material things.35 For example, when a 
lamb senses a wolf, it also senses danger, which is an non-sensible intention. These types 
of intentions are more pure and simpler than the intentions found in the senses or in the 
imagination.36 The estimative power is the first power that actually performs an 
abstraction1 and separates non-sensible intentions from the imaginable forms that were 
transferred from the imagination. Nonetheless, the abstraction1 performed by the 
estimative power is always related to something sensible, and it does not denude these 
intentions from the conditions of matter.37
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[Continued from previous page]
on Intellect Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human 
Intellect (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 95.
34. Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western 
Transformations,” pp. 2–5.
35. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 118–19:  
Sed aestimatio parum transcendit hunc ordinem abstractionis, eo quod apprehendit 
intentiones materiales quae non sunt in suis materiis, quamvis accidat illis esse in 
materia, quia figura et color et situs et his similia sunt res quas non est possibile haberi 
nisi a materiis corporalibus, bonitas vero et malitia, et convenients et inconveniens et his 
similia sunt in se res non materiales, quibus tamen accidit esse materiatas.  Ratio autem 
quod hae non sunt materiales, haec est scilicet quod si hae essent materiales ex seipsis, 
non intelligeretur bonitas vel malitia vel conveniens vel inconveniens nisi accidens 
corpori; intelliguntur autem sine corpore; constat ergo quod hae in se sunt non materiales, 
sed accidit eis esse materiatas.
36. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 119: 
Ergo haec abstractio purior et vicinior est simplicitati quam duae primae.
37. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 2, Ch. 2, p. 119: 
Ergo haec abstractio purior et vicinior est simplicitati quam duae primae, sed cum hoc 
In sum, the term “abstraction” can refer either to the process of abstraction1 or to 
an intentional form (abstraction2) that has been separated from matter in some fashion. 
Abstractions2 vary in degrees. Sensible, intentional forms, which are produced by 
sensible objects, are the least abstracted because they depend on matter in two ways. 
They depend on a material object that must be present to the sense organ for sensation to 
occur. Each of the sense organs has a sensible, intentional form that is specific to its 
receptive capacity. In addition, the ability to unify the various kinds of sensible, 
intentional forms is found in the common sense from whence the senses emanate. Like 
the senses, the common sense can only operate inasmuch as the senses are receiving 
intentional, sensible forms. In addition to unifying the intentional forms from the various 
sense organs, the common sense is responsible for transferring the unified intentional 
forms to the imagination. The imagination is said to have a better abstraction2 because it 
is not dependent on matter inasmuch as the sensible object does not need to be present for 
the sensible object to be imagined. Yet, it is not the case that the imagination actually 
performs an abstraction1. The imagination, unlike the common sense, retains the 
imaginable intentions that it received from the common sense, and it transfers those 
intentions at the request of the estimative power, which is able to perform an abstraction1 
that separates non-sensible intentions such as danger or goodness. Properly speaking, 
only the estimative power performs an abstraction1. Nonetheless, the abstraction1 still 
results in abstractions2 that remain particular. Consequently, although there are various 
degrees of abstractions2, nevertheless, only the estimative power actually performs an 
abstraction1. In other words, there is no power in the human body that is able to give rise 
to intelligibles in act because only that which is material is able to apprehend that which 
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tamen non exspoliat formam hanc ab accidentibus materiae, eo quod particulariter 
apprehendit ea et secundum propiam materiam et secundum comparationem eius ad 
illam, et ligatam cum forma sensibili et stipatam accidentibus materiae et cum 
convenientia imaginationis in illa.
is material, and only that which is immaterial is able to apprehend that which is 
immaterial.38  Intelligibles in act (which will be discussed next) are immaterial, and given 
the substance dualism found in Avicenna, there can be no transference of intentional 
forms between the material world and the immaterial world. Consequently, if the rational 
soul is to be informed it must be informed by the Agent intellect, an immaterial separated 
substance. 
The Many Meanings of Abstraction
As it pertains to the senses, abstraction has two senses: (1) the process that 
separates form from matter; (2) the product of a process that separates form from matter. 
In addition, abstractions vary in degree.39 At one end of the spectrum, there is the 
abstraction2 that can only arise from a material object and it is ineluctably dependent on 
matter. That is to say, not only is matter a necessary condition for the production of that 
species, but the material object must also be present to the sense organ. Higher degrees of 
abstraction2 are less dependent on matter; although they arise from material objects, 
material objects are not necessary for them to persist in an organ. Even higher still are 
abstractions2 that arise from intentions that are concomitant with matter, yet in 
themselves these abstractions2 are not material (e.g., good and evil). At the level of 
sensation, the latter abstractions2 are the highest form of abstraction2. Only as 
apprehended by the estimative power is there a process of abstraction1. Even though the 
intentions in the estimative power are the highest level of abstraction2 at the level of 
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38. Meryem Sebti, “Le Statut Ontologique de l’Image dans la Doctrine 
Avicennienne de la Perception,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005): p. 139: “La 
doctrine psychologique repose sur le postulat d’une similitude entre l’agent et le patient; 
seul ce qui est matériel peut saisir ce qui est matériel et seul ce qui est immatériel peut 
saisir ce qui est immatériel;  Recall that Plato has bifurcated the material from the 
immaterial, and Avicenna has adopted this principle.”
39. Cristina D’ Ancona, “Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna,” in Theories of 
Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Simo Knuuttila and 
Pekka Karkkainen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp.53–56.
sensation, nonetheless, they along with all the other abstractions2 never are intelligible 
because all of the aforementioned abstractions2 exist in matter and denote a particular 
thing that exists at a particular time, in a particular place, and with a particular quantity. 
That is to say, all the abstractions2 at the level of sensation fail to attain the role of 
intelligible forms.
Given the principle that only the material can apprehend the material and given 
that only the immaterial can apprehend immaterial, sensible and imaginable intentional 
forms are unable to affect the rational soul, an immaterial separated substance. It would 
seem that sensible and imaginable intentional forms are superfluous as it pertains to 
intellection, but this is not the case. The reception of sensible and imaginable intentional 
forms disposes the soul for the reception of intelligible forms. If sensible and imaginable 
intentional forms cannot affect the rational soul, are they not superfluous when it comes 
to intellection? No, for the activity of comparing and contrasting the images is an 
exercise which prepares the soul for the reception of the intelligible forms.40 
Consequently, since the rational soul receives intelligible forms, the source of these 
intelligible forms must be immaterial. This immaterial source of forms is the Agent 
Intellect. By examining Avicenna’s texts, I show that the term “abstraction” expands its 
semantic range to include in addition to the two aforementioned senses: (3) the process of 
emanating an intelligible form from the Agent Intellect into the rational soul; (4) the 
intelligible form that the Agent Intellect emanates, and (5) the intelligible forms 
contained in Agent Intellect. First, I examine the text where Avicenna describes 
abstraction3 and abstraction4. Second, I examine the texts that allow one to make the 
distinctions between abstraction4 and abstraction5. 
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40. F. Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology: An English Translation of Kitab al-Najat, 
Book II, Chapter VI, with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on 
the Cairo Edition (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1981), p. 15.
In the chapter titled Capitulum de intelligentia agente in nostris animabus et de 
patiente ex nostris animabus, Avicenna writes:
We say that the human soul first is knowing in potency, then it becomes knowing 
in act. However, everything which goes from potency to act, only does so through 
a cause which has that in actuality and draws out to that [actuality what is in 
potency]. Therefore there is a cause through which our souls go from potency to 
act in intelligible things. But the cause of giving intelligible forms is none other 
than the intelligence in act, to whom belongs the principles of abstracted 
intelligible forms. Its relation to our souls is just as the relation of the sun to our 
sight, because just as the sun is actually seen per se  and is actually seen by its 
light, which was not actually seen, thus is the disposition of this intelligence in 
relation to our soul. For when the rational power considers singular things which 
are in the imagination and when the rational power is illuminated by the light of 
the agent intellect in us, which we mentioned, they become denuded from matter 
and the concomitant factors of matter, and they are impressed on the rational soul, 
not as if they may have moved from the imagination to our intellect, nor because 
an intention resulting from many (since in itself is considered denuded per se), 
makes [something] similar to itself, but because from consideration of these 
[particular things impressed in the imagination] the soul is rendered fit so that an 
abstraction may emanate into it [the rational soul] from the agent intellect.41 
In this text, Avicenna applies the metaphysical principle that anything that is in potency 
can only be moved to actuality by a cause already in actuality. For example, a billiard 
ball will remain at rest although it has the potential to move. Not until something that is 
actually moving comes into contact with the billiard ball (e.g., the billiard stick) will the 
billiard ball go from potentially moving to actually moving. In the billiard example, the 
principle applies to efficient causality. Avicenna, however, does not limit this principle to 
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41. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 5, p. 126–27: 
Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intelligens in potentia, deinde fit intelligens in 
effectu.  Omne autem quod exit de potentia ad effectum, non exit nisi per causam quae 
habet illud in effectu et extrahit ad illum.   Ergo est hic causa per quam animae nostrae in 
rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum.  Sed causa dandi formam 
intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum 
intelligibilium abstractarum.  Cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio 
solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in 
effectu quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantum ad 
nostras animas.   Virtus enim rationalis cum considerat singula quae sunt in imaginatione 
et illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos quam praediximus, fiunt nuda a materia et 
ab eius appendiciis et imprimuntur in anima rationali, non quasi ipsa mutentur de 
imaginatione ad intellectum nostrum, nec quia intentio pendens ex multis (cum ipsa in se 
sit nuda considerata per se), faciat similem sibi, sed quia ex consideratione eorum aptatur 
anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio.
that of mere efficient causality. Like sensation, which was the reception of some form 
that specified and determined the sense organ, intellection is the reception of an 
abstraction4 (i.e., an intelligible form) into the human soul. It is important to note that the 
process of abstraction3 is not the transference of the abstractions2 contained in the 
imagination to the rational soul, a separated immaterial substance. Rather, the process of 
abstraction3 is the emanating of an abstraction4 from the agent intellect to the human soul 
(i.e., from one immaterial substance to another immaterial substance). The abstraction4 
does not arise from considering the intention that is common to many particulars, for it is 
the nature of the abstraction4 to be in itself free or denuded of matter. Instead, the 
abstractions4 emanate from the Agent Intellect into the human rational soul. Thus, human 
souls are prepared to receive abstractions4 based on considering the content of their 
imagination. For example, were I considering a particular human, and another person 
were considering a particular cow, I would receive an abstraction4 that connotes 
humanness, whereas the other person would receive an abstraction4 that connotes 
cowness. In other words, I would come to know humanness (i.e., human essence), and 
the other person would come to know cowness (i.e., cow essence). Yet, what if more than 
one person were considering the same particular (e.g., we are both considering a human)?  
One must ask oneself, wouldn’t this entail that the form of humanness would exist in 
multiple souls? And if it did, wouldn’t this imply that there is a multiplicity of intelligible 
forms for humanness? Moreover, if there were a multiplicity of intelligible forms for 
humanness, they would either differ by something or nothing. They cannot differ by 
something (i.e., the form of humanness, which is common to all), nor can they differ by 
nothing, for to differ by nothing is not to differ. Consequently, there can only be one form 
of humanness, and if there is only one form of humanness, what is this abstraction4 that 
emanates from the Agent Intellect? In order to understand, abstraction4, we need to 
introduce abstraction5.
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Let us recall that in a broad sense the term “abstraction” denotes a form that is 
separate from matter. In the aforementioned text, Avicenna tells us that the principles of 
intelligible abstract forms exist in the intelligence (i.e., in the Agent Intellect). Not until 
later in his work does he reveal their ontological status42.
By now, however, we have said that the body of these [humans] and that which 
results from the body of these [humans]  is not suited  . . .  suited as subject of 
intelligible forms, because it is not fitting that intelligible forms have a location; 
but the conjunction of these [intelligibles] with the body would make them have 
location;  if,however, they were in a body having location, they would not be 
intelligibles. We say that these very same intelligible forms are things existing per 
se, each of which is a species [i.e., a kind] and a thing existing per se, but the 
[human] intellect sometimes views them and sometimes turns away from them, 
and afterwards turns to them [again], and the soul is as it were a mirror, these 
[intelligible forms] are as things extrinsic [to the soul], which sometimes appear 
as it were in [ the soul] and sometimes do not appear. And this happens according 
to the relations which exist between them and the soul; or from the principle agent 
[i.e., the agent intellect], one form after another emanates into the soul according 
to the request of the soul; and later when the soul turns away from the principle, 
the emanation ceases.43
Avicenna makes it clear that intelligible forms cannot exist in a body, nor can they be 
related to a body in any way, for they would then have location, and thus, they would be 
rendered non-intelligible. The immateriality of the form is crucial to its intelligibility and 
qualifies the form to be called an abstraction5 inasmuch as it is a form that is separate 
from matter. Moreover, he tells us that each intelligible form exists per se, and that each 
intelligible form existing in the Agent Intellect is its own species. In other words, these 
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42. Although Avicenna will use metaphors such as “mirror” and “light,”  I will 
explicate his account in non-metaphoric terms.
43. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 6, p. 146–47: 
Iam autem diximus quod corpus earum et quod pendet ex corpore earum non est dignum 
ad hoc, nec est dignum ut sit subiectum intelligibilium, quia non est dignum ut formae 
intellectae sint habentes situm, sed coniunctio earum cum corpore faciet eas habere 
situm; si autem essent in corpore habentes situm, non essent intelligibiles. Aut dicemus 
quod ipsae formae intelligibles sunt res per se existentes, quarum unaquaeque est species 
et res per se existens, sed intellectus aliquando aspicit illas et aliquando avertitur ab illis, 
et postea convertitur ad illas, et est anima quasi speculum ipsae vero quasi res extrinsecae 
quae aliquando apparent in ea et aliquando non apparent.  Et hoc fiat secundum 
comparationes quae sunt inter eas et animam; aut ex principio agente emanet in animam 
forma post formam secundum petitionem animae, a quo principio postea cum avertitur, 
cesset emanatio.
intelligible forms cannot be multiplied. Otherwise, there would be multiple intelligible 
forms for a given species. For example, if the intelligible form of humanness exists per 
se, one cannot multiply this form; otherwise, it would be one of many within the species; 
it would not be the species. Moreover, the principle of multiplication of forms is matter, 
but these intelligible forms exist immaterially in the Agent Intellect, so there is no 
metaphysical principle that allows the multiplication of these forms. Consequently, there 
can be no multiplication of intelligible forms (i.e., abstractions5). Hence, Avicenna is not 
cordoned into the dilemma of how one abstraction5 differs from another abstraction5 in 
multiple human intellects, for properly speaking there is only one abstraction5  per 
species, and each abstraction5 resides in the Agent Intellect. Nevertheless, Avicenna does 
need to resolve another problem. How can multiple human intellects apprehend the 
abstractions5 that exist in the agent intellect without multiplying the abstractions5?
Avicenna tells us that the human intellect sometimes regards these abstractions5 
and sometimes it does not. He uses a metaphor to describe the process by which these 
abstractions5 come to appear in the soul. By functioning as a mirror, the soul is able to 
have abstractions5 appear and disappear. For in the same manner that a reflection only 
appears when the original object is before the mirror, the abstraction5 only appears in the 
soul when the abstraction5 is presented to the soul. Similarly, in the same manner that a 
reflection ceases to appear when the original object has been removed from the mirror, 
the abstraction5 ceases to appear when the abstraction5 is no longer present to the soul.44 
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44. In other words,  in Avicenna there is no intellectual memory.  Only when 
abstractions4 are flowing from the Agent Intellect can one know intelligibles.  As soon as 
the abstractions4 cease, the intelligibles are not present to the human soul. See Avicenna, 
Livre Des Directives et Remarques, A.M. translated by Goichon (Paris: Librairie 
philosophique J. Vrin, 1951), p. 330–31: “Reste donc qu'il y ait là une chose extrinsèque 
à notre substance, en laquelle sont les formes intelligibles elles mêmes, car c'est une 
substance intellectuelle en acte telle, que lorsqu'il se produit entre nos âmes et elle une 
certaine jonction, d'elle en nos âmes s'impriment les formes intellectuelles appropriées, 
par cette préparation particulière, à des jugements qui leur sont propres. Et lorsque l'âme 
s'éloigne de cette substance intellectuelles [pour se tourner] vers ce qui avoisine le monde 
corporel, ou bien vers une autre forme, la similitude qu'il y avait d'abord s'efface, comme 
At the behest of the human soul, these abstractions5 are made to appear or disappear from 
the soul. The mirror metaphor allows Avicenna to ensure that the abstractions5 are not 
multiplied, and at the same time, he gives an account how these abstractions5 can appear 
in each human soul. However, his account is problematic because what actually exists in 
the human is not the abstraction5, which properly speaking only exists in the Agent 
Intellect. What exists in the soul is a reflection or representation, which is a ratio that has 
been impressed on the soul by the Agent Intellect. That is to say, what exists in the 
human intellect is an abstraction4, a formal sign that is not known in itself, but points to 
something other than itself, the abstraction5. In other words, by the process of 
abstraction3, an abstraction4 is transferred from Agent Intellect to the human soul, and by 
means of this abstraction4, the human soul is able to behold abstractions5 that exist in the 
Agent Intellect. Abstraction4 are means of cognitions; they are not objects of cognition. 
The objects of cogition are abstraction5, which ontologically reside in the Agent 
Intellect.45  The notion that abstraction5 can only reside in the Agent Intellect brings us to 
our next topic, the subject of intelligible forms. 
The Subject of Intelligible Forms (Substantia Solitaria Spiritualis)
Earlier I stated that the term “subject” is used analogically, yet what is common 
among the analogates in the case of this term is the notion that a subject is that which is 
capable of receiving some form.46 Avicenna attempts to make the soul a suitable subject 
for receiving intelligible forms. But what does it mean to be a suitable subject for 
intelligible forms? A suitable subject for intelligible forms is one that is immaterial, 
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si le miroir par lequel l'âme faisait face au côté de la sainteté, en avait été détourné [pour 
s'orienter] vers le côté des sens ou vers quelque autre chose sainte.” [emphasis added]
45. For Aquinas, intelligible species are means of cognitions, not objects of 
cognition.  The object of cognition, for Aquinas, is the nature of things existing extra 
animam. See note 116 on page 172.
46. See page 67 note 74.
simple, and capable of receiving intelligible forms. In section (1) Avicenna’s 
Hylomorphism, it was shown that Avicenna took great pain to ensure that the soul was 
not the form of the body. By doing so, he was able to safeguard the immateriality of the 
human soul. The immateriality of the human soul is necessary, for intelligible forms 
cannot be received into a body or into a power in a body as was stated above.  Given that 
intelligible forms are simple and cannot be divided,47 so too the soul must be simple.48 
The subject of intelligibles must be simple; otherwise, the intelligible form would be 
distributed over many parts.49 Last, but not least, the soul must be able to receive 
intelligible forms, for all apprehending occurs via the reception of some form. 
 For Avicenna, although the soul has the potency for receiving intelligible forms 
(i.e., abstraction4 and abstraction5), the intelligible forms (abstraction5) cannot be 
multiplied, and given that this is required in his psychology, the consequence is that the 
objects of intellection are these intelligible forms (abstraction5). The only adequate 
subject for intelligibles (abstraction5)  is the Agent Intellect. In other words, Avicenna 
has gone to great lengths to ensure that the human intellect is able to receive intelligible 
forms only to be stymied by the ontological status of the intelligibles, which precludes 
multiplication. Consequently and properly speaking, no human soul is the subject of 
intelligible forms (abstraction5); only the agent intellect has intelligibles in act 
(abstraction5). 
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47. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 5, pp. 85–85: 
Ergo, impossibile est dividi formam intellectam.
48. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 4, p. 122: 
Manifestum est igitur quod in eo quod est simplex non compositum aut radix compositi, 
non conveniunt effectus permanendi et potentia destruendi comparatione suae essentiae : 
si enim fuerit in eo potentia destructionis, impossibile est esse in eo effectum permanendi 
; si  autem fuerit in eo effectus permanendi et habuerit esse, tunc non est in eo potentia 
destruendi : ergo manifestum est quod in substantia animae non est potentia corrumpendi.
49. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 2, pp. 93–95 
Cf. Plato, “Parmenides,” in Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), 131b-131e.
Summary, Comments and Critique of Avicenna’s Solution
To Avicenna’s credit, he is well aware of the difficulties in holding that 
hylomorphic entities are suitable subjects for the reception of intelligibles. He must 
decide whether to hold onto hylomorphism1 as espoused by Aristotle or to reject it. By 
modifying hylomorphism1 so that it pertains only to the body, he crafts a new form of 
hylomorphism, hylomorphism2. This new form of hylomorphism2 allows him to separate 
the soul from the body, thus rendering it a suitable subject for intelligibles.  As an 
Aristotelian, he asserts that knowledge begins with the senses, and he gives an 
Aristotelian account of sensation. This account allows us to understand the various ways 
in which Avicenna uses the term “abstraction”; there are various grades of abstraction, 
which depend on their association to matter. Properly speaking, however, only the 
estimative power performs an abstraction1 in Avicenna’s psychology.
 Given the dichotomy between the body and the soul, Avicenna cannot bridge the 
gap between the material and immaterial world. Thus, there is no transfer of intentions 
from the imagination to the soul. One finds that the abstractions4 that are transferred to 
the soul come from the Agent Intellect; these abstractions4 serve as the means by which 
the intelligible forms (abstractions5) in the Agent Intellect  are made to appear in the 
human soul. The ontological status of the intelligibles preclude multiplication of these 
intelligibles, so the abstractions4 are meant to safeguard the unity of intelligibles present 
in the Agent Intellect while introducing a means by which the intelligible can appear in a 
multiplicity of  human souls. What comes to exist in the soul is a representation (i.e., an 
intention [mac nà] or a ratio) whose formal content is similar to the intelligibles in act in 
the Agent intellect. This representation points to the intelligibles in the separated 
intellect.50 
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50. Following Avicenna, for Aquinas, intelligible species are means of cognitions, 
not objects of cognition.  The object of cognition, for Aquinas, is the nature of things 
 Consequently, if intellection is the receiving of intelligible forms (i.e., 
abstraction5) into the human intellect, Avicenna unequivocally sets forth an account that 
requires the subject of intelligibles as abstractions5, something outside the soul. The soul 
itself can only be a mirror consisting of representations with intentional content, 
abstractions4, that are derivative upon the intelligibles in the AI, abstractions5.51 
Moreover, given his principle that material substances cannot affect immaterial 
substances, the soul cannot receive knowledge from the world, nor can it receive 
abstractions5 from the Agent Intellect. Instead, Avicenna has created a new category of 
abstractions, abstractions4, which are representations with intentional content based on 
abstractions5. But as such these abstractions4 are not the intelligibles in act themselves. 
Hence, if knowing requires the ontological presence of intelligibles in act in the rational 
soul, Avicenna's account does not meet that requirement. Rather, what are in the soul are 
representations with intelligible content somehow, something quite different from the 
intelligibles required for knowing, yet nevertheless, they are somehow similar to these 
intelligibles. This disparity between intelligibles and the abstractions4 raise the issue of 
formal identity.
 Typically, medieval epistemology appeals to some kind of formal causality to 
account for formal identity between the knower and the known, and it presupposes that 
every effect is like its cause in some way.52 Avicenna establishes formal identity by using 
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existing extra animam. See note 116 on page 172, whereas for Avicenna, abstraction4 is a 
means of cognition pointing to abstraction5, which is the object of cognition, the 
intelligibles in act in the Agent Intellect.
51. I realize that this interpretation of Avicenna is novel.   However, I put it forth 
in an attempt to reconcile the ontological status of the intelligibles, and the multiplication 
of intelligibles into multiple souls. Otherwise,  the multiplication of intelligibles into 
multiple intellects stands in conflict with the uniqueness of intelligibles in the Agent 
Intellect.
52. The principle that every effect is like its cause does not pertain to all of the 
cause.  It is applicable to efficient and formal causes.
two distinct mechanisms. First, he appeals to formal causality between an effect and its 
cause to account for formal identity, and there are three different scenarios in which he 
appeals to formal causality. In scenario one, the world is informed by the Agent Intellect; 
therefore, there is formal identity between the intelligibles in the Agent Intellect and the 
hylomorphic entities in the world.53  In scenario two, human intellects are informed, so 
there is formal identity between the intelligibles in the Agent intellect and the 
abstractions4 in the human intellect. In scenario three, there is formal causality between 
the sensible things in the world and the external and internal senses, so there is formal 
identity between the hylomorphic entities in the world and the intentional forms in the 
body. Nevertheless, formal causality does not safeguard formal identity between the 
intentional forms in body and the forms in the soul because the formal chain of causality 
that begins in the sensible and terminates in the estimative power is not able to bridge the 
gap between two incommensurate substances.
 In order to safeguard formal identity, Avicenna must appeal to the second 
mechanism: the common nature and the plurality of modes of being. For Avicenna, if a 
form is considered in itself, it is neither one nor many, neither spiritual or material, 
neither particular nor universal, neither intelligible or unintelligible. Considered in itself, 
a form is indifferent to these various characteristics that are accidental to it. Nevertheless, 
forms can only exist with these various accidents under a particular mode of being. For 
example, in a hylomorphic entity a form has a physical mode of being. In the 
imagination, a form has a more spiritual mode of being, and in the intellect a form has the 
most spiritual mode of being. Nonetheless, all these forms share a common nature that 
safeguard the formal identity regardless of the mode of being.54Thus, by appealing to a 
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53. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect Their Cosmologies, 
Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, p. 78.
54. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, pp.227–38.
common nature, Avicenna is able to maintain that there is formal identity between the 
intentions in the soul and the abstractions4 that are placed in human intellects. 
Discounting Aristotelian hylomorphism1 and making the rational soul the subject of 
intelligibles yields a severely problematic account, so let us turn to Averroes’s solution, 
who maintains a version of  hylomorphism1 that is apparently much closer to Aristotle’s 
version. 
Averroes’ Solution To The Aristotelian Aporia
Unlike Avicenna who discards Aristotelian hylomorphism1 in order to solve the 
aporia, Averroes holds fast to it.55 That is to say, Averroes affirms that the soul is the 
form of the body;56 consequently, on the dissolution of the hylomorphic1 entity, the form 
of the body ceases to exist as does the hylomorphic1 entity. Moreover, Averroes is well 
aware that a hylomorphic entity, thus construed, is unable to receive intelligible forms. 
The form of the body pervades matter in such a fashion that intelligible forms cannot be 
received into the soul without also being received into matter according to material 
conditions, such as particularity, which would preclude intelligibility. Hence, while a 
hylomorphic entity is not a suitable subject for the reception of intelligible forms, it is a 
suitable subject for sensible and imaginable forms.
Insofar as a hylomorphic entity is unsuitable for the reception of intelligible 
forms, Averroes needs to affirm a subject for intelligible forms that does not fall within 
the Aristotelian metaphysical categories (i.e., it is a “fourth kind of being”57 that is 
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55.  In the footnotes, I use all capital letters to denote that Averroes is quoting 
Aristotle.
56. When I refer to soul in Averroes,   I  refer to the human soul, which is 
sensitive and includes the vegetative power.
57. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 130. Averroes states iste est 
quartum genus esse. Averroes, Averroes Cordubensis  Commentarium Magnum in 
Aristotelis De Anima Libros, Edited by F.  Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), Bk. 3, 429a10, p.409; Averroes Commentary 
will be referred to as Commentarium Magnum henceforth; any English block quotations 
neither form nor matter nor the composite of form and matter.), the Material Intellect. In 
other words, the subject of intelligible forms will be something other than the 
hylomorphic entity. Furthermore, because the Aristotelian account asserts that nothing 
corporeal can affect something that is incorporeal, Averroes must affirm a separated 
substance, the Agent Intellect, whose role is two-fold: (1) to perform a genuine 
abstraction from the sensible intentions stored in the imagination, and (2) to fecund the 
Material Intellect with an intelligible in act, which is the object of knowledge. For 
Averroes, there are two subjects: (a) the subject of truth, which is the imaginative power 
in the hylomorphic entity, for the imagination contains the intentions that originated 
through sensation. And (b) the subject of intelligibles in act, the Material Intellect.58 
Although Averroes’ solution preserves hylomorphism1, nonetheless,  Averroes, just as 
Avicenna, chooses not to make the individual hylomorphic entity the subject of 
intelligible forms, which for him are intelligible acts that come to be in the Material 
Intellect. Once again, the Aristotelian aporia prevents intellection from being a power 
inherent in the hylomorphic entity. By examining (1) Averroes on Hylomorphism, (2) 
Averroes on Sensation, (3) Averroes and the Many Meanings of Abstraction, and (4) 
Averroes on the Subject of Intelligible, I shall show that Averroes’ solution prevents 
intellection from being wholly inherent in man as an intrinsic form. I shall end this 
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will be drawn from Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, trans. & 
intro Richard Taylor, subeditor Therese-Anne Druart  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009).
58. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3,  429a24, p.400: Quoniam, quia 
formare per intellectum, sicut dicit Aristoteles, est sicut comprehendere per sensum, 
comprehendere autem per sensum perficitur per duo subiecta, quorum unum est 
subiectum per quod sensus fit verus (et est sensatum extra animam), aliud autem est 
subiectum per quod sensus est forma existens (et est prima perfectio sentientis), necesse 
est etiam ut intellecta in actu habeant duo subjecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod 
sunt vera, scilicet forme que sunt ymagines vere, secundum autem est illud per quod 
intellecta sunt unum entium in mundo, et istud est intellectus materialis. Nulla enim 
differentia est in hoc inter sensum et intellectum, nisi quia subiectum sensus per quod est 
verus est extra animam, et subiectum intellectus per quod est verus est intra animam.
section with (5) comments and critique of Averroes’ solution. 
Averroes on Hylomorphism1 
According to Averroes, the soul is a substance inasmuch as it is form, 59 and 
matter is a substance inasmuch as it is a subject.60 However, matter, which is the subject 
of form, does not exist in actuality unless it has been informed, for matter cannot exist 
independent of form.61 If matter were to exist in actuality and form were to exist in 
actuality, then the form-matter composite would only be called one in the same manner 
that things that are united via contact or bundled together are called one (i.e., there would 
only be an accidental unity between the form and the matter).62 Therefore, it would be a 
mistake to think of form and matter existing as distinct in actuality. Instead, matter only 
differs from form in the composite potentially, and the form-matter composite is only a 
being in actuality because of the form. Thus, the form-matter composite is only called 
one because its form is one.63 In other words, form accounts for the unity and actuality of 
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59. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 412a21, p.133: Quoniam vero est 
substantia secundum formam manifestum est ex hoc quod est substantia in subiecto.... Et 
differt ab accidente, quoniam accidens non est pars huius substantie composite forma 
autem est pars huius substantie composite.
60. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 412a21, p.134: Et ex hoc 
declarabitur perfecte quod anima non est substantia secundum materiam. Materia enim 
est substantia secundum quod est subiectum, anima autem secundum quod est in 
subiecto.
61. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 412a21,  p.134: Subiectum enim 
accidentis est corpus compositum ex materia et forma, et est aliquod existens in actu et 
non indiget in suo esse accidente; subiectum autem forme non habet esse in actu, 
secundum quod est subiectum, nisi per formam, et indiget forma ut sit in actu.
62. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 412b9, p.139: si materia et forma 
essent in composito existens in actu, tunc compositum non diceretur unum nisi sicut 
dicitur in rebus quae sunt unum secundum contactum et ligamentum.
63. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 412b9, p.139: Modo autem, quia 
materia non differ a forma in composito nisi potentia, et compositum non est ens in actu 
nisi per formam, tunc compositum non dicitur unum nisi quia sua forma est una.
the form-matter composite. Averroes does not err when he speaks in this manner, for 
following Aristotle, Averroes predicates “substance” in a qualified and equivocal sense 
when he speaks of form and of matter, and he predicates “substance” in an unqualified 
and proper sense when he refers to hylomorphic entity, the animate body.64 Moreover, 
every hylomorphic entity is generable and corruptible, and it is a particular determinate 
thing.65 That is to say, all hylomorphic entities are contingent beings that come to be and 
cease to be. In addition to being contingent beings, hylomorphic beings cannot be the 
subject of intelligibles because, as will be seen, the soul’s pervading matter precludes it 
from being the subject of intelligible forms. Reception into matter necessitates that the 
human soul perform all of its functions via a bodily organ.66 Consequently, there are no 
acts that are performed solely by the soul. Rather, all acts are performed by the 
hylomorphic entity by means of some corporeal organ, and essential to intellection are 
the corporeal organs of sensation, which include the inner organs in the brain. 
Averroes on Sensation 
 The vocabulary of sense and sensation in Averroes is different from that of 
Avicenna examined above. Instead of mentioning forms, Averroes mentions sensibles. 
Notwithstanding, although different terms are used, he is working in a similar 
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64. Following Aristotle, the term “body” when used of what has soul implies 
living,  for a corpse is only called a body “equivocally.” 
65. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.389: Omne enim 
generabile et corruptibile est hoc.
66. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk III,  429a29,  p.413–14: Deinde dedit 
secundam rationem super hoc. Et dixit: SI ENIM ESSET ADMIXTUS, etc. Idest, si enim 
esset virtus in corpore, tunc esset aliqua dispositio et aliqua qualitas corporalis; et si 
haberet qualitatem, tunc illa qualitas aut attribueretur calido aut frigido (scilicet 
complexioni in eo quod est complexio), aut esset qualitas existens in complexione tantum 
addita complexioni, sicut est de anima sensibili et sibi similibus, et sic haberet 
instrumentum corporale;  The all caps text indicate that Averroes is quoting Aristotle.
metaphysical paradigm when it comes to sensation. In this section, I examine (1) 
sensation, (2) the external senses, and (3) the internal senses.67
For Averroes, sensation is the reception of a sensible without matter. In this 
context, the term “sensible” is used in three different ways. First, it may connote the 
proper object of the sensing organ (e.g., color is the sensible that pertains to vision.). 
Second, it may connote common sensibles (e.g., movement, rest, and number). Last, the 
term “sensible” may connote that which is sensed accidently (e.g., the white thing that is 
seen is John Doe.)68 In sum, the term “sensible” connotes that which is capable of being 
sensed by a sense organ whether per se or per accidens.
 Now a sensible cannot be received into the sense organ with the same mode of 
being that it has outside of the sense organ.69 Were any of the sense organs to receive 
sensibles as they are in themselves, the sense organs would be destroyed, as mentioned in 
the Avicenna section. Thus, the sense organs must receive the sensibles in an immaterial 
mode of being, whereas the body receives forms in a material mode of being. For 
example, if someone were to throw paint at me, my vision would sense the color (i.e., it 
would receive the color immaterially), and my body would wear the color.70 Note that 
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67. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2,  418a7–418a17, p.224:Antequam 
incipiamus loqui de unoquoque sensuum, loquamur de sensibilibus. Dicamus igitur quod 
sensible dicitur tribus modis, quorum duo dicuntur sentiri per se, et tertius accidentaliter. 
Et alter duorum proprius est unicuique senssum, et alter est communis omnibus. et est 
dicere propius quem non potest alter sensus sentire, et illud quod impossibile est ut ei 
contingat error, v.g. visus apud colorem, et auditus apud vocem, et gustus apud saporem. 
Sensus autem plures modos uno habet, sed unusquisque eorum iudicat ista, et non errat in 
colore quis color sit, neque in voce que vox sit, sed in colorato quid est et ubi est, et in 
audito quid est et ubi est. Quod igitur est tale est proprium.
68. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 418a7–418a17, p.224.
69. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 426a1, p.341: modus esse 
sensibilis extra animam differat a modo sui esse in sentiente.
70. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 426a1, p.340: Visus itaque recipit 
colorem quem recipit corpus extra animam; sed differunt in hoc quod receptio sentientis 
est non materialis, et receptio corporis extra animam est materialis.
although Averroes will use the term “immaterial” when referring to sensation, he is not 
denying that there will be a physical change in the sense organ.71 Rather, he is denying 
that the matter that is part of the hylomorphic sensible comes to exist in the sensing 
organ. If the matter does not come to exist in the sense organ, what causes the sense 
organ to move from not sensing to sensing?
Averroes states that a thing that is potency can only be moved to actuality by 
something that is already in act, and the forms of things existing outside the soul move 
the sense organs from a state of potentiality to actuality.72 It cannot be the case that the 
sensibles existing in the hylomorphic entity cease to exist in the hylomorphic sensible 
and come to exist in the sense organ. Otherwise, one would be sensing that which no 
longer exists in the hylomorphic entity, for all things exist by virtue of forms. Nor is it 
the case that sensibles such as colors are beings in act as if they subsisted. Hylomorphic 
entities have one substantial form, and they have a multiplicity of accidental forms. In an 
Aristotelian metaphysics, a substance exists by virtue of its substantial form and can 
change accidentally by acquiring and losing accidental forms. For example, Socrates has 
one substantial form by which he is human; yet, he can be lighter or darker by acquiring 
different accidental forms. These accidental and substantial forms, not only convey 
existence to the hylomorphic entity, but inasmuch as they are actual, they also convey 
intentional forms to the sense organs. These intentional forms are nothing more than 
abstracted sensibles, which are received immaterially into the sense organ; consequently, 
they specify and determine the sense organ so that the sense organ not only goes from 
potentially sensing to actually sensing, but it goes from potentially sensing to actually 
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71. I will address the notions of “spiritual” and “immaterial” later in this section.
72. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 428b14, p.372–73: Et quia res non 
movent nisi secundum quod est in actu, et movetur secundum quod est in potentia, 
necesse est, inquantum forme rerum sunt in actu extra animam, ut moveant animam 
rationalem secundum quod comprehendit eas, quemadmodum sensibilia, inquantum sunt 
entia in actu, necesse est ut moveant sensus et ut sensus moveantur ab eis. 
sensing a specific and determinate sensible.73 By implication, it follows that the senses 
themselves are passive, for they can only be moved from potentially sensing to actually 
sensing inasmuch as they receive an abstracted sensible (i.e., an intentional form). 
Averroes, like Avicenna, uses the term “abstraction” to denote either (1) the process by 
which a form is separated from matter, or (2) the intentional form that has been denuded 
from its matter in some sense.74 Thus far, these immaterial sensibles are abstractions2 that 
are caused from hylomorphic beings and inform the sense organ.
 In addition to having similar usage of terminology concerning abstraction, 
Avicenna and Averroes are in agreement that abstractions vary in their degree of 
immateriality.75 On one extreme is the hylomorphic entity, which is the most material and 
least spiritual, and at the other extreme is the intelligible in act, existing immaterially and 
spiritually in the Intellect.76 While discussing color, Averroes writes:
What he said concerning sight, that the intermediate nature which {277} serves 
sight is not air insofar as it is air or water insofar as it is water, but a common 
nature, this should be understood here in this way in regard to the nature which is 
the medium, namely, because it is a nature common to water and air. And [it 
should further be understood]that smells are extrinsic to that nature and that that 
nature lacks smells just as the transparent [lacks] colors, in such a way that, just 
as color has a twofold being colored body (this is corporeal being) and being in 
the transparent (this is spiritual being), so too smell has twofold being, namely, 
being in the body which is odorous and being in the medium. The former is 
corporeal being and the latter spiritual, the former natural and the latter 
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73. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 426a1, p.340: CUM FUERINT 
SENSIBILIA ABSTRACTA,Deinde dixit: ET IDEO, CUM FUERINT SENSIBILIA 
ABSTRACTA, etc. Idest, et quia sensus recipiunt sensibilia extra materiam, ideo, quando 
sensibilia fuerint abstracta a materia, efficiuntur in sentientibus sensus et ymaginationes, 
non colores sensibiles neque sapores neque alie qualitatum sensibilium que sunt extra 
animam in materia.
74. See note 20 of the present chapter.
76. For Avicenna who rejects abstraction of intelligibles from the data of 
sensation, the intelligibles exist in the Agent Intellect, whereas for Averroes who accepts 
abstraction of intelligibles from the data of sensation, the intelligibles exist in the 
Material Intellect.
extrinsic.77
So one finds that natural and corporeal being is the being that a sensible has when it is 
existing as an accident in a hylomorphic entity, whereas spiritual and external being is 
the mode of being that a sensible has when it exists outside that body. Hence, one finds 
that the abstractions2 that come to exist in the sense organs are already more immaterial 
and more spiritual in their mode of being than they are when existing in the body where 
they are accidents that specify and determine a hylomorphic being. Moreover, 
abstractions2  also differ in their spirituality (i.e., immateriality) inasmuch as they can be 
affected by physical impediments, for both sound and smell can be impeded by wind, and 
both sound and smell are not moved from one part to another without the aid of wind, 
whereas color is not affected by wind and does not depend on anything else other than 
the medium in order for it to be transmitted from one place to another.78 Last, but not 
least, abstractions2 also are more spiritual as they progress through the external and 
internal sense organs: the five senses, the common sense, imagination, cogitation, and 
memory where memory is the most spiritual and senses are the least spiritual.79Regarding 
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77. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 421b12, p.227: Et quod dixit de 
visione, quod natura media que servit visui non est aer secundum quod est aer, aut aqua 
secundum quod est aqua, sed natura communis, ita est intelligendum hic in natura que est 
media, scilicet quia est natura communis aque et aeris; et quod odores sunt extranei in 
ista natura, et quod ista natura caret odoribus sicut diaffonum coloribus, ita quod, sicut 
color habet duplex esse, scilicet esse in corpore colorato (et hoc est esse corporale) et 
esse in diaffono (et hoc est esse spirituale), ita odor habet duplex esse, scilicet esse in 
corpore odorabili et esse in medio; et illud est esse corporale et hoc spirituale, et illud 
naturale et hoc extraneum.
78.  Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2,421b12, p. 278: Sed tamen apparet 
quod esse coloris magis est spirituale quam esse odoris. Venti enim videntur adducere 
odores, et hoc est ex quo fuit existimatum odorem esse corpus. Sed  ita est de odore in 
hac intentione sicut de sono. Sonus enim fit a passione in aere, sed etiam impeditur a 
ventis;  sed tamen non consequitur ex hoc ut sit corpus. Quasi igitur necesse est in hiis 
duabus passionibus, scilicet soni et odoris, cum fuerint in aere, ut non sint motus illic in 
aere ad aliquam partem sine alia.
79. Richard C. Taylor, “Cogitatio,” in Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition, 
edited by  Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aersten (Boston: Brill, 1999), p.223; Averroes, 
the external senses, there are only five, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.80 
Following Aristotle, the predominant sense is touch, which is found concomitant with the 
other senses. That is to say, if other senses are found in an animal, it must have also have 
touch, but it does not follow that if an animal has touch that it must any other senses.81 As 
for the proper objects of touch, they are humidity and temperature, for every living thing 
is nourished by that which is dry or moist, warm, or cold. Without touch, animals would 
not be able to survive.82 Following touch is taste, which is a kind of touch,83 and the 
purpose of taste is to inform an animal whether or not a particular food is beneficial or 
injurious to the animal.84 Flavors that are pleasing to the animal are related to food that 
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Commentarium Magnum, 429a29, p. 415–16: Virtus igitur cogitativa est de genere 
virtutum existentium in corporibus.  Et hoc aperte dixit Aristoteles in illo libro, cum 
posuit virtutes distinctivas individuales in quatuor ordinibus: in primo posuit sensum 
communem, deinde ymaginativam, deinde cogitativam, et postea rememorativam. Et 
posuit rememorativam magis spiritualem, deinde cogitativam, deinde ymaginativam, et 
post sensibilem.
80. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 424b22, p.324: QUONIAM 
AUTEM NON EST ALIUS SENSUS PRETER ISTOS QUINQUE, SCILICET VISUS 
ET AUDITUS ET OLFACTUS ET GUSTUS ET TACTUS.... Cum complevit sermonem 
de unoquoque sensuum quinque existentium in animali perfecto, incepit declarare quod 
impossibile est invenire animal habens sextum sensum.
81. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 413b4–9, p.156: ET PRIMUS 
SENSUS EXISTENS IN EIS OMNIBUS EST TACTUS. ET QUEMADMODUM 
NUTRITIVUM POTEST SEPARARI A TACTU ET AB OMNI SENSU, ITA TACTUS 
POTEST SEPARARI AB ALIIS SENSIBUS.... Et prima virtus sensus, que est prior 
naturaliter in esse aliis virtutibus sensus, est sensus tactus.
82. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 414b14, p.171: Idest, et quia omne 
vivum non nutritur nisi per siccum et humidum et calidum et frigidum, cum nutrimentum 
est loco eius quod dissolvitur ex elementis ex quibus componitur, necesse est ut sensus 
nutrimenti sit sensus qui innatus est comprehendere has qualitates, et iste est sensus 
tactus.
83. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 414b14, p.171: Sensus gustus est 
aliquis tactus.
84. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 414b14, p. 170: Idest, et etiam 
necesse est ut omne animal habeat sensum per quem comprehendat conveniens et 
inconveniens ex nutrimentis, ut expellat nocivum et attrahat iuvativum.
are beneficial to the animal, and flavors that are displeasing to the animal are related to 
what is dangerous to that animal. Like taste, smell has a proper object, odor, and odor is 
related to sound inasmuch as both arise from air being affected by abstracted sensibles, 
and both require wind to propagate them.85 Last, but not least, vision is the fifth sense, 
and its proper sensible is color.86 All senses have one thing in common: a sense cannot 
err concerning its proper sensible.87 As stated above, sensibles may also refer to common 
sensibles, which are proper to the common sense.88
The common sense, the first of the internal organs of sensation, receives 
abstractions2 from the external sense; it is responsible for coordinating the multiple 
sensations (i.e., the reception of abstractions2 in each of the senses). Were it not for the 
common sense coordinating the various sensations from the various sense organs, the 
various sensations would not be temporally synchronized, nor would we be able to 
ascribe various sensations to one and the same object.89 
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85. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 421b12, P. 278: Sed ita est de 
odore in hac intentione sicut de sono. Sonus enim fit a passione in aere, sed etiam 
impeditur a ventis; sed tamen non consequitur ex hoc ut sit corpus. Quasi igitur necesse 
est in hiis duabus passionibus, scilicet soni et odoris, cum fuerint in aere, ut non sint 
motus illic in aere ad aliquam partem sine alia.
86. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 426a1, p.340: Visus itaque recipit 
colorem quem recipit corpus extra animam; sed differunt in hoc quod receptio sentientis 
est non materialis, et receptio corporis extra animam est materialis.
87. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 418a10–15, p.224: illud quod 
impossibile est ut ei contingat error, v.g. visus apud colorem, et auditus apud vocem, et 
gustus apud saporem. sensus autem plures modos uno habet, sed unusquisque eorum 
iudicat ista, et non errat in colore quis color sit, neque in voce que vox sit, sed in colorato 
quid est et ubi est, et in audito quid est et ubi est. quod igitur est tale est proprium.
88. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 418a25, p.228: sensibilia 
communia, ut declarabitur, sunt propria sensui communi.
89. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 425b4, p.333: mediante colore. 
Deinde dixit: ET HOC EST QUIA EST NOBIS SENSUS, etc. Idest, et accidit nobis talis 
comprehensio, scilicet iudicare per aliquem sensum super sensibile alterius sensus, quia 
contingit quod illi duo sensus fuerint coniuncti in comprehendendo illa duo sensibilia ex 
eodem in aliquo tempore. Et cum post acciderit ut comprehendamus per alterum duorum 
The imaginative power follows the common sense. Inasmuch as the sensible 
intentions affect the common sense, the common sense in turn affects the imagination, 
and moves the imagination from potency to actuality.90 Unlike the senses, the 
imagination retains these sensible intentions even when the sensible object is no longer 
present. These sensible intentions are needed by the animal to aid the animal in seeking 
what is beneficial and avoiding that which is dangerous.91 Imagination is not only moved 
from potency to act by sensibles, but at times, when dreaming, imagination is in act 
though not moved by the senses. The fact that the imagination can at times act 
independent of sensation may be a reason that Averroes asserts that the imagination is a 
more spiritual power than the common sense, which is more spiritual than the senses.92
More spiritual than the imagination is the cogitative power, which is only found 
in rational animals. Whereas the intentions in the imagination represent the accidental 
characteristics of given object (e.g., color, height, width, etc.), the cogitative power works 
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sensuum alterum sensibile ex eadem re, iudicabimus per illum sensum super sensibile 
alterius per coniunctionem precedentem, v.g. quoniam nos non scimus per visum quod 
hoc est dulce, nisi prius acciderit nobis in aliquo tempore quod comprehendimus per 
visum quod mel est citrinum, et per gustum esse dulce.
90. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3,  429a20, p.384–85: Quoniam, si 
sunt quedam que moventur ab aliis et movent alia, et ymaginatio videtur esse virtus 
mobilis et passiva ab alio, et impossibile est ut sit sine sensu, sed est in rebus sensibilibus 
et in animalibus habentibus sensum perfectum, et possibile est ut motus fiat a sensu qui 
est in actu, necesse est ut ymaginatio in actu nichil aliud sit nisi perfectio istius virtutis 
per intentiones sensibiles existentes in sensu secundum modum secundum quem sensus 
perficiuntur per sensibilia que sunt extra animam.
91. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 2, 429a9, p.377: Idest, et quia 
sensationes figuntur et remanent in animali ymaginanti post absentiam sensibilium in eo 
modo secundum quem erant apud presentiam sensibilium, ideo animal movetur ab istis 
sensationibus per hanc virtutem apud absentiam sensibilium multis motibus ad sensibilia 
et non sensibilia, querendo utile et fugiendo nocivum.
92. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a29, p.416: Et hoc aperte dixit 
Aristoteles in illo libro, cum posuit virtutes distinctivas individuales in quatuor ordinibus: 
in primo posuit  sensum communem, deinde ymaginativam,  deinde cogitativam, et 
postea rememorativam. Et posuit rememorativam magis spiritualem, deinde cogitativam, 
deinde ymaginativam, et post sensibilem.   See: Taylor, “Cogitatio,” p.223.
to remove the accidental characteristics that belong to the sensible intentions and deposits 
the denuded intention in memory. Consequently, the cogitative power is deemed less 
spiritual than memory because it does not retain the denuded intentions. In other words, 
the cogitative power performs an abstraction1, and the result of this process is an 
abstraction2 that is deposited in memory.93 The abstraction2 placed in memory is the 
individual intention that denotes the individual form of a thing. For example, when the 
cogitative power performs an abstraction1 of Socrates, the abstraction2 placed in memory 
is the individual form by which Socrates exists as a human.94 This abstraction2 denotes 
the human substantial form, yet it is not a universal because the abstraction2 cannot 
denote an indefinite extension.95 This abstraction2 remains potentially intelligible, but it 
is not actually intelligible.96 In order for the abstraction2 to be actually intelligible (i.e., an 
intelligible in act), the form must have an extension that includes all particulars. In 
addition, the form must not exist in that which is material, nor in that which is particular; 
nevertheless, its intelligible content must come from that which is a particular. 
Furthermore, it must exist necessarily, eternally, and uniquely. In other words, an 
intelligible in act is an abstraction2 of a different kind, and requires an abstraction1 
different from anything that any power in the body is able to perform.97
Averroes and the Many Meanings of Abstraction 
In the previous section, we saw that the term “abstraction” is spoken about in two 
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93. Taylor, “Cogitatio,” p. 224.
94. Taylor, “Cogitatio,” p. 225. Thanks to Dr. Taylor from whom I borrowed an 
analogous example.
95. Richard C. Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the 
Cogitative Powers in Averroes,” in L’Elaboration Du Vocabulaire Philosophique au 
Moyen Age, edited by  Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2000), p.121.
96. Ibid., p. 122.
senses: (1) as a process that separates form from matter, and (2) as a form separated from 
matter in some sense. Furthermore, the cogitative power was the only power that 
performs an actual abstraction1, yet the abstraction2 that it produces is still a particular.98 
In this section, the term “abstraction” will have an extended semantic range. Abstraction3 
denotes the process of separating a form completely from matter. What results from 
abstraction3 is an abstraction4 that is universal and immaterial. Abstraction1 and 
abstraction3 are similar inasmuch as they both have abstraction2 as an input, but they 
differ in what they produce. Abstraction1 produces an abstraction2 with the following 
characteristics: (1) it exists in a particular organ; (2) it has an intentional extension 
limited to one particular; and (3) it is an intelligible in potency. In contradistinction, 
Abstraction3 produces an abstraction4 with the following characteristics: (1) it exists in an 
immaterial subject that is not a particular (i.e., the Material Intellect);99 (2) it has an 
intentional extension that includes every particular;100 and (3) it is an intelligible in act. 
According to Averroes, the Agent Intellect is an eternal substance.101 This 
substance and its activity are one and the same, for in it there is no receptivity of any 
kind. Its activity is to think itself, and inasmuch as it thinks itself, it does not receive any 
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97. Ibid., p. 121.
98. The abstractions2 found in the medium, the external senses, the common 
sense, and the imagination existed as abstractions2 with any abstraction1 having to be 
performed by any sense organ.  Not until one gets to the cogitative power, does one find 
that a sense organ separates an intention form the accidental characteristics that are 
concommitant with the abstraction.
99. The universal nature of the Material Intellect is safeguarded because it is 
neither form, nor matter, nor constituted from form and matter.
100. The universal natures of the intelligibles act safeguard that they cannot be 
one among many particulars.  Whereas particular belong to a species,  intelligible in acts 
are their own species.
101. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 430a17, p.439–40: fuit necesse 
attribuere has duas actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, 
quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne.
intelligible content from the world.102 Yet, inasmuch as humans use the Agent Intellect 
and its power of intellectual abstraction3 for intellection, it must garner the potentially 
intelligible intentions that are stored in the imaginations of humans, for the Agent 
Intellect does not contain intelligible forms that are used for human intellection.103 Given 
that the Agent Intellect has no receptivity, it cannot receive potentially or actually 
intelligible forms; thus, it would seem unnecessary that the Agent Intellect would have to 
garner anything from the imagination. Yet, this is not the case, for the Agent Intellect 
performs a genuine abstraction3 for a subject other than itself.
Although the Agent Intellect does not receive intelligible forms, whether in 
potency or in act, nevertheless, the Agent Intellect does perform an abstraction3. 
Averroes uses the analogy of light to illustrate abstraction3. He says just as light makes a 
color in potentiality to become color in actuality so that it is able to move the transparent 
medium, so too, the Agent Intellect makes the potentially intelligible intentions to 
become actually intelligible so that they may be received in the Material Intellect.104 
Now, the analogy falls short inasmuch as the color in potency does become the color in 
actuality, whereas the intelligible in potency does not become the intelligible in actuality. 
This is the case because the intelligible in act is numerically and specifically different 
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102. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 430a20, p.440: ET EST IN SUA 
SUBSTANTIA ACTIO, idest quod non est in eo potentia ad aliquid, sicut in intellectu 
recipienti est potentia ad recipiendum formas. Intelligentia enim agens nichil intelligit ex 
eis que sunt hic.
103. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 430a17, p.438–39: Non enim 
possumus dicere quod proportio intellectus agentis in anima ad intellectum generatum est 
sicut proportio artificii ad artificiatum omnibus modis. Ars enim imponit formam in tota 
materia absque eo quod in materia sit aliquid existens de intentione forme antequam 
artificium fecerit eam. Et non est ita in intellectu; quoniam, si ita esset in intellectu, tunc 
homo non indigeret, in comprehendendo intelligibilia, sensu neque ymaginatione.  Refer 
to Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 128.
104. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p. 410–11: Et 
quemadmodum lux facit colorem in potentia esse in actu ita quod possit movere 
diaffonum, ita intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu ita quod 
recipit eas intellectus materialis.
from the intelligible in potency. The intelligible in act is numerically different in two 
senses. In the first sense, it is numerically different because the intelligible in act resides 
in the Material Intellect, whereas the intelligible in potency continues to reside in the 
imagination (i.e., they are ontologically distinct, for one is not the other; they reside in 
different subjects). In the second sense, the intelligible in act is not multiplied, for it 
exists uniquely in the Material Intellect,105 whereas the intelligible in potency is 
multiplied according to the number of imaginations that contain this imaginative form 
(i.e., an intelligible in act is one, whereas intelligibles in potency are many).106 They are 
specifically different because the intelligibles in potency are not actually intelligible, nor 
does their extension include all the individuals in a species; they also have a 
particularized mode of being, for they exist in a particular organ, as was stated in the 
previous section. In contradistinction, the intelligibles in act have an extension that 
includes all the particulars and yet, they are distinct because they cannot be included 
among the particulars. According to Averroes, if the intelligibles in act were members of 
a species, then the members in the species would have an intelligible common to both 
members, and if the intelligible that is common to both also is included in the species, it 
too would have an intelligible common to all, and this would proceed ad infinitum.107 
Consequently, an intelligible in act cannot be a member of a species. Also, they are 
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105. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p.126: “In the Long Commentary, 
however, Averroes was swayed by the reasoning of Themistius that there must ultimately 
be a unity of intelligible notions shared by all human beings and came to assert the 
existence of a single Material Intellect containing intelligibles in act shared by all human 
beings.”
106. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p. 404–05: remanet ut 
continuatio intellectorum cum nobis hominibus sit per continuationem intentionis 
intellecte cum nobis (et sunt intentiones ymaginate), scilicet partis que est in nobis de eis 
aliquo modo quasi forma.  
107. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.411: Et si posuerimus 
eum esse multa, continget ut res intellecta apud me et apud te sit una in specie et due in 
individuo; et sic res intellecta habebit rem intellectam, et sic procedit in infinitum.
specifically different because their modes of being differ. Intelligibles in potency have a 
particular mode of being, whereas intelligibles in act have a universal mode of being.108 
So, if the intelligible in potency does not become the intelligible in act, in what sense 
does the Agent Intellect perform an abstraction3?
Averroes states:
For to abstract is nothing other than to make imagined intentions intelligible in act 
after they were [intelligible] in potency. But to understand is nothing other than to 
receive these intentions. For when we found the same thing, namely, the imagined 
intentions, is transferred in its being from one order into another.109 
 The Agent Intellect performs an abstraction3 by acting upon the potentially intelligible 
intentions in the imagination. By separating that which is essential from that which is not 
essential, the Agent Intellect is able to identify and isolate the intention (the essential 
formal content) in the imagined intention. Having identified the intention, the Agent 
Intellect produces an abstraction4 (i.e., an intelligible in act) whose intention is identical 
to the intention found in the imagined intentions, yet whose mode of being is like the 
Agent Intellect’s mode of being: eternal, immaterial, necessary, and simple. Yet, in order 
for this abstraction4 to have a universal extension, it needs to reside in a subject whose 
mode of being is universal. It is not the case that these abstractions4 can exist outside an 
intellect; otherwise, the Agent Intellect would not be needed.110 Nor is it the case that 
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108. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 420a17, p.438–39: Neque etiam 
possumus dicere quod intentiones ymaginate sunt sole moventes intellectum materialem 
et extrahentes eum de potential in actum; quoniam, si ita esset, tunc nulla differentia esset 
inter universale et individuum, et tunc intellectus esset de genere virtutis ymaginative.
109. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 430a17, p.439–40: Abstrahere 
enim nichil est aliud quam facere intentiones ymaginatas intellectas in actu postquam 
erant in potentia; intelligere autem nichil aliud est quam recipere has intentiones. Cum 
enim invenimus idem transferri in suo esse de ordine in ordinem, scilicet intentiones 
ymaginatas. cf. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum Taylor, p. 351.
110. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 430a17, p. 440: Et omnia dicta ab 
Aristotele in hoc sunt ita quod universalia nullum habent esse extra animam, quod 
intendit Plato. Quoniam, si ita esset, non indigeret ponere intellectum agentem.
these abstractions4 can reside in the Agent Intellect because the Agent Intellect has no 
receptivity. In order for these abstractions4 to have a universal extension, they must exist 
in a subject that is not a particular; however, in an Aristotelian metaphysics, all existents 
are particulars. As indicated earlier, one of the contributing factors that gave rise to the 
Aristotelian Aporia is Aristotle’s denying the subsistence of universals, while asserting 
simultaneously that knowledge is universal. The challenge that Averroes faces is making 
the objects of knowledge universal without giving rise to Platonic forms.
Averroes and The Subject of Intelligibles (Intellectus Materialis) 
Averroes is well aware of the Aristotelian aporia, and he is well aware of the 
conditions that gave rise to the aporia. He knows that he needs to avoid hypostatizing 
intelligibles in act; if these intelligibles in act subsist, there would be no need of an Agent 
Intellect, nor would Aristotelian psychology be warranted. This is the case because the 
objects of knowledge would already exist in act. Consequently, the senses would not 
need to contribute anything to the acquisition of knowledge, for there would be no need 
to convert sensible intentions (i.e., abstractions2, intelligibles in potency) to intelligibles 
in act. Averroes’ challenge is to account for intelligibles in act that do not subsist and 
whose mode of being precludes them from being particulars or part of a species. For 
example, let us say that Human1, Human2... Humann-1 comprise the set of all Human 
individuals. Each member of that species has a particular mode of being; consequently, 
none of these particulars has a form that is able to denote the entire species. An 
intelligible in act cannot be another member of that species (e.g., Humann). An 
intelligible in act must have a mode of being that is able to denote the entire species 
(Human1... Humann) while simultaneously excluding it from the species. Each intelligible 
in act must be its own species.111 In order to meet this challenge, Averroes must affirm a 
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111.  Note that Avicenna and Averroes share a similar conception concerning 
intelligibles in act inasmuch as both them maintain that an intelligible in act must be its 
own species.
subject of intelligibles that is able to receive intelligibles without particularizing 
them.112That is to say, he must affirm a subject that is able to confer a universal mode of 
being on the intelligibles in act. What follows are the characteristics that Averroes 
requires for the subject of intelligibles.
Averroes states that the subject of intelligibles in act (i.e., intelligible forms) 
cannot be a body or a power in a body.113 Were the subject of intelligibles a body, or a 
power in a body, then what would exist in the body would be a sensible or imaginative 
form. As mentioned before, Aristotle stated that any form received into a body is a 
quality or a quantity. The intelligible form would inform an intellect concerning heat, 
whereas a sensible form would make a body hot. As a result, the subject of intelligibles 
does not have quality or quantity, for it is not mixed with a body.114 Moreover, it does not 
contain form-matter composites within itself. In addition, subject of intelligibles is not a 
material form (i.e., the type of form found in hylomorphic entities) because the material 
forms are not separable from matter. Its being is other than form, matter or the composite 
of form and matter. The subject of intelligibles cannot be form (i.e., immaterial 
substance) because that substantial form would prevent the reception of intelligible form. 
The subject of intelligible cannot be matter because matter would particularize the 
intelligible form. In addition, its being is unlike the simple first forms, which are pure 
actualities.115 It does not have an essence or nature by which it may be constituted 
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112. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 130.
113. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a20, p. 386: Quoniam autem 
substantia recipiens has formas necesse est ut non sit corpus neque virtus in corpore 
manifestum est ex propositionibus quibus Aristoteles usus est in hoc sermone. 
114. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a29, p.414: sed non habet 
qualitatem attributam calido et frigido, neque habet instrumentum; ergo non est mixtum 
cum corpore.
115. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a20, p.386: Quoniam autem 
substantia recipiens has formas necesse est ut non sit corpus neque virtus in corpore 
manifestum est ex propositionibus quibus Aristoteles usus est in hoc sermone. Quarum 
una est quod ista substantia recipit omnes formas materiales; et hoc notum est de hoc 
material except for the nature of receptivity (possibilitatis), and its nature lacks all 
material and intelligible forms.116 In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, the 
Material Intellect must be simple.117 Averroes goes as far to define the Material Intellect 
as “that which is in potency to the intentions of universal material forms, and it is not any 
of the beings in act before it understands them (i.e., the universal intentions of material 
forms).118 When Averroes asserts that the Material Intellect is not any of the beings in 
acts before it understands, he is not asserting that the Material Intellect is non-existent. 
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intellectu. Secunda autem est quod omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut sit denudatum a 
natura recepti, et ut sua substantia non sit substantia recepti in specie.... Et ex hiis duabus 
sequitur quod ista substantia que dicitur intellectus materialis nullam habet in sui natura 
de formis materialibus istis. Et quia forme materiales sunt aut corpus aut forme in 
corpore, manifestum est quod ista substantia que dicitur intellectus materialis. neque est 
corpus neque forma in corpore; est igitur non mixtum cum materia omnino....  quia ista 
substantia est, et quod est recipiens formas rerum materialium vel materiales non habet in 
se formam materialem, scilicet compositam ex materia et forma. Neque est etiam aliqua 
forma formarum materialium; forme enim materiales non sunt separabiles. Neque est 
etiam ex formis primis simplicibus; ille enim sunt separabiles, sed non...recipit formas 
nisi diversas, et secundum quod sunt intellecte in potentia, non in actu. Est igitur aliud 
ens a forma et material et congregato ex eis.... Et cum talis est dispositio intellectus 
materialis, scilicet quod est unum entium, et quod potentia est abstracta, et non habet 
formam materialem, manifestum est ipsum esse non passivum, cum passiva, scilicet 
transmutabilia, sunt sicut forme materiales, et quod est simplex, sicut dicit Aristoteles, et 
separabilis. Et sic intelligitur natura intellectus materialis apud Aristotelem.
116. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.387: Idest, illud igitur 
ex anima quod dicitur intellectus materialis nullam habet naturam et essentiam qua 
constituatur secundum quod est materialis nisi naturam possibilitatis, cum denudetur ab 
omnibus formis materialibus et intelligibilibus. The text indicates that the material 
intellect does not have a nature and essence by which it may be construed as material.   
However, as previously stated, the material intellect cannot have any matter.  That is to 
say, it must be immaterial.  Hence, the reference to matter here must be alluding to the 
passive potency inherent in matter, and passive potency allows a thing to be acted upon 
(i.e., receptivity).  Futhermore, possibilitas cannot denote pure potency; otherwise,  the 
Material Intellect would be non-existence because pure potency cannot exist because 
since potency is that which is capable of coming into being, but is not.
117. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a20, p.386: quod est simplex, 
sicut dicit Aristoteles.
118. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.387–88: Idest, 
diffinitio igitur intellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones 
formarum materialium universalium, et non est in actu aliquod entium antequam 
intelligat ipsum. 
Rather, he is stating that its being is unlike any other kind of being, for it is neither prime 
matter (i.e., being in potency), nor is it form (i.e., being in actuality), nor is it the 
composite of form and matter (i.e., being in actuality and in potency as a hylomorphic 
entity). Instead, he is asserting that the Material Intellect is a “fourth kind of being.”119 
This “fourth kind of being” has a universal mode of being (i.e., its mode of being is not 
that of a particular),120 which allows the material intellect to receive universal forms (i.e., 
abstractions4, intelligibles in act).121 This universal mode of being puts the Material 
Intellect in class of its own, for that which receives something else must be devoid of the 
nature of the thing received, and it substance must not be the same in species as the 
substance of the thing received.122 In other words, its lack of all the material and 
intelligible forms may be necessary for the subject of intelligibles, but it is not sufficient. 
The subject of intelligibles must have a mode of being that is different from any 
particular. Thus, the Material Intellect is able to receive the form of all things, for it alone 
is universal in its mode of being; it is not a determinate particular and so is able to receive 
forms in a universal way.
Furthermore, the Material Intellect, the subject of intelligibles, is unique in two 
senses: In the first sense, it is unique, for the kind of being that it has is unlike any other 
existent. All material beings are hoc aliquid, for no material existent is its species, but it 
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119. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 130; Averroes, Commentarium 
Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a10, p.409:..iste est quartum genus esse. 
120. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.387–88: Et ex hoc 
apparet quod ista natura non est aliquid hoc.
121. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.387–88: Et causa 
propter quam ista natura est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque 
cognoscens neque distinguens, est quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet 
individuales et istas, ista autem recipit formas universales.
122. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a20, p. 386: omne recipiens 
aliquid necesse est ut sit denudatum a natura recepti, et ut sua substantia non sit 
substantia recepti in specie.
is a member of a species. In contradistinction, immaterial beings are not hoc aliquid, for 
each immaterial being is a species unto itself. Moreover, all immaterial intellects except 
the Material Intellect have no receptivity. Second, it is unique because it cannot be 
multiplied. There is no metaphysical principle by which the Material Intellect can be 
multiplied, for it is neither form, matter, nor the composition of form and matter. 
Moreover, it is imperative that the Material Intellect is not multiplied. Were the Material 
Intellect multiplied, it would be a particular within a species. That is to say, it would be a 
member in a set. Furthermore, if it were multiplied, so would the intelligibles in act that 
reside in the Material Intellect, and this would give rise to the third-man argument.123 
Furthermore, if the Material Intellect were enumerated according to the number of people 
related to it, then it would be related to each individual such that when one person 
acquired an intelligible in act, then all will have acquired that intelligible in act.124 Yet, 
when one person understands by the reception of an intelligible in the Material Intellect, 
it is not the case that all understand. Most importantly, if intelligibles were not in one 
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123. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p. 411: Et si posuerimus 
eum esse multa, continget ut res intellecta apud me et apud te sit una in specie et due in 
individuo; et sic res intellecta habebit rem intellectam, et sic procedit in infinitum. 
Aristotle refers to the third man in Metaphysics 1079a13.  For any pluralitiy of a property 
(x), there exists one and only one form of X-ness in which the properties partake, and by 
partaking in X, they are x’s.  Every form of X is itself X, and no form partakes in itself.  
No form can have contrary properties, and the property of being one and being many are 
contraries.  If one presumes that there exists the form of Human by which all humans are 
human, it follows that the form of Human share a property common to each individual 
human.  Consequently, the form of Human is not one above the many, but one among 
many.   Yet, if each human and the form of Human shares a common property, then there 
must exist another form of Human by which the original form of humaness and the 
individuals are human.  This process continues ad infinitum.   This problem is called the 
third man argument, and it is also found in Plato, “Parmenides,” 132a-135c.
124. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, Bk. 3, 429a24, p.402: Et si posuerimus 
quod non numeratur per numerationem individuorum, continget ut proportio eius ad 
omnia individua existentia in sua perfectione postrema in generatione sit eadem, unde 
necesse est, si aliquod istorum individuorum acquisierit rem aliquam intellectam, ut illa 
acquiratur ab omnibus illorum.
intellect that all people shared, then people would not be able to understand each other.125 
By affirming the Material Intellect, he navigates through the Aporia and avoids 
hypostatizing intelligibles in act. Moreover, he has an ontological foundation that 
safeguards inter-subjective discourse. 
 Summary, Comments, and Critique of Averroes’ Solution
 Like a true Aristotelian, Averroes asserts that knowing begins with the objects of 
sensation. Given their actuality, the objects of sensation act upon the senses via 
intentional forms (i.e., abstraction2). These intentional forms are gathered in the common 
sense and propagated to the imagination, which retains the images and the intentional 
forms of external things even when the external things are no longer present. The 
cogitative power then performs an abstraction1 and produces an abstraction2 that is 
deposited in memory, which retains the individual form by which a thing is the kind of 
thing that it is. Yet, the individual form in memory resides in a particular, and has a 
limited extension, for it only denotes one member in a species even if somehow 
abstracted or separated from the material subject from which it arose and from the 
accidents that characterized it. In order for an intelligible form to arise, it must reside in a 
subject that is universal in its mode of being. That is to say, in a subject that is not a 
particular. The Agent Intellect is able to isolate the intention in abstraction2 found in the 
imagination, and creates an abstraction4 (i.e., an intelligible in act). The intelligible in act 
has an identical intention, and its mode of being is like that of the Agent Intellect: 
immaterial, eternal, and simple. Yet, the Agent Intellect is unable to confer a universal 
mode of being on the intelligible in act, for the Agent Intellect has no receptivity. For 
universality to be conferred upon the abstraction4, it must exist in a subject that is not a 
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125. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 138. Given Averroes 
acceptance of Themistius, the intelligibles in act cannot be multiplied, for human 
discourse would be impossible.
particular; it must exist in an intellect whose mode of being is universal, not a 
determinate particular, that is, the Material Intellect.126 The Material Intellect’s mode of 
being precludes it from being multiplied, for there is no metaphysical principle by which 
it may be multiplied. Moreover, the fact that the Material Intellect cannot be multiplied 
makes it the perfect storehouse for abstractions4 that have a universal extension.
Averroes resolves the Aristotelian aporia by affirming two eternal substances, the 
Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect. The former substance is responsible for 
performing a genuine abstraction3, and the latter is responsible for conferring a universal 
mode of being on the abstraction4 that the former generates. However, separating these 
powers from individual humans seems to imply that individual humans are not per se 
rational, for only by conjoining to the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect can 
people acquire knowledge. Although Averroes asserts that the Agent Intellect is “form 
for us,” and is our “final form,”127 it is difficult to reconcile such a notion with Aristotle’s 
notion that substantial form is principle that is intrinsic to a hylomorphic being.128 If the 
rational powers must be extrinsic to a hylomorphic human being, then a human being is 
nothing more than the highest form of non-rational animal. Moreover, if the subject that 
receives intelligibles is that which is knowing, then it would follow that the Material 
Intellect would know intelligibles, and humans would never have knowledge of 
universals. At best humans would know the form by which a particular thing is what it is 
because of the cogitative power. There could be no syllogistic reasoning or 
demonstration.
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126. When asserting that the mode of being is universal,  I am denying that the 
Material Intellect is a particular existent.
127. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 131.
128. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, 193b7–8, 1.
In order to draw a valid conclusion in a demonstrative syllogism, three conditions 
must be met. First, the middle term in a syllogism must be distributed at least once in 
either the minor or major premise. Second, whatever term is distributed in the conclusion 
must be distributed in a premise. Third, the number of negative propositions in the 
conclusion must be the same number of negative propositions in the premises. The first 
two conditions presuppose that terms are distributed. A distributed term is one that either 
includes or excludes every member in a group. However, in order to exclude or include 
every member in the group, the term must be universal, which arises as a result of 
abstraction.
 Although such charges could be easily leveled at Averroes’ doctrine, such a 
charge presupposes one of three kinds of participation. In an article entitled “Intelligibles 
in Act in Averroes,” Richard Taylor asserts that there are three kinds of participation.129 
The first kind is participation in likeness. In this example, the agent that is participating 
has an action that is similar and inferior to a superior agent. For example, St. Thomas 
Aquinas asserts that God does not reason discursively, but by means of knowing His own 
essence, God knows all things. Angels, likewise, know by means of intelligible species 
that God has placed in them at their creation. Although Angels are rational like God, 
what they know and how they know is inferior to God’s way of knowing: eternal, 
necessary, and immutably.130 The second kind of participation is that in which an 
external agent performs an activity on a passive subject. For example, were the Agent 
Intellect to act on a subject in such a manner that there is only one actor, the Agent 
Intellect, then the subject would not be per se rational, for the ability to act would be 
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129. Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes,” p. 137.
130. Aquinas, S.T., Ia, q. 55, a. 1, co: Hoc autem proprium est essentiae divinae, 
quae infinita est, ut in se simpliciter omnia comprehendat perfecte. Et ideo solus deus 
cognoscit omnia per suam essentiam. Angelus autem per suam essentiam non potest 
omnia cognoscere; sed oportet intellectum eius aliquibus speciebus perfici ad res 
cognoscendas. 
extrinsic to the subject. This is the view that Aquinas will attribute to Averroes.131 The 
third kind of participation I shall label “an inverted primary and secondary causality.”132 
In an “inverted primary and secondary causality,” an ontologically superior and an 
ontologically inferior agent share in one and the same act, and the act is attributed 
primarily to the ontologically inferior agent, and secondarily to the ontologically 
superior agent; yet from a human perspective it is attributed to the superior agent. For 
example, in the case of Averroes, the Agent Intellect is an ontologically superior Agent, 
and the human being is the inferior agent who shares in one and the same act of 
abstraction3. The act of abstraction3 is primary attributed to the ontologically inferior 
agent, the human; yet from a human perspective, the act is attributed to the ontologically 
superior Agent, the Agent Intellect. If this view applies to abstraction3 then the individual 
is primarily an agent and the Agent Intellect is secondarily an agent; yet, the act is 
attributed to the Agent Intellect. If this is in fact Averroes view, it becomes easy to 
reconcile how Averroes can maintain that man is per se rational and simultaneously 
ascribe the power by which we know to the Agent Intellect. Nonetheless, that is not how 
Aquinas understood Averroes. Hence, even if this is the correct view of the position of 
Averroes himself, the primary concern of this dissertation is with the understanding of 
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131. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2,  Ch. 76:  Si intellectus agens est quaedam substantia 
separata, manifestum est quod est supra naturam hominis. Operatio autem quam homo 
exercet sola virtute alicuius supernaturalis substantiae, est operatio supernaturalis: ut 
miracula facere et prophetare, et alia huiusmodi quae divino munere homines operantur. 
Cum igitur homo non possit intelligere nisi virtute intellectus agentis, si intellectus agens 
est quaedam substantia separata, sequetur quod intelligere non sit operatio naturalis 
homini. Et sic homo non poterit definiri per hoc quod est intellectivus aut rationalis. 
132. In a typical primary and secondary causality, an ontologically superior agent 
and an ontologically inferior agent share in one and the same act, and the act is attributed 
primarily to the ontologically superior agent, and secondarily to the ontologically 
inferior agent. The act from a human perspective is attributed to the inferior agent. For 
example, when one moves one’s arm, motion comes into being, but bringing something 
into being is action that can only be performed by God. Thus, when people moves their 
arms, the act of moving the an arm is attributed primarily to God and secondarily to the 
people; yet from a human perspective, it is the people who move their arms. 
Aquinas of sources influential in his formation of the doctrine of intelligible species.133 
Chapter Summary
The Aristotelian aporia has forced Avicenna and Averroes to take diametrically 
opposed positions. Knowing that intelligibles cannot reside in a body, Avicenna separates 
the soul from the body so that it is also accidentally united to the body. In doing so, he 
has safeguarded rationality by allowing the individual person to be the subject of 
intelligibles. However, he has had to deny that the soul is the form of the body, and he 
had to introduce the form of corporeity to account for the body’s hylomorphic 
composition. For Avicenna, personal identity is found in the rational soul, not in the 
body. Averroes also knows that intelligibles cannot reside ontologically in a body, but he 
will not deny that the soul is form of the body. Thus, he must affirm immaterial entities 
capable of abstracting and conferring universality on intelligibles.
 For Averroes, personal identity is found in the hylomorphic composite, and the 
Aristotelian aporia has forced him to affirm two separate immaterial substances. The 
actuality and immateriality of the first substance, the Agent Intellect, allows it to transfer 
the ratio from the material world. The receptivity of the second immaterial substance, the 
Material Intellect, allows it to receive intelligibles in act. The Material Intellect has an 
existence unlike any Aristotelian category, and the mode of being of the Material 
Intellect confers universality on the intelligibles in act. Averroes’ challenge is rendering 
an account that attributes intellection to each individual.
 Although these positions are different, they are both motivated by the fact that 
hylomorphism as understood by the tradition precluded the reception of intelligible forms 
 122 
  
———————————
133.  This understanding of Averroes was not that of Aquinas. For a more lengthy 
account of this, see Richard C. Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul 
According to Aquinas and Averroes,” in The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul, Reflections on 
Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, edited by Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth and 
John M. Dillon (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 187–220.
into the body. Neither Averroes nor Avicenna has broken with tradition, for both of them 
have intelligibles existing outside of the body, and both also agree that the human 
intellect that is capable of receiving intelligible forms must be a spiritual substance. In 
addition, they also agree that the intelligibles in act existing in a separated substance are 
the objects of intellection. Avicenna will have problems reconciling his position because 
he also asserts that the human intellect knows the things that are in the world. Yet, it is 
difficult to see how this is the case when the objects of intellection for Avicenna do not 
come from the world but rather come from the Agent Intellect. 
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CHAPTER 4
AQUINAS’S SOLUTION TO THE ARISTOTELIAN APORIA
Introduction
As explained in chapter two, hylomorphism and the reception of intelligible forms 
appear to be mutually exclusive simply because the reception of an intelligible form into 
a hylomorphic entity entails that it be particularized. To resolve the aporia, Averroes 
affirms an immaterial entity called the Material Intellect which is capable of receiving 
intelligibles in act. Furthermore, he affirms another immaterial entity, Agent Intellect, 
which is capable of performing a true abstraction3. By participating in the activity of the 
Agent Intellect, humans are capable of intellection, which is the intellectual apprehension 
of intelligibles in act. In and of themselves, humans are unable to abstract intelligibles, 
nor are they subjects fitting for the reception of intelligibles (i.e., reified Platonic forms 
existing in the Material Intellect) according to Averroes.
 Avicenna also attempts to resolve the aporia, but he does so by affirming a 
separate immaterial entity called the Agent Intellect that emanates abstractions4 into the 
souls of individual knowers. The abstractions4 that emanate into the souls are not 
abstracted3 from the world. That is to say, there is no transference of a ratio or intention 
from the sensible world to the immaterial Agent Intellect, nor to the immaterial souls. 
Instead, these abstractions4 allow one to behold the intelligibles in act (i.e., abstractions5) 
that exist in the separated Agent Intellect. Unlike Averroes who holds to hylomorphism1, 
Avicenna affirms a new kind of hylomorphism2 that involves the union of the form of 
corporeity with matter. For Avicenna, the human soul is not the form of the body; 
  
 124 
instead, it is a separated, solitary substance that moves and uses the body, but is not 
connected to the body in a hylomorphic fashion. By separating the soul from the body, 
Avicenna attempts to make humans the subjects of intelligible forms; however, because 
intelligibles in act (i.e., abstraction5) cannot be multiplied, the abstractions4 that flow 
from Avicenna’s Agent Intellect are rationes and representations that make the 
intelligibles in act present to many souls without multiplying the intelligible in the Agent 
Intellect. Like Averroes, the intelligibles in act are akin to reified Platonic forms existing 
in an immaterial intellect that is ontologically separate from the individual human 
knower. Although Avicenna and Averroes have different solutions to the aporia, they 
have three things in common: (1) intelligibles in act are reifed as existing in a separate 
intellect; (2) intelligibles in act cannot be received into a form-matter entity (regardless of 
whether the soul is the form of the body); (3) intelligibles in act cannot be multiplied.
Aquinas is well aware of the prior solutions to the aporia, and he realizes that 
intellection is an activity proper to a spiritual substance.1 Given that intellection is the 
operation of a spiritual substance, historically thinkers had separated the subject of 
intelligibles from the body.2 Averroes’ hylomorphism1 maintains that the soul is the form 
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1. Thomas Aquinas, De spiritualibus creaturis (Rome: Leonine Commission, 
2000), Article 2, Response, p. 24:  Oportet igitur principium huius operationis quod est 
intelligere formaliter inesse huic homini. Principium autem huius operationis non est 
aliqua forma cuius esse sit dependens a corpore et materie obligatum siue immersum, 
quia hec operatio non fit per corpus, ut probatur in III De anima : unde principium huius 
operationis habet operationem sine communicatione materie corporalis, Sic autem 
unumquodque operam secundum quod est : unde oportet quod esse principii illius sit esse 
eleuatum supra materiam corporalem et non dependens ab ipsa. Hoc autem est proprium 
spiritualis substantie.
2. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, Article 2, Response, p. 24: Quidam vero concedentes quod 
intelligere sit actus spiritualis substantiae, negaverunt illam spiritualem substantiam uniri 
corpori ut forma. Quorum Averroes posuit intellectum possibilem, secundum esse, 
separatum a corpore....Unde dicebat Plato, ut dictus Gregorius refert, quod homo non est 
aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed est anima utens corpore, ut intelligatur esse 
in corpore quodammodo sicut nauta in navi....Sic igitur et hic homo intelligit in quantum 
hic homo est ipsa substantia spiritualis, quae est anima, cuius actus proprius est 
of the body and it prevents individual humans from being the subject of intelligibles. 
Avicenna’s hylomorphism2 also prevents individual bodies from being the subject of 
intelligibles, but it does not prevent the individual from being the subject of intelligible 
forms because Avicenna denied that the soul is the form of the body. For Avicenna, the 
individual soul is a spiritual substance separate from the body. Yet, the ontological status 
of the intelligible in act in the Agent Intellect prevented the multiplication of these 
intelligibles, the object of knowledge, into individual souls.
Aquinas is also aware of the dilemma. That is to say, either the soul is a spiritual 
substance subsisting independent of the body, or it is the form of the body.3 The soul 
must be a spiritual substance for intellection to occur; this would seem to necessitate that 
the soul cannot be the form of the body. Yet, according to Aristotelian principles, the soul 
must be the form of the body, for it is by virtue ultimately of an intrinsic substantial form 
that any substance acts. Aquinas sees this dilemma as a false dichotomy and grabs both 
horns of the dilemma. He will assert that the soul is a spiritual substance and that it is the 
form of the body.4 How is this possible? Why hadn’t any of his predecessors realized 
what is obvious to Aquinas? Part of the reason is that Aquinas does not have the same 
ontological commitment to intelligibles in act. Also, although Aquinas holds to a 
hylomorphism that is similar to Averroes’, he only does so for non-rational creatures and 
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intelligere; hac tamen substantia forma corporis non existente.Sed ad huius rationis 
improbationem unum sufficiat, quod Aristoteles in II de anima inducit directe contra hanc 
positionem. Si enim anima non uniretur corpori ut forma, sequeretur quod corpus et 
partes eius non haberent esse specificum per animam; quod manifeste falsum apparet: 
quia recedente anima non dicitur oculus aut caro et os nisi aequivoce, sicut oculus pictus 
vel lapides. 
3. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, Article 2, Response: Unde contra rationem substantiae 
spiritualis esse videtur quod sit corporis forma.
4. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, Article 2, Response: Oportet ergo dicere, si praedicta 
coniungantur, quod quaedam spiritualis substantia, sit forma humani corporis.
lower kinds of substantial and accidental forms.5 For rational creatures, Aquinas holds a 
new hylomorphism4 unlike Averroes’s hylomorphism1 and unlike Avicenna’s 
hylomorphism2. Although this new hylomorphism4 makes intellection inherent in the 
individual, it also necessitates intelligible species, as I shall show. That is to say, as a 
result of making intellection inherent in the individual, Aquinas must affirm intelligible 
species.
In this chapter, I consider (1) the two kinds of hylomorphism espoused by 
Aquinas,       (2) Aquinas and sensation, (3) Aquinas and abstraction, and (4) Aquinas 
and the subject of intelligibles, and (5) summary and comments on Aquinas’s position.
 
Aquinas’s Hylomorphism3 and Hylomorphism4
In this section, I examine Aquinas’s Hylomorphism3 and Hylomorphism4. In both 
accounts, I shall examine the source of the hylomorphic entity, the necessary conditions 
for substantial forms in a hylomorphic entity, the hierarchy of forms that undergo 
hylomorphic3 composition, the operations of a hylomorphic entity, the relation of 
substantial form to matter in a hylomorphic entity, and the telos of the hylomorphic 
entity.
For Aquinas, hylomorphic3 entities are generated. That is to say, they are educed 
from the potency of matter. Eduction from the potency of matter is strange terminology 
to contemporary philosophers; however, to Aquinas and to those who followed Aristotle, 
the eduction from matter meant to undergo a substantial change whereby something that 
potentially existed in matter comes to exist actually in matter.6 In a substantial change, 
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5. They are different inasmuch as Aquinas requries a two-fold composition of 
form and matter, which gives rise to essence,  and of essence and existence.   Averroes 
only requires the composition of form and matter. 
6. Aquinas, S.T., Ia, Q. 90, A. 3, R.3: actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil 
aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia.
matter is the subject that undergoes the change. Given that substantial forms cannot be 
created by any natural agents, it is the substantial form of a thing that is educed from the 
potency of matter; consequently, one says that in hylomorphic3 entities their forms are 
educed from the potency of matter.7 The natural order has been established such that 
from the initial creation, other things were able to come to be through mutual action and 
passion. By means of active and passive powers, which Augustine called rationes 
seminales, subsequent effects are produced. Among the various active and passive 
powers are the reproductive powers. Thus, the semen in non-rational animals (e.g., the 
lion and the horse) has the ability to bring about other non-rational animals in the same 
species.8 Yet, it is not the semen alone. The female of the species provides the matter, in 
which is the vegetative soul. This vegetative soul remains in a dormant state until the 
sperm, which acts as a catalyst, transmutes the matter from potency to actuality so that 
the sensitive soul is brought into act. The sensitive soul then begins to operate toward the 
completion of its body by means of nutrition and growth. The power that was in the 
semen ceases and the semen is dissolved.9 Now, this coming to be is not creation, for 
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7. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 4, D. 5, Q. 1, A. 3: Ad tertium dicendum, quod nullum 
agens creatum facit formam, quia formae non fiunt ut probatur in 7 metaph., sed 
educuntur de potentia materiae. 
8. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 13, A. 1, Response: Respondeo dicendum, quod natura 
in operibus sex dierum taliter instituta est ut naturae principia tunc condita in se 
subsisterent, et quod ex eis alia propagari possent per mutuam actionem et passionem; et 
ideo oportuit eis tunc esse conferri, et virtutes activas et passivas, quas Augustinus, vocat 
rationes seminales, quibus ex eis effectus consequentes producerentur. Quantum ergo ad 
esse ipsorum principiorum, sumitur opus creationis, per quod substantia elementorum 
mundi in esse producta est. Sed virtutum activarum et passivarum quaedam sunt 
moventes ad determinatas species, ut virtus quae est in semine leonis et equi.
9. Aquinas, S.T., Ia, Q. 118, A. 1, RA. 4: [M]ateria autem foetus est illud quod 
ministratur a femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non 
quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva 
est in dormientibus. Cum autem incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. 
Huiusmodi igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris, quousque 
creation entails that a thing comes to be from nothing; rather, generation entails that a 
thing comes to be from matter and that it comes to be from contrarieties, as Aristotle had 
established.10 Moreover, this process is completely natural inasmuch as the agents are 
hylomorphic3 entities; furthermore, the semen and the egg are related as act to potency, 
and they are also parts of  natural substances.
Having described the source of non-rational animals, I shall briefly examine the 
two necessary conditions that a substantial form must satisfy.11 First, the substantial form 
must be the principle of being of the hylomorphic entity of which it is the form. That is to 
say, the substantial form must be intrinsic to the hylomorphic entity and must provide the 
actuality by which the hylomorphic entity is a being. Without the substantial form, the 
hylomorphic entity cannot be. The second condition that must be satisfied is that form 
and matter come together to produce one being. In other words, it is not the case that 
some efficient cause (e.g., the movement of the semen) that is concomitant with the 
semen, the formal cause, provides the being of the new entity. Instead, the being that 
arises results from the union of form and matter.12 
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perducatur in actum animae sensitivae... Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi 
quod erat in semine, producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem 
eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum 
proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in 
semine, esse desinit, dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat.
10. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 9, Response: Sed res quae fit, proprie et per se fit. 
Quod autem fit, fit vel ex materia vel ex nihilo. Quod vero ex materia fit, necesse est fieri 
ex materia contrarietati subiecta. Generationes enim ex contrariis sunt, secundum 
philosophum.... Unde restat quod exeat in esse per creationem, quasi ex nihilo facta. 
11. These conditions apply to both hylmorphic3 entities and hylomorphic4 entities.
12. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma 
substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi 
substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo 
aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia 
conveniant in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse. Et 
hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex 
 If one considers the conditions necessary for substantial forms and how non-
rational animals are generated, it becomes evident that the substantial form that arises in 
an animal is the sensitive soul, and this sensitive soul is educed from the potency of 
matter by the power in the sperm acting as a formal cause and by the egg, which is a 
material cause. As a result of this union, a hylomorphic3 entity is generated, and the 
sensitive soul provides the actuality to the hylomorphic3 entity. Moreover, the 
hylomorphic3 entity arises because of union between the form and the matter.
 Although non-rational hylomorphic3 and hylomorphic4 entities are the main 
focus of this section, we should observe that there are various kinds of  forms, and a 
proper understanding of these various kinds of forms will enable us to understand 
hylomorphic4 entities. Therefore, let us examine the four kinds of forms that are 
hierarchically ordered from lowest to highest. 
The lowest forms are the forms of simple bodies that are not able to perform any 
operations except that of being qualitative dispositions of matter, just as are the forms of 
the elements, from which result heat, cold, humidity, dryness, rarity, density, gravity and 
levity, and other qualities similar to these. Such substantial forms are said to be 
completely material (omnino materiales) and totally immersed in matter (totaliter 
immersae materiae).13  When they are received into a hylomorphic3 entity, they are 
received into the matter of that hylomorphic entity as a quality. For Aquinas, these would 
be the forms that Aristotle had alluded to when he had stated that forms received into a 
body would be qualitative or quantitative.
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materia et forma constans.
13. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Invenimus enim aliquas infimas formas, quae in 
nullam operationem possunt nisi ad quam se extendunt qualitates quae sunt dispositiones 
materiae, ut calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, rarum, densum, grave et leve, et his 
similia: sicut formae elementorum. Unde istae sunt formae omnino materiales, et totaliter 
immersae materiae. 
The next highest are forms of mixed bodies. They do not go beyond the operation 
that is able to be completed by the aforementioned lower forms. Sometimes, however, 
they produce those effects by some higher power whose effect, which are consequent 
upon their species and which is allotted by the heavenly bodies. For example, a magnet is 
able to attract iron.14 Notice that in this account, these forms are not said to be totally 
immersed in matter. Yet, neither are they said to transcend or exceed matter. For, 
qualitative dispositions could be accounted for solely by the material form. However, the 
emergent properties (e.g., the magnetism) could not be accounted for solely by a material 
disposition.
Continuing up the hierarchy, one finds forms whose operations extend beyond the 
aforementioned qualitative powers; though the aforementioned organic qualities are 
necessary for these operations. The souls of plants,  for example, are similar not only to 
the powers of the heavenly bodies in that they exceed the aforementioned active and 
passive qualities, but they are similar to the movers of the heavenly bodies inasmuch as 
they are principles for living things which move themselves.15 This kind of form is the 
vegetative soul found in plants accounting for self-movement, nutrition, and growth. This 
kind of soul is higher than the aforementioned forms because it both gives rise to a 
material entity, and it gives rise to a living material entity. It too is a substantial form that 
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14. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Super has inveniuntur formae mixtorum 
corporum, quae licet non se extendant ad aliqua operata quae non possunt compleri per 
qualitates praedictas, interdum tamen operantur illos effectus altiori virtute, quam 
sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus, quae consequitur eorum speciem: sicut adamas trahit 
ferrum. 
15. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Super has iterum inveniuntur aliquae formae 
quarum operationes extenduntur ad aliqua operata quae excedunt virtutem qualitatum 
praedictarum, quamvis qualitates praedictae organice ad harum operationes deserviant: 
sicut sunt animae plantarum, quae etiam assimilantur non solum virtutibus corporum 
caelestium in excedendo qualitates activas et passivas, sed ipsis motoribus corporum 
caelestium, inquantum sunt principia motus rebus viventibus, quae movent seipsas. 
is not totally immersed in matter, but neither does it transcend matter because all of the 
operations performed by this vegetative soul are performed by means of some corporeal 
organ.
Even higher still are forms that are similar to the higher substances not only in 
movement but also in some kind of knowing. And thus, they have operative powers for 
which none of the aforementioned organic qualities are used. Nonetheless, this kind of 
operation is only done by means of a bodily organ, just as is the case with the souls of 
non-rational (brutorum) animals. For sensing and imagination are not achieved by 
heating and cooling although these are necessary for the required disposition of the 
organs.16   This kind of form is the sensitive soul that is found in non-rational animals. As 
a sensitive soul, it has the power of sensation and imagination. All of the operations 
performed by this kind of soul are also dependent on matter. Consequently, it can be said 
that this form is also immersed in matter, but it is not as pressed down (deprimatur)  into 
matter in the same manner as the aforementioned forms.17 This kind of form, which is 
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16. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Supra has formas inveniuntur aliae formae 
similes superioribus substantiis non solum in movendo, sed etiam aliqualiter in 
cognoscendo; et sic sunt potentes in operationes ad quas nec organice qualitates 
praedictae deserviunt, tamen operationes huiusmodi non complentur nisi mediante 
organo corporali; sicut sunt animae brutorum animalium. Sentire enim et imaginari non 
completur calefaciendo et infrigidando: licet haec sint necessaria ad debitam organi 
dispositionem. 
17. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 11. Response : Invenimus autem quasdam formas 
quae se ulterius non extendunt quam ad id quod per principia materialia fieri potest; sicut 
formae elementares et mixtorum corporum, quae non agunt ultra actionem calidi et 
frigidi; unde sunt penitus materiae immersae. Anima vero vegetabilis, licet non agat nisi 
mediantibus qualitatibus praedictis, attingit tamen operatio eius ad aliquid in quod 
qualitates praedictae se non extendunt, videlicet ad producendum carnem et os, et ad 
praefigendum terminum augmento, et ad huiusmodi; unde et adhuc retinetur infra 
ordinem materialium principiorum, licet non quantum formae praemissae. Anima vero 
sensibilis non agit per virtutem calidi et frigidi de necessitate, ut patet in actione visus et 
imaginationis et huiusmodi; quamvis ad huiusmodi operationes requiratur determinatum 
temperamentum calidi et frigidi ad constitutionem organorum, sine quibus actiones 
praedictae non fiunt; unde non totaliter transcendit ordinem materialium principiorum, 
found in perfected animals, is present in the whole body of these animals, and it is wholly 
present in each part of the body, for it is not divided even though its subject is divided.18
Hence, one finds that at one extreme, the lowest forms are completely immersed 
in matter. At the other extreme, one finds the sensitive soul that does not transcend the 
order of material principles, yet it is not as submerged as the lower forms. Given that all 
of the aforementioned forms are immersed in matter, none of these forms are able to be 
the subject of intelligible forms.  According to Aquinas, from observing and considering 
the operations of things, we come to know their natures; for whatever operates does so 
according to its mode of being.19 From observing the aforementioned forms, it is clear to 
Aquinas that these forms are all material forms, immersed in matter whose existence 
depends on the union of form and matter and whose operations cannot extend beyond 
material operations (i.e., they are dependent on matter for their operations).20 
 Finally, hylomorphic3 entities not only have their operations wholly dependent 
on matter, but they are all similar as to their finality. To assert that a hylomorphic3 entity 
is generated entails that the hylomorphic3 entity does not have subsistent being, and, 
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quamvis ad ea non tantum deprimatur, quantum formae praedictae.
18. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 72 : “Si igitur est aliqua forma quae non dividatur 
divisione subiecti, sicut sunt animae animalium perfectorum, non erit opus distinctione, 
cum eis non competat nisi una totalitas: sed absolute dicendum est eam totam esse in 
qualibet parte corporis.” The whole sensitive soul is present to the body and the whole 
sensitve soul is present to each part of the body.  Although not stated, one may infer that 
the matter of the body is wholly present to the soul; consequently, there cannot be any 
operation of the soul that is not a material operation (i.e., an operation of the body).
19. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68 : Quod patet inspicienti operationes formarum, 
ex quarum consideratione earum naturas cognoscimus: unumquodque enim operatur 
secundum quod est.
20. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 11, Response : cum esse formarum naturalium et 
corporalium non consistat nisi in unione ad materiam; eiusdem agentis esse videtur eas 
producere cuius est materiam transmutare. Secundo, quia cum huiusmodi formae non 
excedant virtutem et ordinem et facultatem principiorum agentium in natura.
consequently upon the corruption of the body, the hylomorphic entity ceases to be.21 
Thus, the aforementioned souls that come to be by generation also cease to be with the 
dissolution of the body; hence, neither non-rational animals nor plants are immortal.
 Hylomorphism3, as described above, is similar to the hylomorphism1 that 
Averroes and Aristotle ascribed to all animals regardless of whether they are rational or 
non-rational. It is this kind of hylomorphism that precludes the reception of intelligibles, 
for this kind of hylomorphic subject is immersed in matter in such a way that the 
reception of an intelligible form would be received into matter; consequently, the 
intelligible form would be particularized and rendered a quality or quantity in a body. 
Avicenna, Averroes and Aquinas are in agreement that only an immaterial intellect could 
be the subject of intelligibles; they also are in agreement that if the form of a 
hylomorphic entity were educed from the potency of matter, it could not be the subject of 
intelligibles. Nonetheless, they disagree as to what should be the subject of intelligibles. 
For Avicenna, the subject of intelligibles is each individual soul, a solitary spiritual 
substance accidentally united to a body. For Averroes, the subject of intelligibles is a 
separated spiritual substance, the Material Intellect. Why  have Averroes and Avicenna 
chosen different subjects for intelligible forms?
Averroes and Avicenna have chosen different subjects for intelligibles because 
they have different commitments concerning human identity and constitution. Avicenna 
identifies a human being with the soul, a spiritual substance, and he denies that the soul is 
the form of the body. Instead, there is a two-fold composition; matter and the form of 
corporeity are substantially united to give rise to the body, whereas the soul is 
accidentally united to the form-matter composite in order to animate the body and to 
explain rational activity. By taking this position, not only does Avicenna safeguard the 
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21. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 9, Response: Ponere autem quod per generationem 
corporis fiat, est ponere ipsam non esse subsistentem, et per consequens cum corpore 
corrumpi.
rationality of the human being inasmuch as the ability to receive intelligible forms is 
inherent in each human’s substance, but he safeguards the immortality of the soul 
inasmuch as the soul is an indestructible, simple substance.
 In contradistinction, Averroes will identify a human being with the form-matter 
composite, following Aristotle, and he will affirm that the soul is the form of the body. 
Thus, the soul actualizes the matter and simultaneously animates the body as a result of 
the composition of form and matter. There is no need for dual compositions. The single 
composition of form-matter is necessary and sufficient to give rise to a living 
hylomorphic entity. By taking this position, Averroes remains faithful to Aristotle’s 
teachings, and the immortality of the human being (i.e., the composite) is denied. 
Moreover, by taking this position, Averroes denies that the ability to abstract and receive 
intelligibles is inherent in human being without the aid of two spiritual substances: the 
Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect. That is to say, human beings are not rational 
per se, they are apparently rational only per accidens.22
Similar to Odysseus’ passing through the straits of Messina, Aquinas must 
navigate between Avicenna’s solution and Averroes’s solution.  If he veers to close to 
Averroes’ solution, he risks denying the Catholic doctrine of the immortality of the soul 
with its rewards and punishments after death.23 Moreover, he risks making man per 
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22. Dr. Richard Taylor’s interpretation of Averroes would remove the  per 
accidens vs. per se distinction because human intellection could only be possible by 
participation in the activity of the Agent Intellect.  However, his new interpretation of 
Averroes is outside of scope of this dissertation. See Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal 
Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and Averroes,” pp. 187–220.
23. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A.1: Sciendum est etiam quod secundum 
has opiniones intellectus possibilis generatur generato corpore et corrumpitur corrupto 
corpore et cum non sit differentia intellecturs nisi possibilis in diversis hominibus, quia 
agens est unus quod illud remanet de intellectu ex omnibus homnibus post mortem est 
unum numero, scilicet intellectus agens. Et hoc est valde hereticum: quia sic tolleretur 
retribution meritorum post mortem.
accidens rational. Further, he risks giving up free-agency because for Aquinas volition is 
a power associated with intellect; thus, there would be one intellect for all, and it would 
be extrinsic to all men. That is to say, individual humans would be moved by some other 
agent, the Agent Intellect.24 On the other hand, if he veers too close to Avicenna’s 
solution, he risks human identity, for humans would be nothing more than souls using 
bodies; furthermore, the resurrection would be trivialized, for the resurrected body would 
be something that is being used by a soul, not something that has been ensouled. Free-
agency would also be at risk, for the same reason given regarding Averroes. Aquinas 
seems to be caught in a dilemma: either he must affirm that the soul is the form of the 
body and deny that it is a spiritual substance (Averroes’s position), or he must deny that 
the soul is the form of the body and affirm that it is a spiritual substance (Avicenna’s 
position). 
Instead of avoiding the horns of the dilemma, Aquinas grabs hold of both horns 
and asserts a position that would have been unimaginable to both Avicenna and 
Averroes. Aquinas asserts that the soul is the form of the body and that it is a spiritual 
substance. In order to do so, he needs to deny that hylomorphism3 applies to human 
beings; instead, he will need to reformulate hylomorphism in a manner in which none of 
his predecessors had while still remaining “faithful” to the Aristotelian text. In order to 
understand Thomas’s reformulation of hylomorphism, I shall examine (1) the creation of 
the hylomorphic4 beings, (2) the relationship between the soul and matter, (3) the soul’s 
mode of being, and (4) the operations and the finality of hylomorphic4 entities.
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24. Aquinas, SCG, Bk.2, Ch. 76: “Si igitur intellectus agens est quaedam 
substantia extra hominem, total operatio hominis dependet a principio extrinseco. Non 
igitur erit homo agens seipsum, sed actus ab alio.” This argument does not work against 
Averroes because Averroes maintained that the will is a particular power in the human 
body.  That is to say, for Averroes, the will is not a spiritual substance; See: Taylor, 
“Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Powers in 
Averroes,” pp. 140–42.
Unlike in the case of hylomorphic3 entities, which are generated, the soul in the 
case of hylomorphic4 entities is created.25 The creation of the soul means that the rational 
human soul is not educed from the potency of matter.26 Consequently, the rational soul is 
not something composed of form and matter, nor is it a material form (forma materialis), 
which is able to be educed from the potency of matter as are the other material forms 
found in hylomorphic3 entities.27 But one must ask, “How is the creation of the soul in 
accordance with Aristotle’s text?” Moreover, creation requires an efficient cause, but 
Aristotle argues that the Unmoved Mover (i.e., god) cannot be an efficient cause because 
it would entail that the Unmoved Mover would need to undergo a change. Instead, 
Aristotle opts for the Unmoved Mover being a final cause. There is no way that 
Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover could create anything. Nevertheless, following the “words” 
of Aristotle, Aquinas interprets that nous comes from outside to mean that the intellectual 
soul is created by God.28 
The notion that the soul is created by God is obviously also a religious doctrine, 
and there were three views that were disputed in the Catholic Church. The traducian view 
asserted that the soul of a human child was produced by its human father. The second 
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25. Stump, Aquinas, p. 207.
26. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 86, N.1709: Omnis forma quae educitur in esse per 
materiae transmutationem, est forma educta de potentia materiae: hoc enim est materiam 
transmutari, de potentia in actum reduci. Anima autem intellectiva non potest educi de 
potentia materiae.
27. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 18, Q. 2, A. 1, Response: anima autem rationalis non 
est quid ex materia (ad minus praeexistente) et forma compositum: nec est forma 
materialis, quae possit educi de potentia materiae, sicut aliae formae materiales.
28. Aquinas, ContraAverr, Ch. 1, 780–81: Et hoc ex verbis Aristotelis apparet: 
relinquitur autem intellectum solum de foris advenire;  cf. Aristotle, Generation of 
Animals, 2.3, 736b27 : “It remains, then, that reason alone enters in, as an additional 
factor from outside, and it alone is divine, because physical activity has nothing watever 
to do with the activity of reason.” 
view asserted that souls were created prior to the creation of the body and later infused 
into the body. According to the third view, God created the human soul ex nihilo. The 
first two views were judged by the Catholic Church as heretical. Thus, Aquinas’s 
position is consonant with Catholic doctrine.29 At this point, one may be tempted to 
discount Aquinas’s notion of hylomorphism4 on the basis that it is based solely on 
theology as opposed to philosophy. However, it does not follow that just because a 
position is consonant with Church doctrine that it has no philosophical basis. As a matter 
of fact, Aquinas provides several philosophical arguments why the soul must be created. 
All of Aquinas’s arguments for the creation of the rational soul are based upon his 
conception of the rational soul, so before we look at his arguments for the creation of the 
soul, let us look at Aquinas’s conception of the rational soul.
Aquinas’s Rational Soul
 Following Avicenna, Aquinas conceives the rational soul as a spiritual substance 
in a qualified sense.30  Aquinas does not follow Avicenna completely. When asked 
whether or not the rational soul is a hoc aliquid (a particular existent), Aquinas responds 
that the soul in a qualified sense is a particular existent inasmuch as it is able to subsist 
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29. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 9,  Response: Respondeo....Quidam namque 
dicebant, animam filii ex parentis anima propagari, sicut et corpus propagatur ex corpore. 
Alii vero dicebant, omnes animas seorsum creari; sed ponebant a principio eas extra 
corpora fuisse creatas simul, et post modum corporibus seminatis coniungebantur, vel 
proprio motu voluntatis, secundum quosdam, vel deo mandante et faciente, secundum 
alios. Alii vero dicebant, animas simul cum creantur, corporibus infundi. Quae quidem 
opiniones, quamvis aliquo tempore sustinerentur, et quae earum esset verior in dubium 
verteretur, ut patet ex Augustino, et in libris quos scribit de origine animae; tamen primae 
duae postmodum iudicio ecclesiae sunt damnatae, et tertia approbata; unde dicitur in Lib. 
De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus
30. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, A. 2, Response: In quantum igitur supergreditur esse 
materiae corporalis, potens per se subsistere et operari, anima humana est substantia 
spiritualis; Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 77: Habet enim substantia animae humanae 
immaterialitatem, et, sicut ex dictis (cap. 68) patet, ex hoc habet naturam intellectualem: 
quia omnis substantia immaterialis est huiusmodi.
per se; however, it is not a particular existent inasmuch as it is a completed species in 
itself; rather, it completes the human species as the form of the body, and when it does 
so, the composite is a particular existent.31 In other words, in a qualified sense, the soul is 
a substance because it can exist per se. However, in an unqualified sense, the soul is not a 
substance; rather, the composite of soul and body is a substance. This distinction allows 
Aquinas to safeguard the immortality of the soul because the soul exists per se as a 
spiritual substance. It also allows him to assert that the soul is the form of the body. 
However, it is not self-evident how Aquinas can maintain that the soul is the form of the 
body and simultaneously maintain that it is a spiritual substance. In order to see how this 
is possible, one needs to contrast the metaphysical composition of hylomorphic3 entities 
with the metaphysical composition of hylomorphic4 entities.
The composition of hylomorphic3 entities is different from the composition of 
hylomorphic4 entities. In Thomas’s metaphysical system, hylomorphic3 entities undergo a 
two-fold composition. Matter and form undergo a composition, which gives rise to 
substance (i.e., essence) then essence and existence involve composition, which gives 
rise to a hylomorphic3 entity.32 In contradistinction, hylomorphic4 entities also undergo a 
two-fold composition, but they differ in the order of composition. Hylomorphic4 entities 
involve an act-potency composition, which gives rise to a subsisting spiritual substance, 
the rational soul.33 This spiritual substance then serves as a substantial form and 
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31. Aquinas, QDAnima, Pro. Art 1: Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, 
ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi 
perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et similiter est forma et hoc aliquid.
32. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 54: In substantiis autem compositis ex materia et 
forma est duplex compositio actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae, quae 
componitur ex materia et forma; secunda vero ex ipsa substantia iam composita et esse, 
quae etiam potest dici ex quod est et esse; vel ex quod est et quo est; In this context,  
terms such as  “then” and “afterwards” denote ontological priority not temporal priority.
33. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 54: “In substantiis autem intellectualibus, quae non 
sunt ex materia et forma compositae, ut ostensum est, sed in eis ipsa forma est substantia 
undergoes a hylomorphic composition with matter; this composition give rises to 
hylomorphic4 entities.34  Note well, it is not solely the essence-existence distinction that 
accounts for the per se subsistence of the soul because hylomorphic3 entities also 
undergo an essence-existence composition. Rather, it is also the order in which existence 
is received that accounts for the per se existence of the soul. Consider the following: 
hylomorphic3 entities are corruptible because form-matter composition constitutes the 
essence of a hylomorphic3 entity, and the essence stands in potency to receiving the 
actuality of existence. However, if the form-matter composition is dissolved, there is no 
essence that stands in potency to receiving the actuality of existence, so the hylomorphic3 
entity ceases to be. In contradistinction, a hylomorphic4 entity undergoes an act-potency 
composition (that gives rise to the rational soul) and then the rational soul undergoes 
composition with matter. Therefore if the form (i.e., the spiritual substance that is 
composed of essence and existence) and matter composition is dissolved, that which 
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subsistens, forma est quod est, ipsum autem esse est actus et quo.”
Even though the reference to spiritual substance applies to angels in this context, 
nevertheless,  Aquinas also applies the same characteristics to human souls, and he cites 
the intellectual substance (i.e., angels) to substantiate the dual composition in Aquinas, 
SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68 : Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est 
subsistens, ut probatum est (cap. 51), esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi 
esse suum communicans materiae. Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo 
subsistit compositum et forma ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec 
seorsum utrumque subsistat.
 Clearly, Aquinas is not stating  that nothing impedes an angel (substantia 
intellectualis) from being the formal principle of material being.  Rather,  he is stating 
that nothing impedes the rational soul  (substantia intellectualis) from being the formal 
principle of material being, and he is referring to angels (substantia intellectualis) to 
substantiate hylomorphism4.
34.   Notice that  both forms of hylomorphism meet the conditions that must be 
met by a substantial form:  (1)  The substantial form must be the principle of being of the 
hylomorphic entity of which it is the form. That is to say, the substantial form must be 
intrinsic to the hylomorphic entity and must provide the actuality by which the 
hylomorphic entity is a being. Without the substantial form, the hylomorphic entity 
cannot be. (2)  Form and matter come together to produce one being. Refer to note:12 
on page 129. 
received existence, the rational soul, continues to exist, for it was never dependent on 
matter for its existence.35  Rather, matter was dependent on the form to communicate its 
actuality to the matter. For Aquinas, only God can destroy the rational soul simply 
because no creature has the ability to create ex nihilo or to annihilate and because there is 
a relationship of necessity between the immaterial and its esse. Properly speaking, 
annihilation does not require an efficient cause; rather, it requires God to cease keeping 
the creature in existence. In other words, it requires the cessation of the efficient cause.36 
Now, I grant that Aristotle did not have an essence-existence distinction, but my 
purpose here is not to prove or disprove the essence-existence distinction, for to do so is 
beyond the scope of the dissertation. Rather, my purpose here is to convey how Aquinas 
can maintain that the soul is the form of the body and simultaneously maintain that the 
soul is a spiritual substance. What he does is not found in Aristotle, but, like Avicenna’s 
solitary substance, and Averroes’ fourth kind of being, Aquinas is attempting to reconcile 
the aporia in an innovative fashion; this new form of hylomorphism4 allows him 
philosophically to resolve the aporia while simultaneously remaining consonant to 
Catholic doctrine and to the “letter” (but at times not to the spirit) of Aristotle. Having 
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35. Aquinas, QDAnima, Q. 14, p. 126: Si igitur sit aliqua forma que sit habens 
esse, necesse est illam formam incorrputibilem esse non enim separatur esse ab aliquo 
habente esse nisi per hoc quod separatur forma ab eo. Vnde si id quod habet esse sit ipsa 
forma, impossibile est quod esse separetur ab eo . . . Relinquitur ergo quod principium 
intellectiuum quo homo intelligit sit forma habens esse. Vnde necesse est quod sit 
incorruptibilis.
36. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas On Human Nature, 365–66; Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 5, 
A. 3, Response: Relinquitur ergo quod non est impossibile deum res ad non esse 
reducere; cum non sit necessarium eum rebus esse praebere, nisi ex suppositione suae 
ordinationis et praescientiae, quia sic ordinavit et praescivit, ut res in perpetuum in esse 
teneret; Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 5, A. 3, RA. 15: Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod in 
nulla creatura est virtus quae possit vel de nihilo aliquid facere vel aliquid in nihilum 
redigere. Quod autem creaturae in nihilum redigerentur divina conservatione cessante, 
hoc non esset per aliquam actionem creaturae, sed per eius defectum, ut ex praedictis 
patet.  
understood how Aquinas can philosophically conceive the soul as a spiritual substance, 
we can now look at his arguments for the creation of the soul, not as a theological 
doctrine, but as a philosophical doctrine.
Aquinas gives at least four philosophical reasons why the human soul must be 
created by God. The first reason has to deal with the nobility of the agent to the patient. 
An agent is said to be nobler than a patient in the same manner that act is nobler than 
potency. Inasmuch something is more immaterial, to that degree it is nobler. Therefore, 
an effect cannot be more immaterial than its cause. Given that the mixture of elements 
cannot give rise to a cognitive power, a fortiori, it is impossible for the mixture of matter 
to give rise to the possible intellect, an immaterial power in the rational soul. Otherwise, 
an effect would be more immaterial than its cause.37 The second reason is similar to the 
first. It is impossible for the action of a bodily power to be elevated to a wholly spiritual 
power and to be able to cause the incorporeal, for nothing operates beyond its species. 
Therefore, the agent must be higher than the patient. The generation of humans happens 
through a generative power, which has a corporeal organ, which is the semen, which only 
acts by instrumental heat. Hence, since the rational form is wholly spiritual, neither 
depending on the body nor communicating with the body in [its] operation,38 in no way is 
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37. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 62: Adhuc. Agens est nobilius patiente et faciens 
facto, sicut actus potentia. Quanto autem aliquid est immaterialius, tanto est nobilius. 
Non potest igitur effectus esse immaterialior sua causa. Omnis autem virtus cognoscitiva, 
inquantum huiusmodi, est immaterialis: unde et de sensu, qui est infimus in ordine 
virtutum cognoscitivarum, dicit Aristoteles, in II de anima, quod est susceptivus 
sensibilium specierum sine materia. Impossibile est igitur a commixtione elementorum 
causari aliquam virtutem cognoscitivam. Intellectus autem possibilis est suprema virtus 
cognoscitiva in nobis: dicit enim Aristoteles, in III de anima, quod intellectus possibilis 
est quo cognoscit et intelligit anima. Intellectus igitur possibilis non causatur ex 
commixtione elementorum.
38. Although not explicit in the text, the operation that is being alluded to is 
intellection.  It is evident from other texts that the soul informs the body and actuates the 
body so that the body is able to operate with the soul as the intrinsic formal cause of the 
body.
it able to be propagated with the generation of the body, nor can it be brought into being 
through some power, which is in the semen.39 The third reason that the soul cannot be 
generated pertains to its mode of being. The rational soul is different from other 
substantial forms because it is per se subsisting. Since a thing is only able to perform an 
action according to its mode of being, the action of any entity tells us something about its 
mode of being. Given that the rational soul has operations (e.g., willing and 
understanding) that do not use a corporeal organ, it is evident that it is per se subsisting.40 
That which is per se subsisting does not derive its existence from matter, so it is not 
educed from the potency of matter.41 The fourth reason is that generation arises from 
contraries according to the Philosopher (i.e., Aristotle). Since the soul is either 
completely immaterial or at least does not have material subject as a contrary, it cannot 
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39. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3,  A. 9, Response: Secunda ratio est, quia impossibile 
est actionem corporeae virtutis ad hoc elevari quod virtutem penitus spiritualem et 
incorpoream causare possit; nihil enim agit ultra suam speciem; immo agens oportet esse 
praestantius patiente, secundum Augustinum.Generatio autem hominis fit per virtutem 
generativam, quae organum habet corporale; virtus etiam quae est in semine, non agit nisi 
mediante calore, ut dicitur in XVI de animalibus; unde, cum anima rationalis sit forma 
penitus spiritualis, non dependens a corpore nec communicans corpori in operatione, 
nullo modo per generationem corporis potest propagari, nec produci in esse per aliquam 
virtutem quae sit in semine.
40. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 9, Response:  rationalis anima in hoc a ceteris 
formis differt, quod aliis formis non competit esse in quo ipsae subsistant, sed quo eis res 
formatae subsistant; anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens; et hoc 
declarat diversus modus agendi. Cum enim agere non possit nisi quod est, unumquodque 
hoc modo se habet ad operandum vel agendum, quomodo se habet ad esse; unde, cum in 
operatione aliarum formarum necesse sit communicare corpus, non autem in operatione 
rationalis animae, quae est intelligere et velle; necesse est ipsi rationali animae esse 
attribui quasi rei subsistenti.
41. Aquinas, S.T., Ia, Q. 90, A. 2, RA. 2, p.560b12–20: Ad secundum dicendum 
quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod 
prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia 
corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra 
dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae. 
be made from something (i.e., cannot be generated). Hence, it remains that it is created ex 
nihilo.42 The notion that the soul is created ex nihilo is a necessary conclusion from 
Aquinas’s metaphysical principles. Since a thing can either be produced ex materia or  ex 
nihilo, and the material cannot give rise to the immaterial, it follows that the soul can 
only be created ex nihilo. Moreover, creation ex nihilo requires an infinite amount of 
power, for the distance between nothing and being is infinite.43 Thus, in Aquinas’s 
metaphysical framework, only a being with infinite power, God, can create the rational 
soul, a spiritual substance.
The rational soul has unique characteristics among all the spiritual substances. 
First, it is the only  form of  a body  that can subsist separate from matter.44 Second, it is 
the lowest grade of intellectual substance; it stands on the edge between the incorporeal 
(inasmuch as it is a spiritual substance) and the corporeal (inasmuch as it is the form of 
the body).45 This characteristic that it stands in the gap between the corporeal or 
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42. Aquinas, QDPot, Q.3, A. 9, Response: Generationes enim ex contrariis sunt, 
secundum philosophum: unde cum anima vel omnino materiam non habeat, vel ad minus 
non habeat materiam contrarietati subiectam, non potest fieri ex aliquo. Unde restat quod 
exeat in esse per creationem, quasi ex nihilo facta.
43. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 45, A. 5, RA 3: Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in 
agente, quanto potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex nulla 
praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita, quia nulla proportio est nullius 
potentiae ad aliquam potentiam, quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non 
entis ad ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam, sicut neque esse 
infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod nulla creatura possit creare. 
44. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 3, A. 11, Response: Ab hac autem generalitate formarum 
oportet excludere animam rationalem. Ipsa enim est substantia per se subsistens; unde 
esse suum non consistit tantum in hoc quod est materiae uniri; alias separari non posset.
45. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere 
corporum, scilicet corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad 
infimum superioris generis, scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in 
genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est 
quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et 
incorporeorum, inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma.
incorporeal is essential to Aquinas’s epistemology. Without this characteristic, Aquinas’s 
epistemology would crumble, for if the soul were solely a spiritual substance and not the 
form of the body, Aquinas would have to opt for a solution akin to Avicenna’s solution. 
On the other hand, if the soul were solely the form of the body and not a spiritual 
substance, then he would have to opt for a solution like Averroes’. What is still not clear 
is how can the soul, a spiritual substance, undergo a hylomorphic composition with 
matter and still receive intelligibles. Wouldn’t the composition with matter preclude its 
ability to receive intelligibles, for on the reception of an intelligible form into the soul, 
would it not also be received in matter? In order to understand how the reception of 
intelligibles is possible, let us examine how Aquinas describes the relationship between 
the rational soul and the body.
Aquinas describes the relationship of the soul to the body by means of affirmation 
and negation. By means of negation, Aquinas mentions that the soul is not totally 
immersed in matter as are other natural forms.46  It is not impressed in matter as are other 
natural forms.47  The soul is not able to be totally engulfed and confined to matter.48 In 
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46. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 69: Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualem 
esse formam materialem, quamvis esse eius sit in materia: ut tertia ratio procedebat. Non 
enim est in materia sicut materiae immersa, vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio 
modo, ut dictum est.
47. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 18, Q. 2, A. 1, RA 6: “Ad sextum dicendum, quod 
anima rationalis nec ex materia composita est, nec est forma materialis, quasi in materia 
impressa.” The notion that the soul is not impressed in matter is almost a direct quotation 
from Avicenna who asserts, “anima non est impressa in corpore aliquo modo.” Avicenna, 
Liber de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 4, p. 115; the notion that the soul is 
not submersed in matter is also found in Avicenna. Avicenna stated, “non quod anima sit 
impressa corpori vel submersa in eo.” Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia 
divina, Vol. 2, p. 518; given the likeness in terminology between Aquinas and Avicenna, 
it would be easy to see why some people may consider Aquinas a substance dualist like 
Avicenna.
48. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus (Rome: Leonine 
Commission, 1972), Q. 1, A. 10, Response: Unde anima rationalis, quae immediate a deo 
addition, he also asserts that the rational soul is not totally engulfed (totaliter 
comprehensa) by matter, but it is related in some other way.49 By means of affirmation, 
he will assert that the human soul surpasses corporeal matter; nevertheless, in some 
manner the soul comes into contact with the body.50 He will also assert the rational soul 
surpasses the relationship of the body.51
The notion that the soul surpasses the relationship with the body and is not 
immersed in matter may lead one to think that Aquinas is following Avicenna’s 
substance dualism, for both thinkers assert that the rational soul is a spiritual substance 
and that it is not immersed in matter.  Aquinas borrows the notion that the soul is not 
immersed in matter from Avicenna, and he transforms the notion to conform to his 
reformulation of hylomorphism4.52 However, to ascribe to Aquinas substance dualism 
would be unwarranted for at least three reasons. First, Thomas argues against Avicenna’s 
and Plato’s substance dualist positions. For if a human were a rational soul using a body, 
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causatur, excedit capacitatem suae materiae, ita quod materia corporalis non totaliter 
potest comprehendere et includere ipsam.  For the semantic range of  includere refer to 
Deferrari, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 530.
49. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 69: Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualem 
esse formam materialem, quamvis esse eius sit in materia: ut tertia ratio procedebat. Non 
enim est in materia sicut materiae immersa, vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio 
modo.
50. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, A. 2, Response: oportet quod esse animae humanae 
superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit totaliter comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamen 
aliquo modo attingatur ab ea. 
51. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, A. 2, RA 19: Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod ex anima 
humana et corpore ita fit unum, quod tamen anima superexcedat corporis proportionem.
52. See foonote 47 on page 145.  To see that Aquinas acquires this notion from 
Avicenna,  Refer to Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 1, D. 3, Q. 4, A. 1, Response: Cum igitur natura 
animae sit receptibilis inquantum habet aliquid de possibilitate, eo quod omne habens 
esse ab aliquo est possibile in se, ut probat Avicenna, et non sit impressa organo 
corporali, cum habeat operationem absolutam a corpore, scilicet intelligere.
humans would not be animals, they would be what uses animals. Moreover, humans 
would not be sentient beings, but they would be using sentient beings.53 Second, Aquinas 
explains that the soul cannot be united as a mixture with the body, nor can it be united by 
means of contact in a proper sense.54 He entertains the notion that the soul may be united 
to the body merely by contact of power, which he models after the heavenly bodies.55 
Yet, he ultimately rejects this position, and he ascribes the contact of power position to 
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53. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 58: Amplius. Si homo, secundum Platonis 
sententiam, non est aliquid ex anima et corpore compositum, sed est anima utens 
corpore.... Si autem hoc intelligatur de anima intellectiva tantum, ita scilicet quod 
intelligatur anima sensitiva esse forma corporis, et anima intellectiva utens corpore 
animato et sensificato sit homo, sequentur adhuc inconvenientia: scilicet quod homo non 
sit animal, sed utatur animali, nam per animam sensitivam aliquid est animal; et quod 
homo non sentiat, sed utatur re sentiente.
54. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 56: Est autem primo manifestum quod substantia 
intellectualis non potest corpori uniri per modum mixtionis. Quae enim miscentur, 
oportet ad invicem alterata esse. Quod non contingit nisi in his quorum est materia 
eadem, quae possunt esse activa et passiva ad invicem. Substantiae autem intellectuales 
non communicant in materia cum corporalibus: sunt enim immateriales, ut supra 
ostensum est. Non sunt igitur corpori miscibiles. Adhuc. Quae miscentur, mixtione iam 
facta, non manent actu, sed virtute tantum: nam si actu manerent, non esset mixtio, sed 
confusio tantum; unde corpus mixtum ex elementis nullum eorum Est. Hoc autem 
impossibile est accidere substantiis intellectualibus: sunt enim incorruptibiles, ut supra 
ostensum est. Non igitur potest substantia intellectualis uniri corpori per modum 
mixtionis. Similiter autem patet quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori per 
modum contactus proprie sumpti. Tactus enim non nisi corporum est: sunt enim tangentia 
quorum sunt ultima simul, ut puncta aut lineae aut superficies, quae sunt corporum 
ultima. Non igitur per modum contactus substantia intellectualis corpori uniri potest. 
55. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 56: Si attendatur ad actionem et passionem, 
invenientur aliqua esse tangentia tantum et aliqua tacta tantum: corpora enim caelestia 
tangunt quidem hoc modo elementaria corpora, inquantum ea alterant: non autem 
tanguntur ab eis, quia ab eis non patiuntur....Hoc igitur modo tangendi possibile est uniri 
substantiam intellectualem corpori per contactum. Agunt enim substantiae intellectuales 
in corpora et movent ea, cum sint immateriales et magis in actu existentes. Hic autem 
tactus non est quantitatis, sed virtutis.
Plato.56 The third reason that Aquinas cannot be affirming some form of substance 
dualism is his understanding of what it means for an intellectual substance to be 
“separate.” Historically, those who followed Aristotle’s dictum that intellect must be 
separate had understood “separate” to mean ontologically separate. For Aquinas, 
however, that “separate” in this case does not connote ontological separation; instead, it 
connotes an operation or action that is done without the use of a corporeal body.57 Thus, 
the notion that the soul surpasses its relationship with the body and is not immersed in 
matter does not entail some form of substance dualism. So, what does Aquinas mean that 
the rational soul is not immersed in matter?
In another text, Aquinas clarifies what he means when he asserts that something is 
immersed in matter. He says:
To say that the intellect is a form that is not subsisting, but is immersed in matter, 
is the same in reality as, and to differ only in name from,  to say that the intellect 
is composed of form and matter. It differs only in name, for in the first manner, 
the intellect is said to be the form of the composite; in the second manner, the 
intellect will be said to a composite. Therefore, if it is false that the intellect is 
composed from matter and form, then it will be false that it is a form not 
subsisting but material.58
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56. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 57: Plato igitur posuit, et eius sequaces, quod anima 
intellectualis non unitur corpori sicut forma materiae, sed solum sicut motor mobili, 
dicens animam esse in corpore sicut nautam in navi.Et sic unio animae et corporis non 
esset nisi per contactum virtutis, de quo supra dictum Est. Hoc autem videtur 
inconveniens.
57. Aquinas, SCG, Bk.2,Ch. 69: Nec tamen per hoc quod substantia intellectualis 
unitur corpori ut forma, removetur a philosophis dicitur, intellectum esse a corpore 
separatum....Si autem operatio eius non compleatur per organum corporale, potentia eius 
non erit actus alicuius corporis. Et per hoc dicitur intellectus esse separatus: non quin 
substantia animae cuius est potentia intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, sit corporis actus 
ut forma dans tali corpori esse.
58. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 5: Praeterea. Dicere quod intellectus sit forma non 
subsistens sed materiae immersa, idem est secundum rem et si dicatur quod intellectus sit 
compositus ex materia et forma, differt autem solum secundum nomen: nam primo modo, 
dicetur intellectus ipsa forma compositi; secundo vero modo, dicetur intellectus ipsum 
compositum. Si igitur falsum est intellectum esse compositum ex materia et forma, 
Immersion in matter is tantamount to the composition of form and matter. Thus, in 
asserting that the intellect is not immersed in matter, Aquinas is denying that the intellect 
is composed of form and matter. However, this seems to be problematic because for 
Aquinas the rational soul is a simple substance in a qualified sense.59 By definition, an 
absolutely simple substance is not composed of parts.60 If the soul is the substantial form 
of the body as Aquinas asserts, then it would seem to follow that if part of the soul 
underwent a hylomorphic composition with matter, then the entire soul would undergo a 
hylomorphic composition with matter because there are no parts in a simple substance. 
Furthermore, if the entire soul underwent a hylomorphic composition with matter, then 
the agent intellect and the possible intellect, active and passive powers of the soul, would 
also undergo composition with matter. Consequently, the intellect would be immersed in 
matter like all the other material forms. Yet, Aquinas repeatedly denies that the soul is 
immersed in matter, and he affirms that the rational soul is a spiritual, intellectual, 
substantial form that communicates existence to the matter.61 How should one understand 
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falsum erit quod sit forma non subsistens sed materialis.
59. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 72: Non est autem inconveniens animam, cum sit 
quaedam forma simplex, esse actum partium tam diversarum. Quia unicuique formae 
aptatur materia secundum suam congruentiam. Quanto autem aliqua forma est nobilior et 
simplicior, tanto est maioris virtutis. Unde anima, quae est nobilissima inter formas 
inferiores, etsi simplex in substantia, est multiplex in potentia et multarum operationum. 
Unde indiget diversis organis ad suas operationes complendas, quorum diversae animae 
potentiae proprii actus esse dicuntur: sicut visus oculi, auditus aurium, et sic de aliis. 
60. For Aquinas only God is simple simpliciter.   All other entities are composed 
of essence and existence. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 1, D. 8,  Q. 5, A. 2, RA 4: dictum est verum 
de forma quae est ita simplex quod etiam est suum esse, sicut est deus: et talis simplicitas 
nec in anima nec in Angelo est.
61. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68: Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, 
per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est, esse formale principium essendi materiae, 
quasi esse suum communicans materiae. Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in 
quo subsistit compositum et forma ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec 
seorsum utrumque subsistat. 
the relation of the soul to the body?
If one considers the five conditions that must be satisfied for intellection to be 
inherent in man, Aquinas’s position becomes clear. First, the rational soul must be the 
substantial form of the body. Aquinas repeatedly asserts that in order for intellection to 
be attributed to this or that person, intellection must arise from a person’s substantial 
form.62 Second, the rational soul must be a spiritual, immaterial substance as already 
stated above. Third, the active power that transforms intelligibles in potency to 
intelligibles in act must be an immaterial power, for nothing material can cause that 
which is immaterial, the intelligible in act.63 Fourth, the passive power that receives the 
intelligible in act must be immaterial.64 Fifth, intelligibles in act cannot be things existing 
outside individual minds.65 Consequently, intelligibles in act must be able to be 
multiplied.
If one considers the aforementioned conditions, one finds that as a substantial 
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62. Aquinas, QDAnima, Q.2, N. 325, p. 19:  Et sic salvatur natura intellectus 
possibilis, quam Aristoteles demonstrat, dum intellectus possibilis non est potentia 
fundata in aliquo organo corporali; et tamen eo intelligit homo formaliter, in quantum 
fundatur in essentia animae humanae, quae est hominis forma; Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 
68: Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum 
unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principium 
autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens; Aquinas, 
DeSpiCr, A.2, N. 170–72, p. 24: Oportet igitur principium huius operationis quod est 
intelligere, formaliter inesse huic homini. 
63. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 84, A. 6, Response: Nihil autem corporeum imprimere 
potest in rem incorpoream.
64. Aquinas, S.T., Q. 79, A. 3, RA. 3, p. 482b-483a:  Et ideo ad intelligendum non 
sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret 
intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis. 
65. Aquinas, S.T., Ia. Q. 79, A. 3, p.482b-483a: Intelligibile autem in actu non est 
aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non 
subsistunt praeter materiam.
form, the entire rational soul is present to the body and to each part of the body.66 Thus, 
any operation that is completed by a bodily organ requires the power of the soul, which is 
the principle of that operation. Nevertheless, the action belongs primarily to that part of 
the body through which the operation is performed. For example, vision is the act of the 
eye.67 Thus, in any corporeal operation both matter (i.e., the body) and form (i.e., the 
rational soul) are necessary  conditions to give rise to a bodily operation.
In contradistinction, for intellection to occur, only immaterial powers may be 
used (i.e., no corporeal organ can be used properly speaking). There is nothing to prevent 
a spiritual substance from performing an action without a bodily organ while 
hylomorphically united to matter. Nonetheless, it might appear that the same cannot be 
said concerning the reception of intelligibles. If the matter of the body is present to the 
entire soul, when an intelligible form is received into the possible intellect, it would also 
be received into matter. In order to avoid this situation, it is necessary that the matter of 
the body not be present to the entire soul. So, there is a part of the soul that transcends the 
body, but is not by nature ontologically separate from the body. The part of the soul that 
transcends the body is capable of receiving intelligible forms, which Aquinas calls 
intelligible species. Inasmuch as there is a part of the soul to which matter is not present, 
the soul is said to transcend and surpass matter, and it is also said not to be engulfed in 
matter. In other words, hylomorphism4 allows the entire soul to be present to the body 
(i.e., the matter), but it does not allow the entire body (i.e., the matter) to be present to the 
entire soul. Hylomorphism4 has allowed Aquinas to assert that the soul informs the body 
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66. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 72: Per eadem autem ostendi potest animam totam 
in toto corpore esse, et totam in singulis partibus.... in qualibet forma apparet quod est 
tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eius.
67. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 69: Si igitur operatio animae per organum corporale 
completur, oportet quod potentia animae quae est illius operationis principium, sit actus 
illius partis corporis per quam operatio eius completur: sicut visus est actus oculi. 
and is involved in bodily operations; it also has allowed him to assert that there is an 
immaterial aspect of the soul that is unaffected by matter, so it has the ability to receive 
intelligible forms.68 
 Nevertheless, hylomorphism4 is a two-edged sword because if there is an aspect 
of the soul that is not mixed with matter, then the material world cannot affect that part of 
the soul. Hylomorphism4 has created an ontological rift between the body and the 
intellect, which is located in the part of the soul that is not affected by the body. Thus, 
nothing from the material world is able to impress itself directly upon the possible 
intellect, the receptive power of the soul that is intended to receive intelligibles. 
Consequently, phantasms which are imaginative forms residing in a material organ 
cannot impress themselves on the intellect because the order of being of the imagination 
is ontologically inferior (i.e., material)  to the order of being of the intellect (i.e., 
immaterial).
By taking the best of Averroes (the form of the body) and the best of Avicenna 
(the soul is a spiritual substance), Aquinas has also inherited their problems. Consider the 
following. Avicenna has a rift between the material world and the immaterial world and 
in his psychology only the material can affect the material, and only the immaterial can 
affect the immaterial.69 On the other hand, Averroes must affirm two subjects and 
connect them by means of what Aquinas calls the phantasm. Aquinas has already dealt 
with these positions. In order to solve the problems raised by these positions, he will need 
a vehicle for conveying the ratio or intention in the phantasm to the possible intellect. He 
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68. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, A. 2, RA 19: Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod ex anima 
humana et corpore ita fit unum, quod tamen anima superexcedat corporis proportionem; 
et ex ea parte qua corpus excedit, attribuitur ei potentia intellectiva. Unde non oportet 
quod species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu, recipiantur in materia corporali.
69. Sebti, “Le Statut Ontologique de l’Image dans la Doctrine Avicennienne de la 
Perception,” p. 139.
will also need a power that is able to transfer the ratio from a material mode of being to 
an immaterial mode of being. Hence, the necessity of intelligible species, which serves as 
the vehicle that conveys the ratio from the imagination, and hence, the need of the agent 
intellect; for although a material entity or power cannot affect an immaterial entity or 
power, nevertheless, an immaterial entity is able to affect a material entity.
In sum, there are two kinds of hylomorphism for Aquinas: hylomorphism3 and 
hylomorphism4. These forms of hylomorphism differ in their source: Hylomorphism3 
entities are educed from the potency of matter by natural agents via natural powers, 
whereas hylomorphism4 entities are created directly by God inasmuch as God creates the 
rational souls. These kinds of hylomorphism also differ in their composition: 
Hylomorphism3 entities are composed of form and matter, which together gives rise to an 
essence, and the essence in turn is composed with existence, whereas hylomorphic4 
entities are composed of essence and existence and then the subsisting, rational, 
immaterial soul undergoes a composition with matter, giving rise to a rational, 
hylomorphic entity. They also differ in how form and matter are related: hylomorphic3 
entities are immersed in matter in such a manner that matter is present to the whole 
substantial form, and the whole substantial form is present to matter so that any operation 
performed by hylomorphic3 entities arises from the form and  the matter. On the other 
hand, hylomorphic4 entities are not immersed in matter. That is to say, although there is a 
form-matter composition, the entire rational soul is present to the matter, but matter is not 
present to the entire soul, for there is a part of the soul that transcends matter making it 
possible for the soul to receive intelligible forms. Hylomorphism4 makes it possible for 
the soul to receive intelligible forms, which can be multiplied, but it creates a gap 
between the body and that part of the soul that transcends matter. In order to bridge this 
gap, Aquinas must introduce intelligibles species. Finally, these two kinds of 
hylomorphic entities differ in terms of their finality: a hylomorphic3 entity ceases to exist 
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when there is the dissolution between the form and the matter, whereas hylomorphic4 
entity continues to exist even after dissolution of the form-matter composition. Aquinas’s 
hylomorphism4 differs from Aristotle’s inasmuch as          (1) it has a different origin 
(i.e., Aristotle’s generation vs. Aquinas’s creation); (2) they are metaphysically different 
(i.e., Aristotle’s hylomorphism immersed in matter vs. Aquinas’s hylomorphism not 
immersed in matter) and (3) their differ in their finality (i.e., Aristotle’s mortal soul vs. 
Aquinas’s immortal soul). Having covered hylomorphism, let us take a look at how 
Aquinas’s epistemology functions. 
Aquinas and Sensation
For Aquinas, all our knowledge begins from the senses.70 Moreover, knowing is 
the formal identity between the known and the knower, for the known is in the knower 
according to the mode of the knower.71 For example, when one senses a stone, the stone 
comes to be in the knower according to the mode of being of the knower. Thus, it is not 
the case that the stone itself is in the knower; instead, the species of the stone is in the 
knower.72 The term “species”requires some explanation. So, in this section, I examine (1) 
the notion of species (2) what are the various ways that abstraction is used in Aquinas, 
(3) external senses and the internal senses.
As we have seen in both Avicenna and Averroes, there are two kinds of forms: 
natural forms and intentional forms. Natural forms communicate some quality or quantity 
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70. Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in octo libros physicorum (Romae: Ex 
Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1884), Bk. 2, L. 4, N. 6: Omnis autem 
nostra cognitio est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta.
71. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 14, A. 1, RA. 3: Scientia est secundum modum 
cognoscentis, scitum enim est in sciente secundum modum scientis.
72. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 76, A. 2, RA. 4: Id enim quod intelligitur non est in 
intellectu secundeum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, lapis enim non est in anima, 
sed species lapidis.
to a material object. For example, the form of heat communicates heat to an object. In 
contradistinction to natural forms, intentional forms are those forms that inform the sense 
or the intellect by communicating a sensible or intelligible content. Avicenna referred to 
intentional forms as forms denuded from matter in some way. Averroes, on the other 
hand, referred to intentional forms as intentions. Intentional forms are abstractions (i.e., 
forms separated from matter in some sense).
 As do his predecessors, Aquinas makes a distinction between natural and 
intentional forms. For Aquinas natural forms and intentional forms cause two different 
kinds of changes. Natural forms are received into a subject according to natural being in 
the manner that heat is received into a heated subject. In other words, a physical quality is 
transferred from that which is acting to that which is being acted upon.73 For example, 
were blue paint thrown at an eye, the eye would become blue. Intentional forms, in 
contradistinction, cause a spiritual change.74 In a spiritual change, the form of the agent is 
received into a subject according to a spiritual manner of being. For example, were blue 
paint thrown at an eye, before the eye becomes colored blue, the eye would perceive 
blue. For the sense to operate, this spiritual change is required so that an intention of the 
sensible form informs the sense organ. The distinction between natural and spiritual 
change is necessary; otherwise, were natural change sufficient to account for sensing, 
then all natural bodies would sense when they underwent a change.75  Thus, some other 
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73. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 78, A. 3, Response: Est autem duplex immutatio, una 
naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur 
in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto.
74. In this context,  “spiritual” should not be taken to mean immaterial as if the 
species were a some type of ghostly apparition. Cf. Stump, Aquinas, p. 249;  Cf. Miles 
Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” in Ancient and Medieval 
Theories of Intentionality (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2001), p. 129–53.
75. Aquinas, S.T., Q. 78, A. 3, Response: Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur 
immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, 
si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent 
type of form is required to account for conveying intentions to the sense organs: the 
species.76 
As others attest, species in the cognitive sense are difficult to define, and Aquinas 
does not define the term “species.”77 However, by looking at how the term is used, one 
may conclude that species are intentional, abstracted forms. The term “abstraction,” as I 
use it, may denote one of two things. It may denote a form separated from matter, 
abstraction1, or it may also denote a process that separates a form from matter, 
abstraction2. Species are abstractions1. According to Aquinas, forms differ in their degree 
of materiality. At one extreme, one finds the substantial form of hylomorphic entities, 
and these forms are the most material. At the other extreme, one finds intelligible forms 
(i.e., intelligible species) residing in immaterial intellects, and these forms are the most 
immaterial. It is impossible to go from one extreme to another without going through 
varying degrees of immateriality.78  Hence, the species in the sense has a more spiritual 
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dum alterantur.
76. Thomas Aquinas, In metaphysicam aristotelis commentaria (Turin: Marietti, 
1926), Bk. 1, L. 1, N. 6: “Quod quidem visui accidit, eo quod spiritualior est inter omnes 
sensus.” Although the term “spiritual” is used in this context,  it is wrong to conclude that 
Aquinas is asserting any sort of immateriality other than a very attenuated and qualified 
sense of immateriality.   First, as was seen earlier, the material cannot give rise to the 
immaterial. The physical objects that are acting upon the sense organ are material and 
cannot give rise to something immaterial.  Second, Aquinas say that the vision is more 
spiritual than the other sense organs, and yet the sense organs are material.  On page 160 
in note 85,  I examine why Aquinas says that vision is “spiritual.”
77. Stump, Aquinas, p.249; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle 
Ages, p.14.
78. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Rome: Leonine 
Commission, 1972), Q. 19, Art. 1, Response: Quidam enim dicunt, quod sicut nunc a 
sensibilibus rebus species accipit mediantibus sensibus, ita tunc accipere poterit nullo 
sensu interveniente. Sed hoc videtur impossibile, quia ab extremo in extremum non fit 
transitus nisi per media. Species autem in ipsa re sensibili habet esse maxime materiale, 
in intellectu autem summe spirituale; unde oportet quod in hanc spiritualitatem transeat 
mediantibus quibusdam gradibus, utpote quod in sensu habet spiritualius esse quam in re 
sensibili, in imaginatione autem adhuc spiritualius quam in sensu, et sic deinceps 
mode of being than in the sensible thing because it is received without matter into the 
sense organ. The species in the imagination are more immaterial than in the sense, for the 
sense is dependent on matter; otherwise, it is not able to sense the material object. In 
contradistinction, species in the imagination can be present even when the object of 
sensation is not present. Regardless of their degree of immateriality both sensible species 
and imaginative species have the concrete conditions of matter. That is to say, they 
connote something that is located in time and space, here and now.79 It is important to 
note, that apart from species in the intellect, species are always in some degree material, 
for nothing material can give rise to something immaterial. Therefore, when Aquinas 
asserts that one sensible species is more immaterial than another sensible species, he is 
not necessarily referring to the ontological status of the species; rather, he is referring to 
the degree to which the intention conveyed by the species is dependent on matter. For 
example, the species in the eye resides in a physical organ while the species in the 
imagination resides in a physical organ. Thus, ontologically, both species reside in 
material organs. Yet, the intentional content in the eye is dependent on a physical object 
being present, whereas intentional content in the imagination is not dependent on a 
physical object being present.
The role of species is three-fold and analogous to the role of natural forms. Forms 
are the mechanism that actualize potency as formal causes and ground an efficient cause 
as it communicates actuality to something that is in potentiality. For example, natural 
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ascendendo. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 10, Art. 1, RA. 2: in sensu enim recipitur species sine 
materia, sed tamen cum materiae conditionibus.
79. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 2, Art. 2, Response: Sensus autem recipit quidem species 
sine materia, sed tamen cum conditionibus materialibus; Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 10, Art. 1, 
RA. 2: Sicut enim sensus non apprehendit suum obiectum nisi sub conditionibus 
materialibus, prout scilicet est hic et nunc; Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 55, Art. 2, RA. 2: Esse 
autem formae in imaginatione, quod est quidem sine materia, non tamen sine materialibus 
conditionibus.
forms ground  the transfers of heat from one entity to another. In this respect, species are 
no different, for they ground the transfer of intentions from one entity to another entity 
that has the potential to receive them. Furthermore, like natural forms that specify and 
determine their subject with a quantity or quality, species also determine their subject 
with an intention that specifies and determines the subject so that it takes on the likeness 
conveyed by the species. This aspect of the species is crucial because it ensures that 
sensation and intellection are veridical. For the sense and intellect do not add or 
contribute anything by themselves done to the formal content of species. Last, but not 
least, species account serve as the formal principle behind acts of for both sensation and 
intellection. For sensation involves the reception of a sensible species into a sense organ, 
and intellection involves the reception of an intelligible species into immaterial 
intellects.80 Given the importance of species, then, let us turn to their point of origin.
 Sensible species originate from physical bodies. Although there are species for 
each sense, I shall focus on vision. As light illumines the medium (i.e., the air), physical 
bodies multiply their species into the medium. Prior to the reception of the species, the 
medium is in potency to receiving the species; when the species is received, the medium 
is moved to actuality. This progression from potency to actuality continues until the 
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80. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 14, A. 2, Response: Unde dicitur in libro de anima, quod 
sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Ex hoc 
enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod intellectus noster vel sensus 
informatur in actu per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis.
species in medio81 acts upon the sense.82 This communication of species is necessary 
because the senses are passive, and in order to perceive, they must be specified and 
determined by the intention that is conveyed by means of the species.83 However, 
depending on the sense organ, sometimes species are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for sensations.
For vision, the species is a sufficient and necessary condition.84 That is to say, 
only a spiritual change is necessary for vision to take place. Some organs, however, 
require not only a spiritual change, but they also require a natural change. The natural 
change occurs either in the object of sensation alone, or may occur in the sense organ. 
For example, natural change according to location occurs in sound, which is the object of 
hearing, for sound is caused from striking and the movement of the air. At times, natural 
change occurs by means of alteration, as is the case of odor, which is the object of smell. 
In this case, the body must be altered in some way by means of heat so that it may smell 
the odor. Natural change is found in touch and in taste, for the hand becomes hot 
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81. This phrase refers to the species that have been propagated to the medium. 
According to medieval scholastic thought, no physical object could act at a distance.  For 
more information on species in medio  Cf. Alfred Wilder, “On the Knowing Species in 
St. Thomas: Their Necessity and Epistemological Innocence,” Angelicum 68, no. 1 
(1991): pp. 2–32; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 11–19; 
O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, pp. 177–79; Katharine Tachau, “The Problem of 
the species in medio at Oxford in the Generation after Ockham,” Mediaeval Studies 44 
(1982): pp. 394–443.
82. Aquinas, QDPot, Q. 5, A. 8, Response: Haec autem est actio corporis, quae 
non est ad transmutationem materiae, sed ad quamdam diffusionem similitudinis formae 
in medio secundum similitudinem spiritualis intentionis quae recipitur de re in sensu vel 
intellectu, et hoc modo sol illuminat aerem, et color speciem suam multiplicat in medio.
83. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 77, A. 3, Reponse: Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae 
activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut 
principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. 
84. Aquinas, S.T., Q. 78, A. 3, Response: Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur 
immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu.
touching something hot, and the tongue is made moist by means of the humidity of 
flavors. Vision, however, occurs without natural change in either the object or in the 
organ. Therefore, it is the most spiritual and most perfect among the senses.85 In order of 
descending spirituality, one finds hearing and smell; the most material senses are touch 
and taste.86 Notice that Aquinas is not denying that species are needed for the other 
senses. Instead, he is affirming that vision is the only sense that does not require natural 
changes (i.e., it does not require receiving new natural forms). All the other senses 
require both species and new natural forms.87
It is by means of the species that proper sensibles and common sensibles are 
conveyed to the sense organs. The proper sensibles include color, sound, odor, flavor, 
humidity and temperature. Each proper sensible affects the organ to which it pertains.88 
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85. Similar to Averroes,  Aquinas is asserting that vision is the most spiritual 
among the senses.   Aquinas, however, attributes the spirituality to the lack of a natural 
change.   On the other hand, Averroes attributes the spirituality to the fact that vision is 
the least affected by environmental factors like wind. See page 104 note 78.  
86. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 78, A. 3, Response: Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur 
immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione 
spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte 
autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, qui est 
obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum 
alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari 
aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio 
naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per 
humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione 
immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione 
naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus.... Et 
post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. 
Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur 
in VIII physic. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales.
87. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 78, A. 4, RA. 4:  Nam tactus immutatur naturali 
immutatione, et non solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem 
quae ei proprie obiicitur.
88. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 77, A. 3, Response: Unde rationale et irrationale sunt 
differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species constituentes. Sic igitur non 
On the other hand, common sensibles such as number, shape, movement and rest are all 
reducible to quantity according to Aquinas. Consequently,  just as surface is the 
proximate subject of color, quantity is the proximate subject of the common sensibles. 
Therefore, common sensibles do not primarily move the sense per se; instead, they move 
the sense by reason of sensible qualities (i.e., the proper sensibles).89 For example, 
surfaces are not sensed per se,  but they are sensed by means of the color or texture that 
inheres in the surface. Similarly, common sensibles are not known per se, but by means 
of the proper sensibles. 
Having been informed by sensible species, the sense organs in turn render the 
species that they have received to the common sense, which is the principle and the root 
of the exterior senses.90 The common sense is the first of the interior senses, and, unlike 
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quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad 
quod per se potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per 
se dividitur to in colorem, sonum, et huiusmodi; et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, 
scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus.
89. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 78, A. 3,  RA 3: Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo 
et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per 
accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo 
et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia 
omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt 
species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio 
figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod 
subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel 
localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum 
sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est 
quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis 
alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo 
et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt 
sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in 
immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a parva, 
quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo dividitur secundum proprium 
subiectum. 
90. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 78, A. 4, RA 1: communis radix et principium exteriorum 
sensuum. 
the exterior senses, which are only aware of their own “proper sensibles,” the common 
sense is informed with the five sensible species from the sense; consequently, it is able to 
distinguish among the various sensations.91 For example, when one sees and licks sugar, 
one knows that the sugar is white and that it is sweet. Yet, vision is only aware of white, 
and taste is only aware of sweetness. The ability to ascribe these two qualities to one and 
the same sugar is due to the unifying power of the common sense, which unifies the 
various sensible species into one sensible percept. The common sense, however, for the 
most part only operates when the senses are operating.92 Therefore, if one is to retain 
these sensible objects, there must be another power present.
In the same manner that the sense organs render the sensible species to the 
common sense, the common sense renders the sensible percept to the imagination. In the 
imagination, the sensible percept is referred to as a phantasm. The imagination serves as 
the storehouse of the forms received through senses and the common sense. As a result of 
storing these, an animal is able to imagine the sensible objects when the sensible objects 
are absent. Otherwise, the animal would not seek the imagined object when the object is 
not present.93 For example, if animals were only able to apprehend food and water when 
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91. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 57, A. 2, Response: sensus communis, qui est superior 
quam sensus proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quae quinque sensibus 
exterioribus cognoscuntur, et quaedam alia quae nullus sensus exterior cognoscit, scilicet 
differentiam albi et dulcis.
92. Under the right conditions, the common sense may operate when one is 
sleeping. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 84, A. 8, RA2:  Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, 
non solum imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur; 
ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt somnia esse, quasi diiudicans 
inter res et rerum similitudines.
93. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 78, A. 4: Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut 
conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia 
sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.... Est autem 
considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat 
rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis 
motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid 
absens.
it were present before them, they would starve in their absence, for they would thirst and 
hunger, but they would be oblivious as to what would satiate these desires. But such is 
not the case. When an animal is thirsty, it returns to the watering hole, and it seeks the 
type of food that had previously provided nourishment.
 The imagination, although necessary for the survival of the animal, is not 
sufficient. Animals must also be able to determine whether something is beneficial or 
dangerous to their health. The sensibles that are propagated to the imagination are not 
sufficient to tell an animal that something is dangerous or safe. For example, there is 
nothing in the shape, size, color, or smell of the wolf that communicates that the wolf is a 
threat. Thus, the estimative power is the power that receives non-sensible intentions like 
danger or usefulness. Moreover, not only is it necessary for the animal to receive these 
intentions that are not perceptible to an exterior sense, but the animal must be able to 
store them in order to avoid things that may be harmful to it.94 
Although I have been speaking about animals, there is no difference between 
humans and animals when it comes to the general account of the reception of sensible 
species (i.e., sensible forms). For both rational and non-rational animals are altered by the 
reception of sensible species. Both have a common sense that unifies the species that are 
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94. Aquinas, S.T., Ia. Q. 78, A. 4, Response: Rursus considerandum est quod, si 
animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset 
necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in 
quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non 
solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter 
aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum 
venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum 
naturae... Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non 
percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum 
perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio 
intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur 
sensus proprius et communis.... Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum 
non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, 
quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum.
rendered from the various sense organs, and both store the unified percept in the 
imagination. However, animals differ from humans as it pertains to the estimative power.  
Animals are instinctually able to receive intentional forms regarding what is dangerous or 
beneficial to their well-being, whereas humans normally must cogitate to ascertain 
whether or not something is beneficial. Consequently, the cogitative power is also called 
the “particular reason” because it functions by comparing individual intentions.95 Only 
the cogitative power in human beings actually performs an abstraction2 to separate the 
intentional notions of helpful or harmful.96
 Let us review what we have covered thus far. It is by means of species that 
sensible qualities are communicated to the five external senses. In addition to the five 
external senses, there are four internal senses: (1) the common sense, which is 
responsible for unifying the sensible species from the five sense organs; (2) the 
imagination, which is responsible for retaining the phantasms and sensible species 
received from the common sense; (3) the cogitative/estimative power, which is 
responsible for discerning non-sensible intentions such as danger and utility;97 and the (4) 
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95. Aquinas, S.T., Ia. Q. 78, A. 4: Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad 
formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim 
immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia 
est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, 
homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur 
aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam 
huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis; Aquinas, S.T., Ia 
Q. 81, A. 3, Response: vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod 
est collativa intentionum individualium. Refer to Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and 
Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Powers in Averroes,” p.111–46.
96. I am inferring that intentions as to what or is not beneficial do not magically 
appear in the estimative power. Furthermore, whether something beneficial or dangerous 
is not perceived by the senses.  Therefore, the intention as to whether something is useful 
or dangerous is probably concomitant with the sensible object and would require some 
kind of abstraction.
97. For an account of the difference between the estimative power (in non-rational 
animals) and the cogitative power (in rational animals),   See Black, “Imagination and 
memorative power, which is responsible for retaining the intentions that were produced 
by the cogitative power.
 Like Avicenna and Averroes, the role of these abstractions1 terminates in the 
imagination, and these abstractions1 are unable to affect an immaterial intellect.98 The 
phantasms that reside in the imagination are not able to affect the part of the soul that 
transcends or exceeds the body, for the human intellect has a mode of being that is 
immaterial, whereas the imagination has a mode of being that is material.99 In other 
words, Aquinas’s hylomorphism4 prevents imaginative species from affecting the 
possible intellect in the immaterial soul.100 If Aquinas is to succeed in making intellection 
inherent in man, he needs to cross over the divide that his hylomorphism4 has created, 
and he will need an immaterial power to convey the intention that is in the phantasm to 
the possible intellect in the immaterial part of the soul that transcends the body. He will 
also need a vehicle that can convey the ratio from the phantasm to the possible intellect. 
That vehicle will be the intelligible species which is an abstracted form. 
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Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations,” p. 13.
98. For Averroes, the immaterial intellect is a single, immaterial entity existing 
separate from matter.  For Avicenna,  immaterial intellect is a receptive power in each 
individual human soul,  and it is able to receive abstractions4 and behold the abstractions5 
in the agent intellect  because it exists ontologically separate from a body.  For Aquinas, 
the material intellect (i.e., the possible intellect) is a part of the soul that transcends 
matter but is not ontologically existing separate from matter.
99. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 85 A. 1, RA3: Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines 
individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi 
quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute 
imprimere in intellectum possibilem.
100. Aquinas, S.T., Q. 84, A. 6, Response: Nihil autem corporeum imprimere 
potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum 
Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid 
nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit.
Abstraction3 and Abstraction4
In this section, I explain abstraction3, that which is produced by the agent 
intellect, and abstraction4, the process that gives rise to abstraction3.  
All hylomorphic entities in the natural world are only intelligible in potency. 
Moreover, the sensible species and phantasms are also only intelligible in potency so they 
cannot be comprehended intellectually.101 Given that the species and the phantasms 
reside in corporeal organs, they still are particularized in matter; thus, they can only 
denote particulars.102 For example, just as were one to see a particular dog one would see 
it as a particular,  so the phantasm in the imagination represents the dog in a particular 
way, for phantasms in the imagination have the concrete conditions of matter, time and 
space.103 In other words, at the level of sensation, one is limited to individual (i.e., 
particular) intentions. In order to get to the universal intentions, the ratio or intention 
must be dematerialized. The dematerialization of the ratio or intention can only be 
achieved by an immaterial active power in the soul, the agent intellect.
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101. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 77. Et has quidem determinatas naturas rerum 
sensibilium praesentant nobis phantasmata.Quae tamen nondum pervenerunt ad esse 
intelligibile: cum sint similitudines rerum sensibilium etiam secundum conditiones 
materiales, quae sunt proprietates individuales, et sunt etiam in organis materialibus. Non 
igitur sunt intelligibilia actu. Et tamen, quia in hoc homine cuius similitudinem 
repraesentant phantasmata, est accipere naturam universalem denudatam ab omnibus 
conditionibus individuantibus, sunt intelligibilia in potentia. 
102. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 77: Quae tamen nondum pervenerunt ad esse 
intelligibile: cum sint similitudines rerum sensibilium etiam secundum conditiones 
materiales, quae sunt proprietates individuales, et sunt etiam in organis materialibus. Non 
igitur sunt intelligibilia actu.
103. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 10, A. 1, RA. 2: Sicut enim sensus non apprehendit 
suum obiectum nisi sub conditionibus materialibus, prout scilicet est hic et nunc. Cf. 
Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 57, A. 2, RA. 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus 
loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo; et per ipsam 
abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus, id quod abstrahitur, fit universale.
There are two characteristics that the agent intellect possesses that allow it to 
perform its role: (1) immateriality and (2) actuality. The immateriality of the agent 
intellect is necessary because only something immaterial can give rise to something 
immaterial. That is to say, only an immaterial agent intellect can give rise to an 
immaterial abstraction3, the intelligible species. Furthermore, the agent intellect’s 
actuality is necessary for two reasons. First, were the agent intellect sometimes in 
potency and sometimes in act, it would itself need some spiritual power that moves it 
from potency to actuality in order for it to perform its operations. Yet, this is not 
necessary because the agent intellect is always in act as a secondary efficient cause 
whose primary efficient cause is God.104  Second, the agent intellect’s actuality allows it 
to convey actuality to the abstraction3 that it produces, the intelligible species. In other 
words, given the principle that every agent produces something similar to itself, one finds 
that the intelligible species is like the agent intellect in terms of its actuality and its 
immateriality. Yet, the agent intellect is unlike the intelligible species in terms of ratio 
because there is no potency in the agent intellect to receive rationes.105 Thus, the agent 
intellect does not contain any rationes.106 Therefore, the rationes that are conveyed 
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104. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 10., A. 6, Response: Quod quidem lumen intellectus 
agentis in anima procedit, sicut a prima origine, a substantiis separatis et praecipue a deo.
105. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2,  Ch. 76: Intellectus agens non facit species 
intelligibiles actu ut ipse per eas intelligat, maxime sicut substantia separata, cum non sit 
in potentia: sed ut per eas intelligat intellectus possibilis. Non igitur facit eas nisi tales 
quales competunt intellectui possibili ad intelligendum. Tales autem facit eas qualis est 
ipse: nam omne agens agit sibi simile. 
106. Aquinas, QDAnima, Pro., a. 5, r. 9: “Ad nonum dicendum quod intellectus 
agens non sufficit per se ad reducendum intellectum possibilem perfecte in actum, cum 
non sint in eo determinatae rationes omnium rerum.”
   I do not think  “in eo” is referring to the possible intellect for the following 
reasons.   
First,  from an epistemological standpoint, the text would be saying that the agent 
intellect is not sufficient for moving the possible into act because there are not in the 
possible intellect the determinate intentions of all things.   In other words, the intentions 
would need to exist in the possible intellect as a condition for the agent intellect to 
within the intelligible species must come from the phantasm.
The notion of abstraction4 is sometimes misunderstood because Aquinas often 
asserts that the nature of material things are abstracted from phantasms.107 He also asserts 
that intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms.108 Moreover, he asserts that 
intelligibles in potency become intelligible in act (i.e., intelligible species) inasmuch as 
imaginative species (i.e., the phantasms) are denuded from all material vestiges by the 
power of the agent intellect.109 In the aforementioned assertions, it seems that the 
 168 
  
———————————
[Continued from previous page]
function.   However, if the determinate intentions of all things were in the possible 
intellect,  the agent intellect is superfluous and unnecessary.
  Second, responding to the sixth objection in the same question,  Aquinas writes 
“Ad sextum dicendum quod licet in anima nostra sit intellectus agens et possibilis, tamen 
requiritur aliquid extrinsecum ad hoc quod intelligere possimus. Et primo quidem 
requiruntur fantasmata a sensibus accepta, per que represententur intellectui rerun 
determinatarum similitudines, nam intellectus agens non est talis actus in quo omnium 
rerum determinate species accipi possunt ad cognoscendum.”  In other words,  although 
the agent and possible intellect are powers  in the soul, they need to be specified and 
determined by the phantasm, which provides the intentions.  Cf. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q.84, 
A. 6, Response: Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, 
sed opportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod 
sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis 
quodammodo est materia of the cause.
Third, in the same question and response, the text continues and states the 
following “Et ideo requiritur ad ultimam perfectionem intellectus possibilis quod uniatur 
aliqualiter illi agenti in quo sunt rationes omnium rerum, scilet Deo.”   In other words, for 
the ultimate perfection of the possible intellect, the possibile intellect must be united to  
“an agent” in whom are the rationes of all things, God.  Aquinas is contrasting an agent 
that does not contain the rationes  of all things, the agent intellect,  with an agent that 
does contain the rationes of all things, God.
107. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 85, A. 8, Response: Respondeo dicendum quod 
obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, 
quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet.
108. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 85, A. 1, RA. 4: Abstrahit autem intellectus agens 
species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus.
109. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. I, D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, RA. 3: Intellectus enim humanus, qui 
aliquando est in potentia, et aliquando in actu, quando est in potentia intelligens, non est 
idem cum intelligibili in potentia, quod est aliqua res existens extra animam; sed ad hoc 
quod sit intelligens in actu, oportet quod intelligibile in potentia fiat intelligibile in actu 
phantasms are acted upon by the agent intellect, and they are transformed from 
intelligibles in potency to intelligibles in act. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Aquinas is clear that the phantasms are similitudes of individual things and because they 
exist in a corporeal organ, they do not have the same mode of existence as the human 
intellect. Consequently, the phantasms are not able to impress themselves upon the 
human intellect. Moreover, the intelligibles in act (i.e., the intelligible species) are 
immaterial products of the agent intellect. In other words, it is not the case that the 
phantasm in the imagination becomes the intelligible in act, nor is it the case that which is 
potentially intelligible becomes that which is actually intelligible. Instead, the agent 
abstracts from the phantasm the ratio110 that expresses the specific nature of a thing.111 
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per hoc quod species ejus denudatur ab omnibus appenditiis materiae per virtutem 
intellectus agentis.
110. I am not suggesting that the agent intellect is conscious, nor am I suggesting 
selective attention by the agent intellect. 
111.  Early in his career, Aquinas takes over from Avicenna the notion that the 
common nature is understood by the intellect; Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, 
RA. 3: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Avicennam species intellecta potest 
dupliciter considerari: aut secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, et sic habet esse 
singulare; aut secundum quod est similitudo talis rei intellectae, prout ducit in 
cognitionem ejus; et ex hac parte habet universalitatem: quia non est similitudo hujus rei 
secundum quod haec res est, sed secundum naturam in qua cum aliis suae speciei 
convenit.”  Thanks to Dr. Richard Taylor for sharing his Mexico paper with me and 
bringing this text in the Sentences to my attention; Richard C. Taylor, “Aquinas and the 
Arabs: Aquinas’s First Critical Encounter with the Doctrine of Averroes on the Intellect, 
in 2 Sent, d.17, q. 2, a.1,” Philosophical Psychology in Medieval Aristotelianism (Mexico 
City, 2008. Unpublished Conference Paper); Cf. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu  sextus de 
naturalibus, Bk. 5, Ch. 1, p.237–38: Unde, sicut animal in esse habet plures modos, sic 
etiam et in intellectu. In intellectu etenim est forma animalis abstracta secundum 
abstractionem quam praediximus, et dicitur ipsum hoc modo forma intelligibilis. In 
intellectu autem forma animalis taliter est quod in intellectu convenit ex una et eadem 
definitione multis particularibus. Quapropter una forma apud intellectum erit relata ad 
multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale, quia ipsum est una intentio in 
intellectu, cuius comparatio nor, variatur ad quodcumque acceperis animalium, videlicet 
quoniam, cuiusque eorum primum repraesentaveris formam in imaginatione, si postea 
exspoliaverit intellectus intentionem eius ab accidentibus, acquiretur in intellectu haec 
ipsa forma. Ergo, haec forma est quae acquiritur de exspoliatione animalitatis a quamlibet 
As a result of this operation, the agent intellect, an immaterial power in the soul, is able 
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imaginatione individuali accepta de esse extrinseco, quamvis ipsa non habeat esse 
extrinsecus, sed imaginatio abstrahit eam; Haec autem forma, quamvis respectu 
individuorum sit univeralis, tamen, respectu animae singularis in qua imprimitur, est 
individua; ipsa enim est una ex formis quae sunt in intellectu, et quia singular animae 
sunt multae numero, tunc eo modo quo sunt particulares habebunt ipsae aliud intellectum 
universale, quod in tali comparatione est ad ipsas in quali est ad extra, et discernitur in 
anima ab hac forma quae sit universalis comparatione sui ad extra quae praedicatur de 
illis et de allis;  cf. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, Leonine Edition (Roma: Editori 
di San Tommaso, 1976), Ch. 3, p.374–75: Vnde si queratur utrum ista natura sic 
considerata possit dici una uel plures, neutrum concendendum est, quia utrumque est 
extra intelllectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset 
de intellectu eius, numquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in 
Sorte. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem sortis et Platonis, 
nece posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in 
hoc uel in illo: et sec de ipsa aliquid predicatur per accidens ratione eius in quo est, sicut 
dicitur quod homo est albus quia Sortes est albus, quamvis hoc non conueniat homini in 
eo quod homo. Hec autem natura habet duplex esse: unum in singularibus et aliud in 
anima, et secundum utrumque consequntur dictam naturam accidentia; in singularibus 
etiam habet multiples esse secundum singularium diversitatem. Et tamen ipsi nature 
secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse 
debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse 
in hoc singulari, quia se esse in hoc singulari conueniret homini in quantum est homo, 
numquam esset extra hoc singulare; similiter etiam si conueniret homini in quantum est 
homo non esse in hoc singulari, numquam esst in eo: sed uerum est dicere quod homo, 
non quantum est homo, habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo patet 
quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita, tamen quod non 
fiat precisio alicuius eorum. Et hec natura sic considerata est que predicatur de indiuiduis 
omnibus. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conueniat nature sic accepte, quia 
de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas; nature autem humane neutrum horum 
convenit secundum absolutam suam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de 
intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inueniretur humanitas inueniretur communitas, et 
hoc falsum est, quia in Sorte non inuenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est 
indiuiduatum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat nature 
humane secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura 
humana secundum unitatem ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio uniuersalis 
exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat nature humane secundum illus esse 
quod habet in intellectu. Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab 
omnibus indiuiduantibus; et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua que sunt 
extra anima, prout equaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in 
quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia indiuidua, 
intellectus adinuenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi; unde dicit Commentaror in 
principio De anima quod <<intellectus est qui agit in rebus univuersalitatem>>; hoc 
etiam auicenna dicit in sua, Metaphyisica.Et quamuis hec natura intellecta habeat 
to produce an intelligible species with an intelligible content that is formally the same as  
the phantasm, yet numerically and ontologically different from the phantasm. The 
intelligible species is ontologically and numerically different because whereas the 
phantasm is material, the intelligible species is immaterial. Aquinas writes:
But phantasms, since they are similitudes of individuals and exist in a bodily 
organ, do not have the same mode of existing as the human intellect, as is evident 
from what was stated; and for this reason they are not able by their own power to 
be impressed upon the possible intellect. But, by the power of the agent intellect 
some similitude results in the possible intellect from the turning (ex conversione) 
of the agent intellect upon the phantasms, which indeed are representative of 
those things of which the phantasms are, only as to the nature of the species. And 
in this manner, intelligible species are said to be abstracted from phantasms, not 
because some form that is the same in number, which first was in the phantasm 
afterwards comes to be in the possible intellect, in the manner in which a body is 
taken from one location and transferred to another. 112 
 In other words, the agent intellect transfers the ratio or intentio from one mode of being 
(material) to another (immaterial) just as does Averroes’ Agent Intellect.113 If one defines 
“subject” as that which is capable of receiving some kind of form, as was stated earlier,114 
then in an analogous manner to Averroes, Aquinas has two subjects: the imagination and 
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rationem uniuersalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est una 
similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est 
quedam species intellecta particularis; cf. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic 
Turn, pp.28–30.
112. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 85, A. 1 RA3: Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines 
individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi 
quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute 
imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam 
similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, 
quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad 
naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a 
phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, 
postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et 
transfertur ad alterum. [emphasis added]
113. See note 109 on page 112.
114. See note 74 on page 67.
the possible intellect.115 Yet, unlike Averroes, Aquinas’s subjects are ontologically 
distinct (inasmuch as they have different modes of being and belong to really distinct 
power that are necessary accidents of the soul), but they are not ontologically separate in 
substance by virtue of Aquinas’s reformulation of hylomorphism4. So, one may say that 
via the senses and via the intellect, the hylomorphic4 entity knows. Thus, abstraction4 in 
Aquinas is the production of an intelligible species, which is an abstraction3.
Based on what has been stated concerning abstraction4, one may think that the 
phantasm or the intelligible species is that which is known. However, this is not the case 
for Aquinas’s mature thought. Concerning the phantasm, Aquinas makes specified use of 
the distinction between an object of cognition and a medium of cognition. Concerning 
external sense, Aquinas asserts that a similitude, which is in the sense, is abstracted from 
the thing as from the knowable object; for this reason, the thing is directly known through 
that similitude.116 In other words, in sensation, the extramental object impresses its 
species on the sense, and by means of the species, we sense the extramental object. 
However, such is not the case with the phantasm; the phantasm is not an object of 
cognition, but a medium for cognition just as would be a mirror in which we see an 
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115. See page 111.
116. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 2, A. 6, Response : “Quod similitudo quae est in sensu, 
abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili, et ideo per illam similitudinem res ipsa per se 
directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate 
sicut ab obiecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo sensus noster 
accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo, dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam, 
sed ut in similitudinem rei. Unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit, 
fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma, sed ad cognoscendum rem cuius est phantasma. Sed 
tamen per quamdam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius phantasmatis, dum 
considerat naturam actus sui, et speciei per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem 
abstrahit, scilicet phantasmatis: sicut per similitudinem quae est in visu a speculo 
acceptam, directe fertur visus in cognitionem rei speculatae; sed per quamdam 
reversionem fertur per eamdem in ipsam similitudinem quae est in speculo.”
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas remains silent concerning the use of speculo 
as it relates to knowing hylomorphic entities, but following Augustine, he uses speculo to 
describe how man may know God while on earth.
object. Aquinas asserts that from the species that our intellect receives, our intellect is  
brought directly to know, not the phantasm, but the extra-mental thing. But nevertheless, 
through some reflective act, the intellect is able to return to cognition of the phantasm 
when the intellect considers the (1) nature of its own act, (2) the species through which it 
acts, and (3) the phantasm. Aquinas maintains that in the same manner the likeness 
received in vision from a mirror is directly taken into cognition of the visible object, but 
through  a similar turning back upon itself, vision is brought into the likeness as it is in 
the mirror. Notice that only by a reflexive act is the phantasm an object of cognition. As 
we will see, the same is true concerning the intelligible species.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas is clear that the intelligible species is not 
that which is understood. He writes:
This understood intention, since it is as it were the term of the intelligible 
operation, is other than the intelligible species, which actualizes the intellect.... 
[and] which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding.117
Throughout the rest of his works, Aquinas will maintain that the intelligible species is the 
principle of understanding and not that which is understood directly. This can be seen in 
two of his mature works.
In Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Aquinas writes:
the possible intellect only operates inasmuch as it is in act in the same manner 
that vision only sees inasmuch as it is brought into actuality through a visible 
species. Hence, the visible species is not related [to vision] as that which is seen, 
but as that by which it sees. And the same is true concerning the possible intellect, 
except that the possible intellect reflects upon itself and upon its species. Such is 
not the case with vision.118
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117. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 1, Ch. 53: Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi 
terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in 
actu....species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium.
118. Aquinas, DeSpiCr, Pro. A. 9,  ad. 6: Intellectus possibilis non operatur nisi 
secundum quod est in actu, sicut nec visus videt nisi per hoc quod est factus in actu per 
speciem visibilem. Unde species visibilis non se habet ut quod videtur, sed ut quo 
videtur. Et simile est de intellectu possibili; nisi quod intellectus possibilis reflectitur 
supra seipsum et supra speciem suam, non autem visus. [emphasis added]
Via analogy, Aquinas is saying that species are not objects of cognition, but means for 
cognition. One does not see visible species, but by means of visible species, one sees 
physical objects. Similarly, one does not know intelligible species, but by means of 
intelligible species, one knows the natures of things.
In another mature work, De Unitate Intellectus, Aquinas writes:
However, these [intelligible] species are not related to the possible intellect as 
that which is understood (intellecta), but just as the species by which the intellect 
understands... except inasmuch as the intellect reflects upon itself, which is not 
able to happen in the sense.119
Once again, one sees that intelligible species are not objects of cognition, but means of 
cognition. Having examined abstraction3 and abstraction4, and having addressed any 
misunderstanding concerning phantasms and intelligible species, let us consider the 
subject of intelligibles in Aquinas.
Aquinas and Subject of Intelligible Forms (Intellectus possibilis)
As has been explained, the soul is a spiritual substance that functions as the form 
of the body. However, there is part of the soul that transcends the body although it is not 
ontologically separated from the body. That part of the soul that transcends the body is 
the possible intellect, which is the subject of intelligible forms (i.e. intelligible species). 
In this section, I shall consider the three characteristics that make the possible intellect a 
suitable subject for intelligibles: its receptivity, its immateriality, and its ability to retain 
intelligible species. I shall also consider the operations of the possible intellect.
 In a similar way to the way prime matter is in potency to all sensible forms, the 
possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms.120 The receptivity (i.e., passive 
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119. Aquinas, ContraAverr, Ch. 5: Hae autem species non se habent ad 
intellectum possibilem ut intellecta, sed sicut species quibus intellectus intelligit (sicut et 
species quae sunt in visu non sunt ipsa visa, sed ea quibus visus videt), nisi in quantum 
intellectus reflectitur supra seipsum, quod in sensu accidere non potest.
120. Aquinas, QDAnima, p. 16. Hunc igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est 
potency) of the possible intellect to all intelligible forms is crucial to human intellection 
because at its inception the human intellect is like a blank slate in which nothing is 
written.121 Without this receptivity, humans would not be able to receive intelligible 
forms regardless of the productive power of the agent intellect, for only that which is in a 
state of potency can be moved to a state of actuality by that which is in act. In other 
words, if the possible intellect were not in a state of potency to an intelligible form, then 
the intelligible forms that the agent intellect produces could not inhere in the possible 
intellect. Without intelligible forms inhering in the possible intellect, the natures of things 
in the world would not be made present to the possible intellect, which is wholly 
immaterial.
The immateriality of the possible intellect is just as important as its receptivity if 
not more so. For Aquinas, it is not particularity that prevents intellection; rather, it is 
matter. In his early work, In Scriptum in Sententiarum, an objector asserts:
... anything that is received in another is received in it according to the mode of 
the recipient and not according to its own mode of being, as is known from 
Dionysius and the Book of Causes. Therefore, if intellect is individuated at the 
division of bodies,  so that it is different in diverse [bodies], necessarily 
intellectual forms received into it would also be individuated. From this there 
seem to follow two untoward consequences. First, since no particular is what is 
understood in act but [only ] in potency,  species of this kind will not be 
intelligibles in act, but they will need to be understood through other species, and 
so on, ad infinitum. The other [untoward consequence] is that the mode of 
receiving forms in prime matter and in the possible intellect would be the same, 
because in both, they are received so that they are those [particulars], not such 
that as they are forms simpliciter. Thus, just as prime matter is not knowable 
through the forms which it receives, neither [would the possible intellect know 
through the form it receives], as it seems to be.122
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[Continued from previous page]
esse in potentia ad omnia quae sunt intelligibilia per hominem. Also see: John Frederick 
Peifer, The Concept in Thomism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), p. 33.
121. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 79, A.2, Response: Intellectus autem humanus, qui est 
infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in 
potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est 
scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III De Anima.
122. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, AG. 3: Praeterea, omne quod 
 Citing Avicenna, Aquinas responds:
To the third it should be said that according to Avicenna, the “species 
understood” can be considered in two senses. Either according to the being that it 
has in the intellect [i.e., as existing in it] and that it has singular being, or 
according as it is a likeness of such an understood thing, insofar as that it leads to 
knowledge of it. According to this latter sense, it has universality; because it is 
not a likeness of this thing inasmuch as it is this thing, but according to the nature 
in which it conforms to others in its species. Moreover, it is not necessary that 
every singular being be intelligible only in potency, as is evident concerning 
separated substances. But [this is necessary] in those things which are 
individuated by matter, as is the case with corporeal entities. But these 
[intelligible] species [in the second sense] are individuated through the 
individuation of the intellect, hence they remain intelligibles in act.123
There are three parts to Aquinas’s argument regarding the knowledge of particulars. The 
first part is a reductio ab absurdum. By means of a reductio ad absurdum, Aquinas 
demonstrates that if individuality precludes intelligibles in act, then separated substances 
(e.g., angels) would not be actually intelligible to themselves, since they themselves are 
particular existents as well. Supposedly, the objector would have agreed that separated 
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[Continued from previous page]
recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis, et non per modum sui, ut ex 
Dionysio et ex Lib. De Causis habetur. Si ergo intellectus individuetur ad divisionem 
corporis, ut sit alius diversorum, oportet quod formae intellectuales in eo receptae, etiam 
sint individuatae: ex quo videntur sequi duo inconvenientia. Unum est, cum nullum 
particulare sit intellectum in actu, sed in potentia, quod hujusmodi species non erunt 
intelligibiles in actu, sed indigebunt intelligi per alias species, et sic in infinitum 
procedetur. Aliud est quod erit idem modus recipiendi formas in materia prima et in 
intellectu possibili, quia utrobique recipiuntur ut sunt istae, et non ut sunt formae 
simpliciter: et ita, sicut materia prima non est cognoscibilis per formas quas recipit, ita 
nec intellectus possibilis, ut videtur. 
123. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, RA. 3:  Ad tertium dicendum, quod 
secundum Avicennam species intellecta potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum esse 
quod habet in intellectu, et sic habet esse singulare; aut secundum quod est similitudo 
talis rei intellectae, prout ducit in cognitionem ejus; et ex hac parte habet universalitatem: 
quia non est similitudo hujus rei secundum quod haec res est, sed secundum naturam in 
qua cum aliis suae speciei convenit. Nec oportet omne singulare esse intelligibile tantum 
in potentia (sicut patet de substantiis separatis), sed in illis quae individuantur per 
materiam, sicut sunt corporalia: sed species istae individuantur per individuationem 
intellectus; unde non perdunt esse intelligibile in actu.
substances know themselves per se.124 Thus, Aquinas has refuted the claim that 
individuality precludes knowability by appealing to the nature of separate substances. 
Furthermore, Aquinas continues that it is only the individuation by means of matter that 
precludes intelligibles in act. This is the case because a thing is knowable only inasmuch 
as it is in act and not in potency, while that which is material is always an intelligible in 
potency.125 
 The second part of the argument has to deal with the human intellect and the 
individuation of the species. Aquinas asserts that because the intelligible species is 
individuated by the human intellect, it remains intelligible in act. This may seem like a 
non-sequitur fallacy, but this is an enthymeme. The argument goes as follows:
Major: All intelligibles in act that are individuated by immaterial intellects are 
that which remain intelligibles in act.
Minor: The human intellect is immaterial.
Therefore intelligibles that are individuated by the human intellect remain 
intelligible in act.
Aquinas had already established the major premise by means of the reductio. The minor 
premise was unstated. Thus, Aquinas concludes that intelligibles in the human intellect 
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124. ”Intellgibiles in act” is  predicated equivocally in Aquinas’s system.   When 
intelligibles in act are used concerning God, they denote the Divine Essence.  When 
intelligbles in act are used concerning angels, it denotes connatural intelligible species. 
When intelligibles in act are used concerning humans,  they denote acquired intelligibles 
species. When intelligibles in act are predicated in Avicenna’s system, they denote reified 
Platonic like forms existing in the Agent Intellect. When intelligibles in act are predicated 
in Averroes’ system, they denote reified Platonic like forms existing in the Material 
Intellect.
125. Aquinas, S.T., Q. 87, A. 1, Response: Respondeo dicendum quod 
unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in 
potentia, ut dicitur in IX metaphys., sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub 
cognitione cadit, prout actu Est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, 
non enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in actu. Et similiter 
intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non 
cognoscit nisi quod est actu, et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi 
secundum proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I physic..
remain intelligible in act. In other words, the immateriality of the possible intellect makes 
it possible for intelligibles in act to inform the possible intellect.
The informing of the intellect constitutes the third part of Aquinas’s argument. 
The informing of the intellect can be considered one of two ways: ontologically or 
epistemologically. Ontologically, the intelligible species is an accidental, particular, 
intentional form inhering in the possible intellect. The intelligible species specifies and 
determines the intellect and renders the possible intellect into a state of actuality. So, 
where previously, the possible intellect was like a blank slate (tabula rasa), now there is 
writing. In other words, the intellect has been informed. The informing of the intellect 
can also be looked at epistemologically. In an epistemological sense, when the human 
intellect is informed, the intelligible in act (i.e., the intelligible species) conveys a ratio to 
the possible intellect. This ratio conveys an intelligible content to the intellect, and the 
content that it conveys is a specific nature.
The nature that is conveyed by means of the intelligible species can be considered 
in one of two ways. First, it can be considered without relations to anything else. When 
considered in this way, the specific nature is not yet considered as a universal. For 
example, when abstracting the nature from a particular horse that one is sensing, one 
would apprehend the abstracted nature of that particular horse. That is not to say, that the 
abstracted nature is a particular; it is universal insofar as  it has been abstracted from 
matter and the concrete conditions of matter.126 Nevertheless, the intellect is not 
considering the abstracted nature in relation to anything else (i.e., as one in relation to 
many particulars), so it is not yet understood as universal. The second way that the nature 
is considered is in relation to other particulars. Having abstracted the nature of that 
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126. Recall that the intelligible species can be considered epistemologically or 
ontologically.   Epistemologically, the intelligible species conveys a nature that is devoid 
of the concrete conditions of matter and devoid of matter.   Ontologically, the intelligible 
species is a particular; it is an accident inherening in the possible intellect.
particular horse, the intellect by means of the phantasm, which is a medium for cognition 
not an object of cognition, compares the abstracted nature to the many particular horses 
existing in extra-mental reality; by doing so, the intellect realizes that the abstracted 
nature is present in the many particular horses. In other words, one operation is to 
apprehend an abstracted nature and another operation to recognize that the abstracted 
nature is universal (one over many). The fact that the intellect is that which ascribes 
universality is a point on which Aquinas, Avicenna, and Averroes agree.127 Without its 
immateriality, universality would not be possible. Moreover, the intellect’s immateriality 
is the basis for its power of retaining intelligibles.
Unlike for Avicenna, who denied that the intellect is able to store intelligibles,128 
Aquinas argues that humans have intellectual memory, and for the most part, his 
argument rests on the immateriality of the soul. Aquinas states:
First, because the possible intellect is of a more stable of nature than the senses 
necessarily that species received in it is more stably received. Hence [the 
intelligible] species are better able to be conserved [in the possible intellect] than 
in the sensitive part (i.e., in the imagination).129
One must remember that form and matter are metaphysical constructs intended to explain 
the problem of being and becoming. Form is meant to account for the actuality and 
permanence of a given entity, whereas matter is meant to account for the potentiality and 
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127. Aquinas, DeEnte, Ch. 2, p. 375: Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad 
omnia individua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi; unde dicit 
Commentator in principio De Anima quod “intellectus est qui agit in rebus 
universalitatem”; hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica. Et quamvis haec natura 
intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, 
quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in 
illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis.
128. See page 91 note 44.
129. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 10, A. 2, Response: primo, quia cum intellectus 
possibilis sit stabilioris naturae quam sensus, oportet quod species in eo recepta stabilius 
recipiatur; unde magis possunt in eo conservari species quam in parte sensitiva.
change of a given entity. Aquinas is using an a fortiori  argument. He argues that if an 
unstable place such as the imagination, which resides in a material organ, is able to retain 
imaginative forms a fortiori a stable place such as the possible intellect is much more 
suitable for the storing of intelligible forms.
 Now that we have examined the characteristics that make the possible intellect a 
suitable subject for intelligibles, let us consider the operations of the possible intellect. In 
addition to the characteristics mentioned above, from the aforementioned texts, we see 
that there are five operations that the possible intellect can perform. First, the possible 
intellect is able to reflect upon its own activity so that it knows that it is knowing. 
Second, the possible intellect is able to reflect upon the intelligible species by which it 
knows. Third, after having received the intelligible species, the possible intellect is 
cognizant of the nature that exists in the particular existent.130 Fourth, from the fact that 
intelligible species are stored, the possible intellect is able to operate as it wills and is 
able to understand.131 Fifth, the possible intellect is able to form a concept, which serves 
as the subsequent basis for enunciation.132. As is evident, there is much to consider when 
examining Aquinas’s natural epistemology, let us quickly review before proceeding to 
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130. Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia de anima (Rome: Leonine Commission, 
1984), Bk. 2,  Lession 12: Relinquitur igitur, quod natura humana non habet esse praeter 
principia individuantia, nisi tantum in intellectu.
131. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 79, A. 6, Response: Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species 
intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur, 
quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet 
modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu.
132. Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 85, A. 2,  ad 3: Nam primo quidem consideratur passio 
intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem 
formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per 
vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio 
significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas 
species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus 
exterioribus. 
Aquinas’s supernatural epistemology.
 Review of Aquinas’s Natural Epistemology
In sum, the possible intellect is the subject of intelligibles for Aquinas, and 
hylomorphism4 with its unique relation of form to matter allows the possible intellect to 
remain unaffected by matter. The immateriality of the soul allows Aquinas (1) to ascribe 
intelligibility in act to the intelligible species, (2) to ascribe universality to the ratio that 
is conveyed through the species, and (3) to ascribe memory to the possible intellect as 
well. In addition, the receptivity of the possible intellect allows intelligible species to 
inhere in it. Although there is more that can be said concerning the concept and the 
mental word, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The point of this chapter was to 
establish the fact that Aquinas had two forms of hylomorphism: hylomorphism3, which 
applied to non-rational entities, and hylomorphism4, which applied to rational entities. 
Notwithstanding the essence-existence distinction in the composition of hylomorphic3 
entities, this kind of hylomorphism was similar to that which was held by Averroes, 
Aristotle, and Avicenna. This kind of hylomorphism along with the rejection of the forms 
gives rise to the Aristotelian aporia; it is this kind of hylomorphism that serves as the 
fulcrum that made it necessary to teeter between two exclusive views of the soul (i.e., 
either the soul is the form of the body or it is a spiritual substance). Aquinas’s innovative 
form of hylomorphism4 allows him to get rid of the fulcrum that causes one to teeter 
between these two options. Instead, it allows Aquinas to assert that the soul is a spiritual 
substance and the form of the body. However, this new form of hylomorphism4 is not 
without consequences because the weaknesses inherent in both Avicenna’s and Averroes’ 
position are inherited by Aquinas. Because the soul is not immersed in matter, there is 
part of the soul that is wholly immaterial and wholly unaffected by the body. 
Consequently, Aquinas faces an ontological gap between the material world and the 
immaterial intellect just as do Avicenna and Averroes.
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 Whereas Avicenna tried to resolve the problem by having only the immaterial 
intellects affect the immaterial soul and whereas Averroes attempted to transfer the ratio 
from a material substance to an immaterial substance, thereby transferring the mode of 
being of the ratio from material to immaterial, Aquinas’s approach is different from 
Avicenna’s and analogous to Averroes’. Wanting to affirm that our intellectual 
knowledge is concerning things in the world, Aquinas, as does Averroes, needs a power 
that is devoid of intelligible forms, yet able to act on imaginative forms. As for Averroes, 
the agent that transfers the ratio is the agent intellect. However, unlike Averroes’ Agent 
Intellect, which was one eternal substance in which each individual participated, 
Aquinas’s agent intellect is a power in each human soul through which each soul is 
informed not by God, but by the phantasms found in the imagination.
The intelligible species is necessary as the vehicle that allows Aquinas to bridge 
the ontological gap that he had created with his new form of hylomorphism4. The 
intelligible species, serving as a vehicle, conveys a ratio which presents the specific 
nature of a particular thing to the intellect. By means of abstraction4, the agent intellect is 
able to produce an intelligible species which is received into the possible intellect. 
Aquinas is clear that phantasms and intelligible species are not objects of cognitions 
except reflexively. Instead, they are means of cognition. As a result of the reception of an 
intelligible species, the nature of extra-mental things in the world is cognized by the 
intellect. When that specific nature is considered in itself, it is treated as a nature of a 
particular, but when the intellect compares that nature to the extra-mental existents, it 
confers universality to the nature, for it is able to understand that the same nature is 
present in other extra-mental existents. The basis for the universality of the natures 
conveyed to the intellect and the basis for the retention of the intelligible species is the 
immateriality and spirituality of the soul, which is only possible because the soul is not 
immersed in matter.
 182 
  
In addition to being a suitable subject for the reception of intelligibles, the 
possible intellect has several operations; one of its operations is concept formation. 
Concept formation provides the ontological basis for enunciation.133 One must remember 
that Aquinas avoids making phantasms and intelligible species objects of cognition. 
Because some have conflated Aquinas’s natural epistemology with his supernatural 
epistemology, I shall briefly review Aquinas’s supernatural epistemology in order that I 
may correct some views in the next chapter. 
Aquinas’s Super-Natural Epistemology
Aquinas’s Super-Natural Epistemology is divided into two main branches: 
supernatural knowing while embodied on earth and supernatural knowing in a beatific 
state. In this section, I shall examine both forms of supernatural knowing. However, 
before I do so, it is important that we understand God’s role in knowing.
On page 167, I stated that God is the primary efficient cause of knowing. In his 
early work, The Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombardi, Aquinas elaborates on 
how God is involved in all knowing in such a way that would explain how it is the case 
that God teaches all, and how it is the case that only God is said to teach.  Aquinas writes:
To the fourth it should be said that just as in natural actions, an inferior agent does 
not have the efficacy to produce an effect except through the power of the first 
agent (i.e., God), which [power] more vehemently impresses upon the effect [than 
does the secondary agent], so also in a subordinate illuminator is able to effect 
nothing except through the power of the first illuminator. Consequently, it is God 
himself who teaches all [subordinate illuminators]. Nevertheless, this does not 
exclude illumination from others, just as the natural action from natural agents [is 
not excluded].134
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133. Although concept formation is beyond the scope and purpose of this 
dissertation, I will briefly allude to it in chapter five.
134. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 9, A. 2,  RA. 4: Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut in 
actionibus naturalibus inferius agens non habet efficaciam in productione effectus nisi 
per virtutem agentis primi, quae vehementius imprimit in effectum; ita etiam in 
intellectualibus inferior illuminans nihil potest efficere nisi per virtutem primi 
illuminantis: et propter hoc ipse deus est qui omnes docet; nec tamen excluditur ab aliis 
illuminatio, sicut nec ab agentibus naturalibus naturalis actio. 
Aquinas here is using a principle found in the Book of Causes.135 The principle states that 
each primary cause is more penetratingly influential upon its effect than any secondary 
universal cause. The implications of this principle are the following: (1) The primary 
cause is more a cause of an effect than a secondary cause; (2) a secondary cause does not 
produce its effect except by the power that it receives from the primary cause.136 
Consequently, in any activity, God is involved inasmuch as he is empowering the 
creature so that it may act. Thus, in the aforementioned text, God is said to teach 
inasmuch as he provides the ability to learn. Aquinas proceeds to affirm that this does not 
exclude learning from others. To clarify his point, Aquinas gives an analogy concerning 
visible objects. He writes:
The human being comes into sensible cognition of colors from two things, namely 
from the visible object, and from light under which it is seen (hence each is said 
to “show forth” the thing, namely the light, the one who prepares, and the one 
who presents the object) so also for intellectual cognition two [conditions] are 
required, namely the intelligible itself and the light through which it is seen. For 
this reason in two ways it is said [that] someone teaches: either just as putting 
forth the intelligible or as offering the light for understanding. This light however 
is two-fold. One [is] intrinsic or connatural to the intellect, to which is similar the 
light which is from the composition of the eye, and through the conferring of this 
light only God is said to teach. The second light  supervenes for the strengthening 
of the connatural light, to which the light of the sun or of a candle is similar in 
corporeal vision; and thus an angel is able to illuminate another angel or also a 
man for knowing something.137
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135. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti thomae de aquino super librum de causis expositio, 
H. D. edited by  Saffrey (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954), Lesson 1: Omnis causa primaria 
plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis. 
136. Aquinas, DeCausis, Lesson 1: Ergo prima causa est magis causa effectus 
quam causa secunda.... Causa secunda non agit in causatum suum nisi virtute causae 
primae.
137. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 9, A. 2, RA4: in cognitionem coloris sensibilem 
pervenit homo ex duobus, scilicet ex visibili objecto, et ex lumine sub quo videtur (unde 
et uterque dicitur demonstrare rem, scilicet qui lumen praeparat, et qui objectum 
repraesentat) ita etiam ad cognitionem intellectualem duo exiguntur; scilicet ipsum 
intelligibile, et lumen per quod videtur; et ideo dupliciter dicitur aliquis docere; vel sicut 
proponens intelligibile, vel sicut praebens lumen ad intelligendum. Hoc autem lumen est 
duplex. Unum intrinsecum vel connaturale intellectui, cui similatur lumen quod est de 
Using the analogy, Aquinas makes a distinction between what is known and that by which 
 something is known. Concerning how things are known, Aquinas gives two causes: an 
intrinsic cause and an extrinsic cause. The intrinsic cause is natural to the intellect and is 
provided by God alone. The extrinsic cause, on the other hand, may be provided by a 
secondary cause to help a secondary agent (e.g., humans and angel) know. One may 
wonder: what is this “internal light” that God is providing. To answer, we need to look 
elsewhere.
In Questiones disputatae de anima, Aquinas informs us that the interior light is 
the agent intellect:
Colors moving vision exist outside the soul, but phantasms, which move the 
possible intellect, are intrinsic to us. For this reason, although the exterior light of 
the sun suffices for making colors visible in actuality, nevertheless, for making 
phantasms become intelligibles in act, an interior light is required, which is the 
light of the agent intellect.138
The agent intellect is this interior light, for it is a power of the human soul that proceeds 
necessarily from the essence of the human soul, always under the primary causality of 
God; in this sense, the agent intellect is natural in us. Consequently, it is not necessary 
that another light be added to this emanation in matters which fall under natural 
reason.139 That is to say, the agent intellect has sufficient power (along with the phantasm 
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compositione oculi; et per collationem hujus luminis solus deus docere dicitur. Secundum 
lumen est superveniens ad confortationem connaturalis luminis, cui similatur in visu 
corporali lumen solis vel candelae; et sic potest Angelus alium Angelum vel etiam 
hominem illuminare ad aliquid cognoscendum.
138. Aquinas, QDAnima, Pro, A.5, RA. 7: Ad septimum dicendum, quod colores 
moventes visum sunt extra animam; sed phantasmata, quae movent intellectum 
possibilem, sunt nobis intrinseca. Et ideo, licet lux solis exterior sufficiat ad faciendum 
colores visibiles actu, ad faciendum tamen phantasmata intelligibilia esse actu, requiritur 
lux interior, quae est lux intellectus agentis. [emphasis added] 
139. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 28, A. 5, RA4: Ad quartum dicendum, quod ipsum 
lumen intellectus agentis est quaedam irradiatio primae lucis... et ideo non oportet quod 
huic irradiationi aliud lumen superaddatur in his quae naturali rationi sunt subdita.
that functions like a material cause and provides the ratio) to account for the active 
component of natural reason.  Of course, it would not be sufficient in an unqualified 
sense because the receptivity of the possible intellect is also required.  It is no wonder 
that from the beginning of his career, Aquinas will also refer to the agent intellect as a 
“natural light.”140Aquinas contrasts the “natural light” with “super-natural” light. 
Whereas natural light is used to understand the natural order of things, super-natural light 
is used in two ways: (1) to convey “super-natural” knowledge to a person on earth (e.g., a 
prophet); or (2) to allow believers to see the face of God when they are in heaven.141 
 At this point, one may wonder, if God is the primary efficient cause, then would 
not God be involved in both natural and supernatural knowing, for it is He who confers 
the ability to know to every rational creature? So, to make the distinction between 
supernatural and natural knowing seems to commit the fallacy of a distinction without a 
difference. However, Aquinas does not commit this fallacy. In the following text, 
Aquinas conveys the distinction:
If the agent intellect were some separated substance, it is manifest that it is 
beyond the nature of man. However, an operation that a man performs only by the 
power of some supernatural substance, is supernatural: just as performing 
miracles and prophesying and other [operations] of this kind that humans perform 
by divine dispensation. Since, therefore, man cannot understand except through 
the power of the Agent Intellect, if the Agent Intellect were some separated 
substance, it would follow that knowing is not a natural operation to man. And, 
thus, he would not be able to be defined by the fact that he is  intellectual or 
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140. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 3, D. 24. Q. 1 A. 2, Response: videmus quando per lumen 
intellectuale ipsa forma intellectualis fit in intellectu nostro; sive illud lumen sit naturale; 
sicut cum intelligimus quidditatem hominis, aut alicujus hujusmodi.
141. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 3, D. 24, Q. 1, A.2, Response: videmus quando per lumen 
intellectuale ipsa forma intellectualis fit in intellectu nostro; sive illud lumen sit naturale; 
sicut cum intelligimus quidditatem hominis, aut alicujus hujusmodi; sive sit 
supernaturale, sicut quo deum in patria videbimus. Et ulterius videri per intellectum 
dicuntur illa complexa quorum cognitio ex praedicta visione consurgit; sicut per lumen 
naturale videmus principia prima quae cognoscimus statim, ut terminos; sive per lumen 
supernaturale, sicut est visio prophetiae.
rational.142
Two criteria must be fulfilled for knowing to be classified as natural knowing. One 
criterion for an operation to be considered natural to humans is that it must be an 
operation that is performed by powers that are formally inherent in human beings, for 
nothing operates except through some power that is formally in it.143 Thus, Aquinas 
would classify Avicenna’s epistemology and Averroes’s epistemology as supernatural, 
for both assert that the Agent Intellect is a separated substance ontologically separate 
from each human, not to mention that Averroes also asserts that the Material Intellect is a 
separated substance ontologically separate from each human. It should come as no 
surprise that Aquinas appeals to Avicenna’s epistemology to give a philosophical account 
of prophecy144  and to Averroes’ epistemology to give a philosophical account of 
beatification.145 That is to say, Aquinas will appeal to their epistemologies to give an 
account of supernatural knowing.
 The other criterion that is not immediately evident in the aforementioned text is 
that the content for natural knowing must be garnered from the natural world. Avicenna’s 
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142. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 76:  Si intellectus agens est quaedam substantia 
separata, manifestum est quod est supra naturam hominis. Operatio autem quam homo 
exercet sola virtute alicuius supernaturalis substantiae, est operatio supernaturalis: ut 
miracula facere et prophetare, et alia huiusmodi quae divino munere homines operantur. 
Cum igitur homo non possit intelligere nisi virtute intellectus agentis, si intellectus agens 
est quaedam substantia separata, sequetur quod intelligere non sit operatio naturalis 
homini. Et sic homo non poterit definiri per hoc quod est intellectivus aut rationalis.
143. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 76: Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem quae 
formaliter in ipso est: unde Aristoteles, in II de anima, ostendit quod quo vivimus et 
sentimus, est forma et actus. Sed utraque actio, scilicet intellectus possibilis et intellectus 
agentis, convenit homini: homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente 
intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in 
nobis experiremur. Oportet igitur quod principia quibus attribuuntur hae actiones, scilicet 
intellectus possibilis et agens, sint virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter existentes. 
144. See note 150 on page 189.
145. See note 156 on page 191.
epistemology is disqualified because the formal content is provided by the Agent 
Intellect. Recall that for Avicenna, an abstraction4 flows from the immaterial intellect 
into the human soul, and by means of that abstraction4 the intelligibles (i.e., abstractions5) 
in the Agent Intellect become present to the human intellect. Averroes’s epistemology, on 
the other hand, would not have been discounted based on this criterion, for there is an 
actual transfer of the ratio from the material world to the Material Intellect. That is to 
say, a transfer of the ratio from a material mode of being to an immaterial mode of 
being.146 However, even if one accepts that the Agent Intellect is “form for us” in a kind 
of Aristotelian participation, as Taylor states,147  it does not follow that the Material 
Intellect is formally in each person. Given that Averroes does not state that the Material 
Intellect is form for us, some arguments must be given showing why and how the 
Material Intellect is form for us. Consequently, Averroes’ Material Intellect does not 
meet the first criterion. Let us now turn to the two forms of supernatural knowing: 
prophecy and beatification.
Regarding prophecy, it is important to know that unlike the “light” that is natural 
and intrinsic to the human intellect, the “light” needed for prophecy is extrinsic to the 
human soul.148 That is to say, it is an operation that exceeds human nature. In addition, 
the “light” needed for prophecy does not remain in the prophet, but it is like some sort of 
passion that impresses itself in the soul of the prophet only during the time of divine 
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146. See note 109 on page 112.
147. Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According to 
Aquinas and Averroes,” p. 208.
148. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 12, A. 1, Response: In intellectu igitur humano lumen 
quoddam est quasi qualitas vel forma permanens, scilicet lumen essentiale intellectus 
agentis, ex quo anima nostra intellectualis dicitur. Sic autem lumen propheticum in 
propheta esse non potest.
inspiration.149 Citing Avicenna, Aquinas affirms that the mind of the prophet becomes 
more positively disposed for future inspirations with each inspiration. As a result of 
having been inspired, the mind of the prophet becomes more disposed for further 
inspiration just as Avicenna states, the habits of science in us are nothing other than 
dispositions of the soul for receiving light from the agent intellect and for receiving 
intelligible species flowing into [the soul] from the Agent Intellect.150 Aquinas is not 
affirming that one should accept the Agent Intellect as a source of knowledge; instead he 
is asserting that God or an angel would function in a manner similar to Avicenna’s Agent 
Intellect.151 Hence, although Aquinas rejects Avicenna’s epistemology for natural 
knowing, he has no problem using it to describe supernatural knowing. 
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149. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 12, A. 1, Response: Unde oportet quod lumen 
propheticum non sit habitus, sed magis sit in anima prophetae per modum cuiusdam 
passionis ut lumen solis in aere. Unde, sicut lumen non remanet in aere nisi apud 
irradiationem solis, ita nec lumen praedictum remanet in mente prophetae nisi quando 
actualiter divinitus inspiratur.
150. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 12, A. 1, Response: Unde et mens prophetae postquam 
fuerit semel vel pluries divinitus inspirata, etiam actuali inspiratione cessante remanet 
habilior ut iterum inspiretur. Et haec habilitas potest habitus prophetiae dici; sicut etiam 
Avicenna dicit, VI de naturalibus, quod habitus scientiarum in nobis nihil aliud sunt 
quam habilitates quaedam animae nostrae ad hoc quod recipiat illustrationem 
intelligentiae agentis, et species intelligibiles ab ea in se effluentes.  cf. Avicenna, Liber 
de anima seu  sextus de naturalibus, Bk. 6, Ch. 5, p. 151: Cum vero homo habet hoc in 
seipso non aliunde, vocatur haec aptitudo subtilitas ; quae so aptitudo aliquando in 
aliquibus hominibus ita praevalet quod ad coniungendum se intelligentiae non indiget 
multis, nec exercitio, nec disciplina, quia est in eo aptitudo secunda ; immo, quia 
quicquid est, per se scit : qui gradus est altior omnibus gradibus aptitudinis. Haec autem 
dispositio intellectus materialis debet vocari intellectus  sanctus qui est illius generis 
cuius est intellectus in habitu, sed hic est supremus in quo non omnes homines 
conveniunt.
151. Recall that Avicenna’s Agent Intellect contains the intelligibles in act (i.e., 
abstractions5).  Also recall that there is no intellectual memory in Avicenna;  therefore, 
when one desires to know intellectually one must receive an abstraction4 from the Agent 
Intellect, a separated, immaterial entity.
Supernatural knowing can happen in one of four ways.152 First, it can happen with 
only the reception of some content. Second, it can happen with the reception of only 
discernment. Third, it can happen with the reception of both content and discernment. 
The fourth way that supernatural knowing can happen is “face to face,” and typically this 
is reserved for the beatific state. Aquinas divides the supernatural reception of content 
into three kinds of vision. The first kind is according to bodily vision, when God makes 
something visible to corporeal eyes. The second kind of vision is according to imaginary 
vision. The last type of vision is intellectual vision. Intellectual vision occurs when 
something is made present to the intellect, and what is made present to the intellect is 
beyond the natural operations (e.g., knowledge of future contingents).
Aquinas is clear that the human intellect is naturally in potency to all intelligible 
forms from sensible things; this kind of reception is not supernatural. Only when forms 
are received into the intellect that are not naturally formed can one classify them as 
supernatural. For example, the viewing of angels or God is beyond the power of the 
human intellect; thus, if such viewing were to occur, it would be supernatural. When 
there is reception of content (e.g., sensible species, imaginative species, or intelligible 
species) that did not originate in the natural world, one has supernatural knowing. 
However, concerning discernment, there is no species received. Instead, there is an 
external “light” infused into the intellect of the recipient. The purpose of the “light” is to 
strengthen that person’s understanding, so that he or she would be able to understand.153 
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152. See note 153 below.
153. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 12, A. 7, Response: Sed prima supernaturalis acceptio, 
scilicet quae est secundum corporalem visionem, est infra propheticam acceptionem; quia 
per hanc acceptionem non praefertur propheta aliis quibuscumque; cum speciem divinitus 
formatam ad videndum, omnes aequaliter videre possint. Supernaturalis ergo acceptio 
quae est propria prophetiae, est acceptio imaginariae visionis. Sic ergo omnis propheta 
vel habet iudicium tantum supernaturale de his quae ab alio videntur, sicut ioseph de visis 
a Pharaone; vel habet acceptionem simul cum iudicio secundum imaginariam visionem.  
Iudicium igitur supernaturale prophetae datur secundum lumen ei infusum, ex quo 
Although all of these instances of supernatural knowing are miraculous, they are all 
inferior to the ultimate form of supernatural knowing, seeing God face to face.
Looking for a means to describe the beatific vision, Aquinas discounts 
Avicenna’s solution because everything which is received in something is in it in the 
mode of the recipient. Consequently,  as he puts it, “the likeness of the divine essence 
impressed by it on our intellect will be through the mode of our intellect.”154  As Richard 
Taylor points out, “That is, what will be in the human intellect will be imperfect and 
diminished in accord with the mode and nature of our imperfect human intellects, not in 
accord with the divine essence itself.”155 Instead, Aquinas borrows from Averroes 
because in order to know separate substances (e.g., God), the separate intellect must be 
both that by which we know and that which we know.156 In other words, the separated 
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intellectus roboratur ad iudicandum; et quantum ad hoc nullae species exiguntur. Sed 
quantum ad acceptionem requiritur nova formatio specierum, sive ut fiant in mente 
prophetae species quae prius non fuerunt, utpote si alicui caeco nato imprimerentur 
species colorum; sive ut species praeexistentes ordinentur et componantur divinitus tali 
modo quod competat significationi rerum quae debent prophetae ostendi. Et per hunc 
modum concedendum est, quod prophetae revelatio non solum fit secundum lumen, sed 
secundum species etiam; quandoque vero secundum species; quandoque vero secundum 
lumen tantum. 
154. Richard C. Taylor, “‘The Role of Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas 
Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in His Commentary on the Sentences IV, 
d.49, q.2, A. 1’” (Presented  in March 2009  at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, Paris. 
Unpublished conference presentation), p. 17.
155. Ibid.
156. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 4, D. 49, Q. 2, A. 1, Response: Et ideo alius modus 
intelligendi substantias separatas ponitur ab Avicenna in sua Metaph., scilicet quod 
substantie separate intelliguntur a nobis per intentiones suarum quidditatum que sunt 
quaedam ipsarum similitudines non abstracte ab eis, quia ipsemet sunt immateriales, set 
impresse ab eis in animabus nostris. set hic modus etiam non videtur nobis sufficere ad 
visionem divinam quam querimus....  Et ideo accipiendus est alius modus, quem etiam 
quidam philosophi posuerunt, scilicet Alexander et Averroes in III De Anima. Cum enim 
in qualibet cognitione sit necessaria aliqua forma, qua res cognoscatur aut videatur, forma 
ista qua intellectus perficitur ad videndas substantias separatas, non est quidditas quam 
substance must become “form for us” and it must be intrinsic to the knower. Yet, one 
should not understand this as an ontological unity with the human intellect; instead, it 
should be understood as the relationship of the perfect to the imperfect as is the 
relationship of form to matter. For Thomas, “the Divine Essence must not displace the 
power of the human intellect;”157 otherwise, the human intellect would not be seeing 
God; rather, God would be seeing himself.158 Thus, the Divine Essence comes to be 
present in the human intellect as a form that actualizes the human intellect so that the 
human intellect is capable of seeing God.
Summary, Comments and Critique of Aquinas
It is more than a bit remarkable how prolific a writer Aquinas was in his short life 
time. Without a doubt, Aquinas was also a prolific reader. He was intimately aware of the 
epistemological solutions that had been proposed to resolve the Aristotelian aporia. This 
awareness stems  in part from Averroes’s Long Commentary as Aquinas himself 
attests.159  Aquinas is well aware that many of his predecessors understood that the 
propositions “the soul is the form of the body” and “the soul is a spiritual substance” as 
contradictory. He is also aware that many of his Aristotelian predecessors had understood 
Aristotle in such a manner that would allow intellection to be inherent in the individual 
human as evident from his treatment in Summa contra gentiles chapters 56 - 70. From 
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intellectus abstrahit a rebus compositis, ut dicebat prima opinio, nequa aliqua impressio 
relicta a a substantia separata in intellectu nostro, ut dicebat secunda, set est ipsa 
substantia separata que coniungitur intellectui nostro ut forma, ut ipsa sit quod hic 
intelligitur et qua intelligitur. [emphasis added].  See Taylor, “Taylor Beatific Vision,” p. 
19.
157. Taylor, “Taylor Beatific Vision,” p. 20.
158. Ibid.
159. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, Response: Una est Themistii et 
Theophrasti, ut Commentator eis imponit in 3 de anima. 
Aquinas’s vantage point, Avicenna and Averroes and their predecessors had all lapsed 
into some form of Platonism, for as soon as one accepts that intelligibles in act are 
objects of intellection existing in act, it follows that there is no longer a need for a true 
abstraction from intelligibles in potency. In an attempt to avoid the problems found in 
Averroes and in Avicenna, Aquinas asserts that the soul is both the form of the body and 
a spiritual substance. However, in order to do so, he needs to reformulate hylomorphism 
in a manner that was inconceivable to his predecessors; he needs to reformulate the form-
matter relationship in such a way that it is asymmetric. That is to say, as I would put it, 
the entire soul is present to the body (i.e., the matter), but the entire body (i.e., the matter) 
is not present to the soul. By doing so, he allows for the possibility of intellection in 
humans.
Nevertheless, in the same manner that Avicenna and Averroes come to an 
impasse in reconciling a material body and an immaterial intellect, Aquinas too runs into 
the same impasse. In order to bridge the gap, he must affirm a power that is able to 
transfer the ratio in the phantasm to an immaterial intellect, and this transfer of ratio is 
evident in the work of Averroes. In addition, Aquinas needs a vehicle that allows for the 
transfer of the ratio, the intelligible species. Thus, given his new form of hylomorphism4, 
Aquinas must affirm intelligible species to bridge the gap. Following Avicenna who 
makes abstractions4 the means of cognition for beholding abstraction5 (i.e., the 
intelligibles in act in the Agent Intellect), Aquinas makes intelligible species the means of 
cognition for beholding the natures in things from the world. Moreover, in a way 
different from that of his predecessors who asserted that intelligibles in act are the objects 
of knowledge, Aquinas asserts that intelligible species are that through which we know 
the nature of a particular thing existing in the world. In other words, intelligible species 
are used to convey the ratio of a thing in the world to the human intellect. Intelligible 
species are not what is known (except reflexively), but that by which one knows. The 
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ratio that is made present to the human intellect is formally identical in terms of its 
intelligible content with the nature of the thing existing in the world. It is not formally 
identical in terms of its ontological status, for in the world the form in particular existents 
are substantial forms, whereas in the possible intellect the intelligible species are 
accidents inhering in immaterial intellects. Moreover, by making the intelligible species a 
vehicle through which one knows, Aquinas avoids the charge that one is knowing 
intelligible species; by making phantasms a medium of cognition (as opposed to an object 
of cognition), Aquinas avoids the charge that one is knowing phantasms. Hence, Aquinas 
is asserting that we know things in two ways: as particulars and as universals. 
Universality is not a property that is affixed to an intelligible object as if there were some 
mental object to which the property of universality is attached.  Instead, Aquinas can say 
that an essence in se is neither universal nor particular and that universality is a 
characteristic of essences as in the mind when compared to reality. Were one to reify 
universals as intelligible objects in the mind, one would be left knowing universals in the 
possible intellect and not in extra-mental reality. The mature Aquinas gives an account 
that tries to explain how we know things directly by means of distinct intelligible species 
in the mind that communicate the rationes in things. It is easy to see why Aquinas might 
be misunderstood as a substance dualist, for as was stated earlier, a subject is anything 
capable of receiving some type of form.160 Thus, the eye is the subject of sensible 
species; the imagination is the subject of phantasms; the intellect is the subject of 
intelligible species. One can easily misunderstand Aquinas to hold a dualist position, but 
this would be based on an equivocation on the term “subject.” For Aquinas, there are 
multiple subjects if one is referring to the different passive powers (albeit material or 
immaterial) able to receive forms. However, if one is referring to the hylomorphic entity4 
that is knowing, there is only one subject, one knower who is hylomorphically4 composed 
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160. See note 74 on page 67.
in such a manner that allows that one subject to know both particulars and universals.
Chapter Summary
By analyzing Avicenna’s and Averroes’ solution to the Aristotelian aporia, 
Aquinas sees that grabbing either horn of the Aristotelian aporia prevents a hylomorphic 
entity from being the subject of intelligibles. Agreeing with Avicenna, Averroes and the 
tradition, Aquinas knows that the subject of intelligibles must be a spiritual subject, yet 
he needs to make the intellection inherent to each person’s substantial form, which is the 
form of the body. By reformulating hylomorphism4, Aquinas is able to grab both horns of 
the dilemma to resolve the aporia. Along with the benefits inherent in each view (e.g., 
spiritual substance and form of the body), Aquinas nevertheless  inherits the weakness 
inherent in both views. That is to say, he inherits the ontological gap between the 
material world and the immaterial world. In order to overcome that gap, Aquinas needs 
two mechanisms. First, he needs to transfer the intention in the imagination from a 
material to an immaterial mode of being in the same manner that Averroes did. He also 
needs to affirm two subjects capable of receiving the intention under both modalities: the 
imagination and the possible intellect. However, unlike Averroes who has two 
ontologically separated substances, Aquinas has two ontologically distinct subjects that 
are found in a hylomorphic4 entity. In addition, properly speaking there is only one 
subject of knowing, the hylomorphic4 entity. From Avicenna, Aquinas derives that it is 
the nature of things that are being known. For one may consider the intelligible species 
ontologically, in which case it is an accident inhering in the possible intellect. One may 
also consider the intelligible species epistemologically, in which case it conveys the 
nature of things existing in extra-mental reality. Thus in natural knowing, one sees that 
Aquinas analyzes and synthesizes the views of his predecessors to make intellection 
inherent in the individual hylomorphic4 entity, and this feat was something that none of 
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his predecessors satisfactorily achieved. Not only does Aquinas learn from Avicenna and 
Averroes to develop his doctrine of intelligible species, but he relies upon Avicenna’s 
epistemology to account for prophecy, and he relies upon Averroes’ epistemology to 
account for the beatific vision. In light of what has been stated in chapters 2, 3, and 4, let 
us examine the issues raised in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Introduction 
As stated earlier, the primary objective of this dissertation is to show how and 
why intelligible species are necessary to Aquinas’s epistemology. In order to demonstrate 
what gave rise to intelligible species,  one must  go back to Plato who framed the debate 
as to what constituted knowing. For Plato, the subject and object of knowledge must both 
be immaterial, for matter is an impediment to knowing. As a result, the subjects of 
knowledge are the immaterial human souls, and the objects of knowledge are the 
immaterial, unchanging forms. Yet, the unchanging forms are not the only objects of 
knowledge; human souls are also objects of knowledge inasmuch as they are immaterial. 
Thus, one finds that among the intelligibles only human souls are both intelligible and 
intelligizing. So, for Plato, two different realms exist, the realm of being and the realm of 
becoming. The realm of being contains entities that are immaterial, simple, immutable, 
and intelligible (i.e., it contains the forms and human souls). On the other hand, the realm 
of becoming contains entities that are material, complex, mutable, and unintelligible (i.e., 
it contains natural bodies). Having divided the material (i.e., unintelligible) from the 
immaterial (i.e., the intelligible), Plato has framed the debate on what constitutes 
knowing in a fashion that precludes knowledge from arising from the natural world.
For an empiricist like Aristotle, if there is going to be knowledge, it must be 
derived from the material things in the world. Thus, Aristotle denies the existence of the 
forms, which serve as the metaphysical basis for being and knowing in Plato’s system. 
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Having denied the existence of the immutable, intelligible forms, Aristotle must find how 
material entities that are mutable and unintelligible can give rise to universal and 
necessary knowledge. That is to say, Aristotle must find an ontological basis for 
knowledge which must be immutable, necessary and universal. By revamping Platonic 
forms in such a fashion that they are multiplied and essentially inherent in matter, 
Aristotle finds the ontological basis that he needs for immutable, necessary and universal 
knowledge. The substantial form in the hylomorphic1 composite becomes the ontological 
basis for knowledge.
Having set forth his understanding of the ontological basis for knowledge, 
Aristotle faces two challenges: (1) separating the substantial form so that it becomes 
intelligible, and (2) finding a subject suitable for the reception of intelligible forms. 
Concerning the first challenge, Aristotle uses the analogy of a rout during a battle. The 
problem with the analogy is that it tells us that universals come to rest in the soul, but it 
does not tell us how.1 In the De anima, it was seen that in order for intellection to occur, 
there must be an active component that functions as does light in accord with Aristotelian 
conception of light. This active component of mind is separable, unmixed, and is 
essentially an activity, and it alone is immortal and everlasting. It is intelligible and 
intelligizing, and it is able to think itself. Without the active component, nothing is able 
to think. However, the active component is only one necessary aspect for thinking to 
occur, for the images in the imagination, which were communicated via the senses, are 
also necessary for thinking to occur. Aristotle does not provide sufficient detail 
describing the process, but he mentions that the objects of thoughts are found in sensible 
forms. By means of the active component, somehow the objects of thought are made 
visible by the light or intelligibility of the agent intellect. Yet, there is enough ambiguity 
in his text to allow various interpretations concerning the active component. It is unclear 
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whether the active component is acting upon the imagination or even whether the active 
component lacks intelligible content (because Aristotle does say that the active 
component is able to think itself). Its ability to think itself results from the fact that the 
active component is immaterial; hence, it is per se intelligible. On the other hand, it may 
be able to think itself because it contains intelligible content. Having affirmed an active 
component that is able to separate the substantial form so as to make it intelligible, 
Aristotle faces his second challenge: finding a suitable subject for the reception of 
intelligible forms.
For Aristotle, the subject suitable for the reception of intelligibles must be 
unmixed with the body, for if the subject were mixed with a body, then the intelligible 
forms would be particularized, rendering them unintelligible. Instead, they would be 
received as a quality or quantity into the body. Consequently, there must be an 
immaterial component of mind that is receptive of intelligible forms. However, the 
assertion that the active and passive components of the mind must be unmixed with the 
body presents a grave problem for Aristotle, for according to him, all natural bodies are 
hylomorphic1 entities in which the soul is the form of the body. Moreover, given that 
neither matter nor form alone are sufficient conditions to perform any operation, one 
finds that matter and form (i.e., the soul) constitute a sufficient condition for any 
operations of a hylomorphic1 being. Yet, Aristotle states that intellection happens without 
the use of a corporeal organ. Thus, Aristotle’s hylomorphism1 apparently precludes the 
active and passive components of mind from residing in the soul if the soul is the form of 
the body. Consequently, either the soul is a spiritual substance but not the form of the 
body (Avicenna’s position), or the soul is not a spiritual substance and it is the form of 
the body (Averroes’ position). In either case, intellection cannot occur in a hylomorphic 
body. This is the Aristotelian aporia.
 199 
  
The secondary objective of this dissertation was to show that Aquinas drew 
deeply on Avicenna and Averroes to develop his natural and super-natural 
epistemologies. Let me summarize Avicenna’s and Averroes’ theories, and highlight the 
contributions to Aquinas’s position. Avicenna goes to great lengths to ensure that the 
soul is a spiritual substance that is not immersed in matter.2 By reformulating 
hylomorphism2 so that the form of corporeity is form of the body, Avicenna is able 
safeguard the immortality of the human soul and receptivity of intelligibles (i.e., 
abstractions4) into the soul.3 Moreover, in Avicenna, one sees that intentional forms 
become more “immaterial” as they proceed from the sensed object through the 
imagination.4 The increasing immateriality is not due primarily to the ontological status 
of the intentional form, but to its independence from matter. However, given the 
ontological chasm between two incommensurate substances, the hylomorphic2 body and 
the spiritual soul, there appears no way to bridge the chasm. So Avicenna affirms an 
immaterial entity, the Agent Intellect which is replete with intelligible forms (i.e., 
abstractions5). Each abstraction5 is its own species; therefore, it cannot be multiplied 
because there is no principle of individuation (e.g., matter) in the Agent Intellect. 
Nonetheless, Avicenna asserts that abstractions4 flow from the Agent Intellect to the 
individual souls in order that the intelligible forms (abstractions5) in the Agent Intellect 
are made present to the soul. It is by means of abstraction4 that abstraction5 is made 
present to the intellect. In other words, abstraction4 is not that which is known, but that 
through which abstraction5 is known.5 By means of abstraction4, Avicenna is able to 
multiply the appearance of the intelligibles (i.e., abstraction5) to multiple souls while 
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2. See note 47 on page 145.  See pages 72 - 77.
3. See note 43 on page 90.  See note 48 on page 93.
4. See pages 81 - 86.
5. See pages 90 - 92.
simultaneously avoiding multiplying intelligibles (i.e., abstraction5). Ultimately, 
however, intelligibles (i.e., abstraction5) are only ontologically present in the Agent 
Intellect, and if intellection is the reception of an intelligible form (i.e., abstraction5) into 
the soul, then properly speaking, only the Agent Intellect knows. Also, Avicenna 
establishes formal identity between the knowner and the know by means of two 
mechanisms, formal causality and common nature. Formal causality ensures that the 
effect (abstaction4) is like its cause (abstraction5), the intelligibles in the Agent Intellect, 
and formal causality ensures that the intentional forms in the body are like their cause, 
the hylomorphic entities in the world. However, given the ontological gap between the 
body and soul, Avicenna’s doctrine of common nature establishes the formal identity 
between the sensible world and the intelligible world by allowing Avicenna to maintain 
that regardless of the mode of being, there is a common nature that provides formal 
identity between sensible, imaginable, and intelligible forms.
Averroes, unlike Avicenna, made no attempt to reformulate hylomorphism1; he 
follows the tradition, so the soul is the form of the body, not a spiritual substance. Given 
that intelligibles can only be received into a spiritual substance, the body cannot be a 
subject of intelligibles for Averroes.6 Like Avicenna, intentional forms become more 
immaterial (i.e., more spiritual) as they are propagated from the object through the senses 
and into the imagination. Given that the images in the imagination are only potentially 
intelligible and given that there cannot be an active spiritual component and a receptive 
spiritual component in a hylomorphic1 being, Averroes must affirm two separated, 
spiritual substances: the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect. Averroes’ Agent 
Intellect has no passive potency, for its being and its activity are one and the same, and it 
is not able to understand anything from the material world. Furthermore, Averroes’ 
Agent Intellect contains none of the intelligibles that are impressed on the Material 
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Intellect, for if it did the senses and the imagination would not be necessary.7 The role of 
the Agent Intellect is to transfer the ratio contained in the images in the imagination 
from one mode of being (i.e., material) to another mode of being (i.e., immaterial). The 
transfer of the  ratio is not the moving of the ratio from one place to another, for the ratio 
in the imagination is numerically distinct from the ratio in the Material Intellect. The 
ratio in the imagination is only intelligible in potency, whereas the ratio in the intellect is 
actually intelligible.8 Averroes affirms that if intelligibles in act existed outside of the 
soul, there would be no reason to affirm an Agent Intellect.9 In addition, the Agent 
Intellect has no receptivity.10 Unlike all the other existents in an Aristotelian framework, 
the Material Intellect is neither form, nor matter, nor a composite of form and matter. Its 
being is unlike any other existent, for although it is an intellect, it has receptivity (i.e., 
passive potency). When intelligibles are abstracted and impressed by the Agent Intellect, 
the Material Intellect confers a universal mode of being on the intelligibles because it 
itself is universal in its mode of being.11 In other words, universality is not conferred by 
comparing the intelligible to the particulars; rather, since a thing is received according to 
the mode of the recipient, and the Material Intellect has a universal mode of being, then 
intelligibles become universal just by being received into the Material Intellect. 
Consequently, neither the Agent Intellect nor the Material Intellect are inherent in the 
substantial form of any hylomorphic1 being; it is not surprising, then, that Aquinas would 
hold that according to the reasoning of Averroes a particular human being is rational per 
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8. See note 109 on page 112.
9. See note 110 on page 112.
10. See note 102 on page 110.
11. See page 116.
accidens, not per se. Nevertheless, Averroes himself maintains that the Agent Intellect is 
“form for us,” and our “final form.”12 In other words, Averroes is asserting that in some 
substantial manner, the Agent Intellect is present in the individual human. Having briefly 
reviewed and highlighted the contributions made by Avicenna and Averroes, I shall now 
examine their contributions to Aquinas.
Avicenna’s and Averroes’ Contributions to Aquinas’s Natural and Super-Natural 
Epistemologies
As stated earlier, Aquinas is well aware of the two solutions.13 He is aware that 
Avicenna made the subject of intelligibles a spiritual substance ontologically separate 
from the body, and he is aware that Averroes has made the soul the form of the body. 
Neither solution is able to make intellection inherent in a hylomorphic being (i.e., 
hylomorphic1 or hylomorphic2). Nevertheless, from Avicenna, Aquinas accepts the 
notion that the soul is a spiritual substance that is not immersed in matter, and he 
reformulates what it means for the soul not to be immersed in matter. Whereas for 
Avicenna, “not immersed in matter” meant ontologically separate, for Aquinas “not 
immersed in matter” means transcending matter as a spiritual substance, but not 
ontologically separate from matter. From Averroes, he learns that he cannot have two 
ontologically separate subjects, and so the passive and receptive powers can only be 
inherent in humans if the soul is the form of the body. Thus, by affirming that the soul is 
a spiritual substance not immersed in matter and by affirming that the soul is the form of 
the body, Aquinas is able to make intellection inherent in humans. Moreover, by 
affirming the soul is a spiritual substance, he is able to safeguard the Catholic doctrine 
concerning the immortality of the soul. And so by analyzing and synthesizing Avicenna’s 
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and Averroes’ positions, he is able to reformulate hylomorphism4 so that the active and 
receptive components of intellection inhere as powers of the soul.
Except for his reformulation of hylomorphism4, for the most part, Aquinas 
follows Avicenna and Averroes inasmuch as he agrees that intentional forms, which 
Aquinas calls species, are propagated from physical objects to the senses and to the 
imagination. He also agrees that intentional forms are most material as they are emitted 
from physical objects and that they are least material in the imagination. Nevertheless, as 
for Averroes and Avicenna, there is an ontological chasm between the imagination and 
receptive component of the intellect, for nothing material can affect an immaterial 
substance.
Following in the steps of Averroes, Aquinas’s agent intellect does not contain any 
intentions. Furthermore, the agent intellect’s primary role is to transfer the ratio from one 
subject, the imagination, to another subject, the possible intellect. Given that the 
imagination has a material mode of being and given that the possible intellect has an 
immaterial mode of being, the agent intellect is responsible for transferring the ratio from 
one mode of being to another mode of being, just as Averroes had stated.14 However, 
instead of having two ontologically separate subjects as for Averroes, Aquinas has two 
ontologically distinct subjects (i.e., the imagination and the possible intellect) in one 
hylomorphically4 united entity who is the subject of intellection and knows particulars 
and universals.15 Aquinas, however, parts company with Averroes because Averroes’ 
abstraction gives rise to intelligibles in act in the Material Intellect which are the object 
of knowledge for Averroes. In contradistinction, Aquinas’s abstraction gives rise to an 
intelligible species, which is that through which one knows, not that which one knows. In 
other words, Aquinas’s intelligible species is functioning similar to Avicenna’s 
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abstraction4 inasmuch as it directs intellection to something other than itself.16 However, 
whereas Avicenna’s abstractions4 directed one to intelligibles in act (i.e., abstraction5) in 
the Agent Intellect, Aquinas’s intelligible species direct one to the natures that exist in 
hylomorphic entities (hylomorphic3 and hylomorphic4) of the world. In a manner similar 
to Averroes, Aquinas holds for a genuine abstraction of intelligibles from the intelligibles 
in potency present in the intentions apprehended through sensation and grounded in the 
things of the world. The intelligible species performs this function by moving the 
possible intellect from potency to actuality and by specifying and determining the 
possible intellect with the ratio that was transferred from the imagination. Aquinas 
follows the account of Averroes, though he rejects Averroes's notion of unique separate 
intellects shared by all human knowers. After the possible intellect has been specified and 
determined, by means of the intelligible species, one is aware of the nature that has been 
conveyed by means of the ratio. Aquinas accepts Avicenna’s notion of common nature. 
The fact that the common nature in itself  is indifferent to its mode of being (e.g., in a 
particular existent, in the imagination, and in the human soul) serves as the ontological 
basis for universals. By comparing the abstracted nature to all the particulars, the intellect 
becomes aware that the abstracted nature is common to all the particulars and recognizes 
that the abstracted nature is universal, just as Avicenna had stated.17
In addition to providing a context and the material components from which 
Aquinas would draw  his natural epistemology, the accounts of Averroes and Avicenna 
also served as the basis for Aquinas’s supernatural epistemology. Aquinas is clear that if 
the formal content is derived from something that is beyond human nature, or if an 
operation is performed only by a supernatural agent, then that operation is supernatural or 
miraculous. When it comes to prophecy, Aquinas says that prophecy happens in the 
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manner that Avicenna had said concerning the Agent Intellect. Furthermore, when it 
comes to the beatific vision, Aquinas says that no intelligible species is adequate for 
seeing God. Instead, God raises our powers and becomes that which we know and that 
through which we know.18 That is to say, God becomes “form for us” as Averroes had 
stated concerning the Agent Intellect. Having addressed my secondary objective, I now 
turn to my third objective, the critical analysis of direct realist and representationalist 
positions in light of the foregoing account of the sources and nature of the teaching of 
Aquinas on intelligible species.
Response to the Representationalists and the Direct Realists
The analysis that follows requires two important distinctions. First, in The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd Edition under the article entitled direct realism, 
we find the following:
The theory that perceiving is epistemically direct, unmediated by conscious or 
unconscious inference. Direct realism is distinguished, on the one hand, from 
indirect, or representative, realism, the view that perceptual awareness of material 
objects is mediated by an awareness of sensory representations, and on the other 
hand, from forms of phenomenalism that identify material objects with states of 
mind. It might be thought that direct realism is incompatible with causal theories 
of perception. Such theories invoke causal chains leading from objects perceived 
(causes) to perceptual states of perceivers (effects). Since effects must be distinct 
from causes, the relation between an instance of perceiving and an object 
perceived, it would seem, cannot be direct. This, however, confuses epistemic 
directness with causal directness. A direct realist need only be committed to the 
former.19
One must make a distinction between epistemic directness and causal directness. If direct 
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18. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 4, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ra 15:  In visione igitur patriae non erit 
tertium medium, ut scilicet deus per species aliorum cognoscatur, sicut nunc cognoscitur, 
ratione cujus dicimur nunc videre in speculo; nec erit ibi secundum medium, quia ipsa 
essentia divina erit qua intellectus noster videbit deum, ut ex dictis patet; sed erit ibi 
tantum primum medium, quod elevabit intellectum nostrum ad hoc quod possit conjungi 
essentiae increatae modo praedicto. Sed ab hoc medio non dicitur cognitio mediata, quia 
non cadit inter cognoscentem et rem cognitam, sed est illud quod dat cognoscenti vim 
cognoscendi. 
19. Heil, “Direct Realism,” p. 237. [Emphasis Added]
realism can only be defined as causal directness, then by definition, there can be no direct 
realism for the materialist or for those who believe in material and immaterial entities. 
The materialist cannot be a direct realist because retinal images, electrical impulses via 
the optic nerve, the firing of synapses, and a litany of other biochemical reactions serve 
as causal intermediaries between extra-mental objects and the portion of the brain that is 
cognizant of the extra-mental object. Similarly, the epistemologies of Avicenna, 
Averroes, and Aquinas would have to be discounted as well because of the various 
intermediary intentions inherent in their systems. It would seem that only Plato could be 
a direct realist inasmuch as the immaterial soul is beholding immaterial forms. Yet, it 
would seem to be the case that those who hold that direct realism can only be defined as 
causal directness may be committing the redefinist fallacy. For they have not proven 
their position, but rather merely defined it.20 Unless some argument is given why 
epistemic directness is impossible, then one may still coherently hold to direct realism 
while denying causal directness.
The denial of causal directness implies that there are intermediaries between the 
knower and the known. Depending on how one defines “intermediary,” the epistemic 
directness position may be incoherent or coherent. If one defines “intermediary” as an 
object of cognition (i.e., that which is known), then the epistemic directness position is 
incoherent because what is being known is the object of cognition, not the thing in itself. 
If, on the other hand, one defines “intermediary” as the means of cognition (i.e., that 
through which something is known), then the position is coherent. In Aquinas’s 
epistemology, the sensible species21 and the intelligible species are not that which are 
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20. James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George S. Pappas, Philosophical 
Problems and Arguments (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), p. 25.
21. See note 118 on page 173.
known, but that through which one knows.22 Furthermore, the phantasm is not an object 
of cognition but a medium (i.e., a means) of cognition.23 Whether or not the concept 
precludes epistemic directness, depends on what aspect of the concept one focuses on, for 
Aquinas writes:
[The] concept of the intellect is a medium between the intellect and the 
understood thing [i.e., thing existing in extra-mental reality] because through [ the 
concept’s] mediation the operation of the intellect extends to the thing [existing in 
extra-mental reality]. For this reason, the concept of the intellect is not only that 
which is understood, but also that by which the thing is understood. In this way, 
that which is understood can be called both the thing itself and the concept 
belonging to the intellect. Similarly, what is said can be called both the thing 
which is meant by the word and the word itself.24
If the concept were solely that which is understood, then Aquinas’s position would be 
incompatible with epistemic directness. However, Aquinas tells us that the concept is 
also that by which the thing [existing in extra-mental reality] is understood. 
Consequently, Aquinas’s position is consonant with “epistemic directness direct 
realism.”  Let us revisit the issues raised in chapter one now that we have made the 
distinction between causal directness and epistemic directness.
For Klima, the intelligible species is what is ontologically present to the intellect, 
and by virtue of the intelligible species, the common nature is represented in the 
intellect.25  If one looks at the ontological status of the intelligible species as the basis for 
determining whether Aquinas is a representationalist, then Aquinas is a 
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22. See note 119 on page 174.
23. See note 116 on page 172.
24. Aquinas, QDVer, p. 124: [C]onceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et 
rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem. Et ideo conceptio 
intellectus non solum est id quod intellectum est, sed etiam id quo res intelligitur; ut sic 
id quod intelligitur, possit dici et res ipsa, et conceptio intellectus; et similiter id quod 
dicitur, potest dici et res quae dicitur per verbum, et verbum ipsum.[emphasis added]
In Aquinas’s mature works, he no longer states that the concept is that which is 
understood “id quod intellectum est.” 
25. See note 13 on page 6.
representationalist because the intelligible species is ontologically distinct from the 
nature that exists in a hylomorphic entity. In other words, the nature of the hylomorphic 
entity arises as a result of its substantial form, but in the intellect, the intelligible species 
is only an accident inhering in an immaterial substance. Given that the substantial form 
and an accident are not ontologically the same, then the intelligible species must be some 
kind of representation that serves as an intermediary. However, one must recall that 
following Avicenna, Aquinas stated that the understood thing is able to be considered 
either ontologically or epistemologically.26 Thus, one may still be a direct realist while 
denying causal directness. One may maintain epistemic directness, and thus, the intellect 
is directly aware of the nature of the thing, the intelligible intention that was abstracted 
from the particular, for it is the nature that was conveyed by means of the intelligible 
species. Consequently, one need not conclude with Klima that Aquinas is a 
representationalist, for one need not subscribe to the notion of causal directness to 
maintain a direct realist position.
Similarly, I take issue with Pasnau on several counts. First, Pasnau affirmed that 
for Aquinas, the immediate objects of cognitive apprehension are our internal 
impressions.27 However, it was shown that for Aquinas, the immediate objects of 
cognitive apprehensions are not our internal impressions.28 Second, Pasnau stated that 
formal identity does not help Aquinas get from our ideas and impressions to the external 
world, and he is correct. However, Aquinas is concerned with the knowing of extra-
mental reality, and his natural epistemology gives an account of how this is possible. 
Aquinas is not concerned with starting with thoughts and impressions and trying to get to 
extra-mental reality, for there is an asymmetric relationship between the known and the 
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28. See pages 207 thru 208.
knower. That is to say, the knower is dependent on the known, but the known is not 
dependent on the knower.29 Those who begin with thought generally end up with some 
sort of solipsism unable to bridge the gap between thought and extra-mental reality. One 
sees an example of this kind of solipsism  in Descartes’s thinking substance. Descartes 
relies on the idea of God and the idea of the beneficence of God in order to bridge the gap 
between thought and things. Similarly, in Kant, the gulf between the phenomena and the 
noumena cannot be bridged because ultimately the subject of intellection is limited to his 
or her thoughts or perceptions. Thus, positions like Bishop Berkeley’s are logical 
conclusions when one begins solely with thought. Third, Pasnau asserts that Aquinas’s 
natural epistemology is following Augustine in some form of divine illumination. Yet, 
Aquinas follows Averroes, for both affirm that there are no intentions in the agent 
intellect, and the agent intellect has no receptivity.30 Consequently, although the agent 
intellect is a light that participates in the First Light for Aquinas, nevertheless, the agent 
intellect does not do so by means of its formal content because it does not contain any 
intentions nor is it able to receive any intentions. Fourth, given that the possible intellect 
is initially a blank slate in which nothing is written, it is not the case that the agent 
intellect or the possible intellect can contain any innate intentions.31 Pasnau’s 
interpretation of Aquinas would be more plausible if he were alluding to Aquinas’s 
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29. Aquinas, QDVer, Q. 21, A. 1, Response: Illa autem relatio, secundum 
philosophum in V metaph., invenitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri 
id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam 
dependentia sit, sicut patet in Scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet 
a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile, est realis; 
relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum: dicitur enim scibile 
relatum, secundum philosophum, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud referatur ad 
ipsum.
30. See note 102 on page 110  and  note 103 on page 110 for Averroes.  cf: notes 
105  and  106  on page 167 for Aquinas.
31. See note 121 on page 175.
supernatural epistemology. This response to Pasnau suffices to respond to Houston 
Smit’s understanding of Aquinas because he also maintains that the formal content of 
intellect is given by God to the human intellect, so I turn now to Claude Pannacio.
Claude Pannacio is correct that neither the intelligible species nor the concept is 
the nature of the thing existing in reality.32 However, by means of the intelligible species 
and by means of the concept, the intellect is directly aware of the nature that has been 
abstracted from the hylomorphic entity. It has been shown already that Aquinas does not 
maintain causal directness; rather, he maintains epistemic directness. Pannacio’s 
objection holds true if and only if the sensible species, phantasm, the intelligible species, 
and the concept were solely objects of cognition, but it has been demonstrated that these 
are means of cognitions, not objects of cognition.33 Thus, it is still possible to assert that 
Aquinas is a direct realist inasmuch as he affirms epistemic directness.
Last, but certainly not least, Fernand van Steenberghen states that the intellect 
does not have direct knowledge of singulars because signate matter is not intelligible to 
us. However, we are able to attain to the singular by returning to cerebral images. Van 
Steenberghen is correct that the intellect does not have direct causal access to extra-
mental reality, for it is impossible to go directly from a wholly material mode of being to 
a wholly immaterial mode of being without going through varying degrees of 
abstractions and immateriality.34 He is also correct that the intellect cannot grasp a 
hylomorphic entity directly because the hylomorphic entity’s matter renders it 
unintelligible.35 Yet, one does not need to maintain his conclusion that Aquinas is a 
representationslist because the species, phantasm, and concepts are means of cognitions. 
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33. See pages 207 thru 208.
34. See note 78 on page 156.
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In other words, there is epistemic directness although there is not causal directness. 
Having dealt with the representationalist objections that were raised in chapter one, let us 
turn to the direct realists.36
For Owens, human cognition is directed toward real existents, yet he says that 
“The concept is produced as a similitude of the things in order that the thing itself may be 
known in and through it.”37 Owens’ understanding of the concept is consonant with what 
Aquinas stated.38 Inasmuch as the concept is ontologically present in the intellect, it is 
that which is known, but inasmuch as it conveys the ratio from the intelligible species, it 
is that through which the nature of the thing is known. In other words, the concept may 
be treated as an object of cognition or a means of cognition. Considered ontologically, it 
is an object of cognition; considered epistemologically, it is a means of cognition. For 
Owens, the concept is a vehicle that is used to store and recall the intelligible content to 
the intellect. Owens seems to avoid the charge of representationalism by holding to 
epistemic directness, as is evident in the imperfect examples that he gives.39 Stump’s 
critique stating that Owens wants to deny any kind of intermediary seems to be 
unwarranted because he does not deny that there are intermediaries. He only denies that 
they are primarily objects of cognition. Notwithstanding, Stump is correct that Aquinas is 
a direct realist even though he uses intermediaries.
As we have seen, the agent intellect produces an intelligible species that serves as 
a vehicle in order to convey an intention from a material mode of being to an immaterial 
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36. All of the direct realists except for O’Callaghan will affirm that the concept 
has some type of ontological status,  and thus, I will assume that their reading of Aquinas 
is correct.  I will address the ontological status of the concept when I examine 
O’Callaghan’s view.
37. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 243.
38. See note 24 on page 208.
39. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 244.
mode of being. Ontologically speaking, the intention in the imagination is numerically 
distinct from the intention in the possible intellect, and both these intentions are 
numerically distinct from the substantial form in a hylomorphic entity. Furthermore, there 
is no “mode of species” in Aquinas’s corpus; the substantial form is the most material, 
whereas the intelligible species is the most spiritual (i.e., immaterial).40 Consequently, 
Gilson is mistaken when he denies that the extra-mental object has one mode of being 
and the species has another mode of being and when he asserts that it is the very object 
under the “mode of species.”41
Kenny asserts that there are no intermediaries, and if by intermediaries he means 
objects that must first be cognized, then Kenny is correct. However, if intermediaries are 
vehicles that communicate the intentions from the object to the intellect, then Kenny is 
mistaken that there are no intermediaries. Once again, ontologically there are many 
intermediaries, but epistemologically there are no intermediaries if one treats the concept 
as that by which one knows.
For Kretzman, the key to understanding Aquinas’s direct realism is found in the 
proper understanding of the role of the phantasm and the intelligible species. That is to 
say, one needs to understand that the intelligible species and the phantasms are means of 
cognitions. As was seen, both are means of cognition.  Therefore, neither the phantasm or 
the intelligible species are impediments to epistemic direct realism. However, Kretzman 
affirms that the intellect forms concepts of external objects. Once again, concept 
formation can be looked at epistemologically or ontologically. Epistemologically, 
concept formation does not necessarily pose a problem for direct realism if the concept is 
not treated as the primary object of cognition.
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40. See note 78 on page 156.
41. Gilson does not explain what a mode of species is, but it seems to be some 
mode of existence that allows the same thing to exist simultaneously outside of the soul 
and in the intellect.  See page 17 note 39.
Unlike the other direct realists seen thus far, O’Callaghan takes a different 
strategy, and it is two-pronged. The first prong deals with the usage of in and extra in 
Aristotle and Aquinas. The second prong deals with the ontological status of concepts. 
O’Callaghan first shows the various ways that Aristotle uses in and extra, and he shows 
that these prepositions do not necessarily entail spatial connotations.42 After examining 
Aristotle’s usage, O’Callaghan turns his attention to Aquinas’s usage of these 
prepositions. O’Callaghan points out that in and extra are predicated of concept and res, 
but they should not be understood in a spatial sense; they should be understood in a form-
subject sense. Therefore, when an intelligible species is said to be in the intellect, it 
should be understood as an accident inhering in the intellect, but not in a spatial sense. 
O’Callaghan then refers to De ente et essentia to show that a nature can exist in anima or 
in singularibus (i.e., in hylomorphic entities). In a hylomorphic entity, the form does not 
exist in a spatial-sense but in an existential sense. Similarly, a nature existing in the soul 
is in the soul because one knows the nature. In other words, in and extra are modes of 
existence, not location. According to O’Callaghan, the basis for representationalism is 
that it presupposes that in and extra denote modes of locations when in fact, they denote 
modes of existence.43 Having established that in  and extra denote modes of being, 
O’Callaghan moves to the second prong of his strategy.
According to O’Callaghan, concepts are not a third thing interposed between the 
knower and the known. After citing a text from Summa theologiae that states that 
articulated sounds do not signify the intelligible species but rather that which the intellect 
forms for itself,44 O’Callaghan asserts that one is misreading Aquinas if one interprets the 
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42. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 164.
43. Ibid., p. 165.
44. See note 53 on page 21 .
concept as a third thing interposed between the knower and the known.45 According to 
O’Callaghan, Aquinas is engaged in a reflexive analytical study. Such a study 
distinguishes for separate consideration that which may not be separate in reality. If one 
were to map that which is separate in consideration to reality, one would commit the 
error of the Platonist that Aquinas had admonished.46  Thus, when one talks about the 
concept as a thing, one is objectifying the concept.47  In order to understand the concept 
correctly, one must understand that the concept is the informed activity of the intellect as 
it grasps res extra animam.48 The nominalization of a verb to a substantive is a way of 
reflectively talking about our activities; it is not a recognizing of a realm of things in 
addition to our activities.49 Similarly, an enunciation and a definition should not be 
thought as a third thing; rather, they should be thought of as immanent activities like 
conceiving and enunciating.50 However, the concept, the enunciation, and the definition 
are not the only things that can be mistaken for third things interposed between the 
knower and the known; the res in anima may also be seen as a third thing.51
According to O’Callaghan, Aquinas’s dictum that the intelligible in act is the 
intellect in act makes it appears that the res extra animam is converted into res in anima 
which is directly related to the act of understanding. However, O’Callaghan asserts that 
this is a misunderstanding of Aquinas because things outside the soul are only potentially 
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45. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 167.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 168.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 169.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 170.
intelligible, and in order to be rendered actually intelligible, it (res extra animam) must 
come to be known by some intellect. Furthermore, the intelligible in act is not a mental 
entity distinct from the act of the intellect, but it is the act of the intellect informed by the 
intelligible species.52 If one recognizes that the concept is related to the intellect as act is 
related to potency, then it does not make sense to treat the concept as a third thing.53 This 
is the case because act and potency are not two diverse things. Rather, only one thing 
arises when some form (i.e., act) is received into that which is in potency to receive the 
form.54 Thus, the intelligible in act is the same thing as the intellect actually 
understanding;55 the concept is not a res in anima distinct from the activity. The concept 
is the intellect’s act.56 Understanding that nominalization of activities is in play, 
O’Callaghan “see[s] no reason in the passage quoted earlier from the summa, or in 
general, why St. Thomas must be interpreted as holding that the acts of intellect produce 
mental entities, third things.”57
In principle, O’Callaghan’s approach is sound. He is correct that we nominalize 
actions into substantives. When a pitcher throws a ball and hits a batter, we say that it 
was bad throw. Yet, the subject complement is not some substantial thing; rather, it is an 
action that resulted in injury to the batter. Furthermore, the value of his approach can be 
seen in biblical hermeneutics. In Romans 7, St. Paul talks about “sin producing” and “sin 
deceiving,” and St. Paul actually states that it is not he who sins, but sin that dwells in 
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53. Ibid., p. 172.
54. Ibid., p. 172–73.
55. Ibid., p. 173.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 171.
him. The act of sinning has been nominalized into a substantive by St. Paul. Unless one 
recognizes the nominalization of actions, one ends up with interpretations that exculpate 
humans from any moral responsibilities. Notwithstanding, the question at hand is not 
whether such a principle is valid when interpreting a text, but whether it is valid to use 
this principle in interpreting Aquinas.
I have two concerns with O’Callaghan’s methodology. One is methodological and 
the other is textual. In terms of methodology, O’Callaghan mentions that Aquinas is 
engaged in a “reflective analytic study,” and such “an analytic study by its very nature 
distinguishes for separate consideration features that in reality may not be separate.” 
Failure to understand the nature of this analytic study would lead to “the error of the 
Platonist” who maps the mode of knowing back onto the reality known.”58 Thus, concept, 
definitions, and enunciations should not be treated as separate things; rather, they are 
activities. We err when we nominalize these verbs into substantives.59 
Yet, does Aquinas’s “reflective analytic study” only begin with intellection? Is it 
not the case that Aquinas’s account of sensation is also part of this “analytic study”? If 
so, then phantasms, sensible species and the like should not be treated as “third things.” 
Rather, if one is going to be consistent, one should interpret Aquinas as saying that there 
is only sensing and imagining. O’Callaghan “see[s] no reason... why St. Thomas must be 
interpreted as holding the acts of intellect produce mental entities, third things, when he 
speaks of the intellect ‘forming’ definitions or combinations and divisions.” Similarly, by 
extending that line of reasoning, one should be warranted in affirming: “I see no reason 
why St. Thomas must be interpreted as holding the acts of sensation produce phantasms.” 
Moreover, why affirm sensible species? Why not just affirm that sensible species are not 
third things, there is only sensing? Also, why affirm that phantasms exist in the 
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imagination? Why not just affirm that there is only imagining? In other words, why not 
apply this methodology consistently and get rid of all ontological intermediaries?
One objection against this “broad brush” approach may be that the senses are 
passive, and as such, if there were only sensing and imaging, there is no causal account 
as to what specified and determined the senses so that the sensible in act becomes the 
sense in act. Thus, one should not apply this approach to the senses. However, 
O’Callaghan tells us that “[o]nce one recognizes that the concept is related to the intellect 
as act to potency, it makes very little sense to treat intellect and concept as if the intellect 
is one thing and a concept another thing.”60 In other words, one should not consider the 
concept a thing, one should recognize that there is only conceiving. If one applies this 
approach to sensation, one may say that the sensible species is related to the sense organ 
as act to potency, so it makes little sense to treat the sensible species and the sense organ 
as if the sense organ is one thing and a sensible species another. In other words, there 
should be no reason that the sensible species should have an ontological status, and by 
extension, neither should the phantasm.  In other words, if one takes O’Callaghan’s 
method  to its logical conclusion, the formal causality that is necessary in Aquinas’s 
epistemology would be eliminated. In addition to the inconsistency of applying this 
methodology only to intellection (since sensation is also part of the “reflective analytical 
study”), there is also problem concerning the ontological status of the concept.
O’Callaghan is certainly correct to hold that act and potency are not diverse 
things.61 Nevertheless, the act-potency relation that we have seen in Avicenna, Averroes, 
and Aquinas all require some kind of form. In the case of hylomorphic beings, some kind 
of substantial form is related to matter in an act-potency relationship. In the case of some 
action (e.g., heating), there is the communication of a non-intentional form that was 
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related to the heated subject in an act-potency relationship. Similarly, in sensation and 
intellection, some kind of intentional form is related to its subject in an act-potency 
relationship. In those three scenarios, form has some kind of ontological status, and it 
must, for it is in act which is a principle of being in metaphysics. In Aquinas’s system, 
existence and form account for the actuality of anything. If the concept is in an act-
potency relationship with the intellect, then it is in act by virtue of its existence or by 
virtue of its form. In either case one must grant some kind of ontological status to the 
concept. On the other hand, if the concept has no ontological status (i.e., it is not a form, 
and it does not exist), then it cannot be related to the intellect in an act-potency 
relationship as O’Callaghan states.62 In addition to the ontological status of the concept, 
there seems to be some equivocation concerning intelligibles in act.
O’Callaghan affirms that the “intelligible in act is not a mental entity distinct 
from the act of the intellect, but rather is the act of the intellect informed by the 
intelligible species.”63 In a certain sense, O’Callaghan is correct, for Aquinas states “the 
possible intellect becomes in act through the intelligible species in act, and for this 
reason, the intellect in act is called the intelligible in act.”64 However, in another sense, 
O’Callaghan is mistaken because the intelligibles species is also called the intelligible in 
act, for it can be considered in itself, or it can be considered as it is received into the 
intellect. Considered in itself, the intelligible species is the intelligible in act because it is 
immaterial and has no vestiges of matter or the concrete conditions of matter. Hence, it is 
no longer potentially intelligible. Furthermore, Aquinas asserts that the agent intellect 
produces intelligibles in act, and we know that the product of the agent intellect is the 
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62. Ibid., p. 168, 172.
63. Ibid., p. 170.
64. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 78: [I]ntellectus possibilis fit actu per speciem 
intelligibilem actu; et hac ratione intellectus in actu dicitur ipsum intelligibile in actu.
intelligible species, not the concept. So, unless the agent intellect is producing two 
different products, the intelligible species and the intelligible in act are one and the 
same.65  That is to say, the intelligible in act, which is the intelligible species, is a mental 
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65. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 1, D. 35, Q. 1, RA 3:  [O]portet quod intelligibile in 
potentia fiat intelligibile in actu per hoc quod species ejus denudatur ab omnibus 
appenditiis materiae per virtutem intellectus agentis; et oportet quod haec species, quae 
est intellecta in actu, perficiat intellectum in potentia.  [emphasis added]
Aquinas, QDAnima, Q. 13, RA 20:  Ad vicesimum dicendum quod idem 
obiectum, scilicet intelligibile in actu, comparatur ad intellectum agentem ut factum ab 
eo;  
Aquinas, InDeAnima, Bk. 3, Ch. 3, p. 216:  Dicit ergo primo, quod intellectus 
possibilis est intelligibilis non per suam essentiam, sed per aliquam speciem 
intelligibilem, sicut et alia intelligibilia. Quod probat ex hoc, quod intellectum in actu et 
intelligens in actu, sunt unum, sicut et supra dixit, quod sensibile in actu et sensus in actu 
sunt unum. Est autem aliquod intelligibile in actu, per hoc quod est in actu a materia 
abstractum: sic enim supra dixit, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic sunt et 
quae sunt circa intellectum. Et ideo hic dicit, quod in his quae sunt sine materia.  
[emphasis added]
Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 3, Ch. 53: Et quia corporalis visio non completur nisi per 
lucem, ea quibus intellectualis visio perficitur, lucis nomen assumunt: unde et Aristoteles, 
in III de anima, intellectum agentem luci assimilat, ex eo quod intellectus agens facit 
intelligibilia in actu, sicut lux facit quodammodo visibilia actu.  [emphasis added]
Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, RA3: [S]pecies istae individuantur per 
individuationem intellectus; unde non perdunt esse intelligibile in actu.  [emphasis 
added]
Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 20, Q. 2, A. 2, RA. 2: Ad secundum dicendum, quod 
perfectio intellectus possibilis est per receptionem objecti sui, quod est species 
intelligibilis in actu.
Aquinas, InDeAnima, Bk. 3, D. 14, Q. 1, A. 1: non potest ex parte luminis in illa 
visione esse habitus quantum ad effectum lucis intellectualis, cujus est intelligibilia 
facere in actu: quia res immateriales secundum se sunt intelligibiles in actu.  [emphasis 
added]
Aquinas, InDeAnima, Bk. 4, D. 49, Q. 2, A. 1, RA10: Ad decimum dicendum, 
quod substantia separata a materia intelligit se et intelligit alia: et utroque modo potest 
verificari auctoritas inducta.Cum enim ipsa essentia substantiae separatae sit per 
seipsam intelligibilis in actu, eo quod est a materia separata.  [emphasis added]
Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 76: Praeterea. Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem 
quae formaliter in ipso est: unde Aristoteles, in II de anima, ostendit quod quo vivimus et 
sentimus, est forma et actus. Sed utraque actio, scilicet intellectus possibilis et intellectus 
agentis, convenit homini: homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente 
intelligibilia in actu.
Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 3, Ch. 84: Cum igitur intellectus noster non sit in potentia nisi 
entity distinct from the intellect. So if one uses intelligible in act1 to denote the 
intelligible species, and one uses intelligible in act2 to denote the act of intellect, one may 
say that the agent intellect produces an intelligible in act1 that is received into the 
possible intellect. Having received the intelligible in act1, the possible intellect is moved 
from potency to actuality and is specified and determined, which is the intelligible in 
act2.That is to say, intelligible in act1 is the formal cause that gives rise to intelligible in 
act2.
O’Callaghan also states, “To be rendered actually intelligible, it (res extra 
animam) must come to be known by some intellect.”66 Once again, in some sense, 
O’Callaghan is correct because for Aquinas, intelligibles in act can only exist in minds.67 
However, Aquinas also tells us that Plato did not have to affirm an agent intellect because 
Plato’s forms were already intelligibles in act and that which is intelligible in act is so by 
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ad intelligibilia in actu.  [emphasis added]
Aquinas, S.T., Ia Q. 79, A. 3, Response:  Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere 
intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen 
intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine 
materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid 
intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex 
quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua 
naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc 
quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit 
formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non 
sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas 
intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, 
nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur 
ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per 
abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi 
intellectum agentem. [emphasis added]
66. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 170.
67. See note 65 on page 150.
virtue of its immateriality.68 In other words, the reception of the intelligible act into the 
intellect does not render it actually intelligible for Plato and for Aristotle, properly 
speaking. Rather, the intelligible in act is rendered actually intelligible by virtue of its 
intrinsic and per se immateriality for Plato and by virtue of the act of the agent intellect 
making it immaterial on the common Aristotelian account. Once the intelligible in act is 
received into the possible intellect, the individual understands by virtue of his or her 
intellect.
In sum as it pertains to method, O’Callaghan reasons that concepts, enunciations, 
and intelligibles in act be understood as conceiving, enunciating, and understanding, 
respectively. Yet, he limits his methodology only to intellection. Given that sensation is 
also part of the “reflective analytical study” in which Aquinas is engaged, for consistency 
one should apply the same methodology to sensation. However, if one applies the same 
method to sensations, one would have to deny that there are sensible species and 
phantasms. Instead, one would have to affirm merely that sensing and imagining is 
occurring. Given that Aquinas affirms that the senses are passive, there would be no 
causal account that could tells us how the senses and the imagination are specified and 
determined. In an attempt to reduce the “intelligible in act” to an activity, O’Callaghan 
 222 
  
———————————
68. Aquinas, S.T., Ia  Q. 79, A. 3, Response: Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere 
intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen 
intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine 
materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid 
intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex 
quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua 
naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc 
quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit 
formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non 
sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas 
intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, 
nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur 
ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per 
abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi 
intellectum agentem. [emphasis added]
asserts the “intelligible in act” is an activity of the intellect, and it should not be treated as 
a third thing. Nevertheless, in Aquinas’s text, the intelligible in act can be understood as 
the act by which the intellect understands, or it may be understood as the intelligible 
species. It is by virtue of its immateriality that the intelligible in act is intelligible, not by 
its reception into the intellect. Thus, when one affirms that “the intelligible in act” is an 
operation, this operation of moving the intellect from potentially understanding to 
actually understanding is due to the intelligible in act which is none other than the 
intelligible species, “an accident of the intellect, existing ‘in’ it.”69 The operation is called 
“an intelligible in act” because it is by virtue of receiving an intelligible in act, the 
intelligible species, that the intellect is moved from potency to act. For the intelligible 
species is related to the intellect as act to potency.70 O’Callaghan also asserts that the 
concept is related to the intellect as act to potency. However, as we have seen, if the 
concept is related to the intellect as act to potency, it must have some ontological status 
by virtue of its existence or by virtue of its form. If it has no ontological status, it cannot 
be related to the intellect as act to potency. The notion that concept is related to the 
possible intellect as act to potency is not only a problem in terms of method, but it is also 
a problem textually.
O’Callaghan tells us to “[r]ecall that in St. Thomas a concept is the informed 
activity of the intellect as it grasps res extra animam.”71 Furthermore, he asserts that “The 
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69. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p.165.
70. I am not asserting that the intelligible species exist independent of its subject, 
the possible intellect, as if the intelligible species were an object of cognition.  I do, 
however, want to make a distinction between the proximate cause of understanding [i.e., 
the intelligible species] and the act of understanding, which is the effect. I think 
conflating the intelligible species and the operation that it causes diminishes the formally 
causal role that the intelligible species is intended to serve.
71. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 168.
concept is to the intellect as act to potency.”72 Lastly, he states, “Once one recognizes 
that a concept is related to the intellect as act to potency, it makes very little sense to treat 
intellect and concept as if the intellect is one thing and a concept another thing.” Yet, 
there are no references to St. Thomas’s work stating that the concept is related to the 
intellect as act is potency. Instead, O’Callaghan refers to a passage that read as:
In the human intellect the likeness of the understood thing is something other than 
the substance of the intellect, and it is as a form of it; hence from the intellect and 
the likeness of the thing is made one complete thing, which is the intellect 
understanding in act; and this likeness is received from the thing.73
Nowhere in this passage does Aquinas assert that the likeness is the concept. Moreover, 
in the first response, Aquinas asserts:
To the first, therefore, it ought to be said, that the soul is called the form of forms, 
inasmuch as through the agent intellect, it makes intelligible species in act, and it 
receives them into the possible intellect.74
In other words, that which is received from the thing is the intelligible species in act, not 
the concept. Furthermore, O’Callaghan refers to this text:
And it is necessary that this species, which is the intellect in act, should perfect 
the intellect in potency: from the union of which one perfect thing is brought 
about, which is the intellect in act... Hence just as the soul is not other than man, 
so the intellect in act is not other than the intellect actually understanding, but the 
same thing.75
After citing this text, he states:
Thus, the intelligible in act is the same thing as the intellect actually 
understanding, not a res in anima distinct from it. The concept is the intellect’s 
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72. Ibid.
73. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 3, Q. 3, A. 1, Response: [I]n intellectu vero humano 
similitudo rei intellectae est aliud a substantia intellectus, et est sicut forma ejus; unde ex 
intellectu et similitudine rei efficitur unum completum, quod est intellectus in actu 
intelligens; et hujus similitudo est accepta a re.
74. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 2, D. 3, Q. 3, A. 1, RA 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 
anima dicitur species specierum, inquantum per intellectum agentem facit species 
intelligibiles actu, et recipit eas secundum intellectum possibile.[emphasis added]
75. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 173. [emphasis added]
act.76
However, the text that he cites refers to the intelligible species, not the concept. 
Moreover, twice in this passage Aquinas refers to the what is understood in act, but 
O’Callaghan translates it as intellect in act. Aquinas writes:
It is necessary that this species, which is what is understood in act, perfects the 
intellect in potency: from the union of these is made one perfected thing, which is 
the intellect in act, just as the soul and the body is made one, which is the man 
having human operations. Hence, just as the soul is not something other than the 
man, so the what is understood  in act is not something other than the intellect in 
act understanding, but the same thing.77
The non-restrictive clause “which is what is understood in act” (quae est intellecta in act) 
is referring to“this species” (haec species), and intellecta is a past participle which agrees 
in person and number with haec species, which is also feminine and singular. Similarly,  
intellectum in actu should be translated as “what is understood in act.” The point of the 
analogy is that just as the soul (i.e., form) is related to the body (i.e., matter) and gives 
rise to human operations, so too what is understood in act (i.e., the intelligible species) is 
related to the possible intellect to give rise to an operation, the act of understanding.78
In summation, from a textual standpoint, O’Callaghan asserts that the concept 
should be understood as the act of the intellect, and the nominalization of verbs to 
substantive misleads one into affirming that concepts are things. Moreover, by showing 
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76. O’Callaghan, Thomistic Linguistic Turn, p. 173.
77. Aquinas, Sent, Bk. 1, D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, ad. 3: [O]portet quod haec species, 
quae est intellecta in actu, perficiat intellectum in potentia: ex quorum conjunctione 
efficitur unum perfectum, quod est intellectus in actu, sicut ex anima et corpore efficitur 
unum, quod est homo habens operationes humanas. Unde sicut anima non est aliud ab 
homine, ita intellectum in actu non est aliud ab intellectu intelligente actu, sed idem. 
[emphasis added]
78. Early in his career, Aquinas seems to have adopted Averroes’ nomenclature.  
See footonote 109 on page 112.  Also, in order to avoid a special pleading fallacy, I agree 
that  species intellecta could refer to any intelligible form including the concept.  See 
note 111 on page 169. However, in the present context, the intelligible species is being 
denoted, not the intellect.
that the concepts are related to the intellect as act is to potency, O’Callaghan attempts to 
avoid assigning an ontological status to the concept (i.e., he tries to avoid that concepts 
are third things). However, the texts that he provides to support the notion that the 
concept is an activity of the intellect refer to the intelligible species, not the concept. 
Though I agree that O’Callaghan is correct inasmuch as we nominalize verbs into 
substantives, I do not see any textual evidence that would show that the concept is related 
to the intellect as act is to potency. In other words, there is no textual evidence that would 
allow one to affirm that the concept is an activity in reality. Similarly, the same can be 
said for enunciations and definitions. Moreover, just because the intelligible species has 
an act-potency relationship with the possible intellect, it does not follow that the concept 
does. The concept seems to be something that is produced by the intellect to act as an 
ontological and epistemological basis for enunciations. 
I would agree with O’Callaghan that “that which” is related as act to potency is 
one and not diverse entities. Thus, the reception of the intelligible species into the 
possible intellect produces one operation, the act of understanding. The act of 
understanding is not a thing, but an operation that is performed by the intellect, which 
was Aquinas’s point in the aforementioned passages. If I have understood O’Callaghan 
correctly, then by applying O’Callaghan’s principles, one comes up with a position 
similar to Father Dewan’s position. That is to say, there is preconceptual understanding 
in Aquinas. The concept, the enunciation, and the definition may in fact be activities that 
we nominalize into substantives, but thus far there is no textual evidence that would 
support O’Callaghan’s interpretation. Moreover, as stated earlier, O’Callaghan does not 
apply his method consistently, for he only applies it to intellection.
 As for Father Dewan’s position, I think that he is correct, understanding is an 
activity that happens prior to conceptualization. Dewan maintains Aquinas’ grew in his 
understanding and changed his position as he matured. According to Dewan, the mature 
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Aquinas maintains that understanding occurs when the intelligible species fecunds the 
possible intellect and prior to conceptualization. According to Dewan, Aquinas’s silence 
concerning the mental word (i.e., the concept) in his mature work indicates that 
understanding happens when the intelligible species fecunds the possible intellect, for the 
intelligible species is a means of cognition not an object of cognition.79
The direct realist is correct to assert that Aquinas affirms that we know things, not 
our concepts or sense impressions. Understanding happens prior to conceptualization, 
and therefore, there are no intermediaries that must be known prior to being cognizant of 
the world. Human beings understand particulars via their external and internal senses, 
and they understand the nature of things when the intelligible species is received into the 
intellect. Given that the species are means of cognition and not objects of cognition, it is 
coherent to maintain that Aquinas is a direct realist epistemologically, but one must deny 
that he is a direct realist causally.  By coming to grips with the Aristotelian aporia and by 
his critical study of Averroes’ and Avicenna’s solution, Aquinas is able to synthesize 
what he takes to be the best from these systematic approaches and to create from them his 
unique epistemology that made intellection inherent in the individual. No one in the 
Aristotelian tradition prior to Aquinas was able to make intellection inherent in the 
individual in the way we have seen Aquinas do. Aquinas’s openness to learn from those 
who were not of his faith is a testament to his willingness to seek truth wherever it may 
be found. At times Aquinas pitted himself against the philosophical views of Averroes, 
yet Aquinas refers to Averroes as the commentator over 423 times in his corpus, and he 
refers to Averroes by name 92 times. He refers to Avicenna by name 427. The doctrine of 
intelligible species was not capricious, but the fruit of an insightful and synthesizing 
mind learning from Avicenna and Averroes; it was Aquinas’s attempt to make 
intellection inherent in the human but to avoid what Aquinas considered Avicenna’s and 
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79. See page 28.
Averroes’ errors in their conception of human intellect and the ontological status of 
intelligibles in act.
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